The Qualitative Revolution and Psychology
Science, Politics, and Ethics

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Growing interest in qualitative research methods and methodological pluralism in psychology since the 1990s is placed in the historical contexts of long-standing philosophical and scientific rationales and the more recent “qualitative revolution” in other social sciences that began in the 1970s. An examination of areas in which qualitative methods have become most strongly established—applied, feminist, and multicultural psychologies—suggests practical and social motivations as primary and as energizing renewed expression of previously ignored ontological, epistemological, and scientific reasoning in the turn to qualitative methods. Methodological diversification in the arenas of human suffering, women’s issues, and cultural politics is traced to psychologists’ deeply rooted ethical obligations. The existential philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas articulates an implicit ethics at the heart of psychology’s increasing acceptance of qualitative methods and provides an understanding of how the emerging methodological diversity can contribute to social justice and human liberation as well as to an enhancement of rigorous scientific knowledge.

Qualitative methods have been present through the history of psychology in the work of such seminal researchers as William James, Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslow, and Carl Rogers, to name only a few. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman have used them in their Nobel Prize winning research. Strong rationales and arguments for the use of these methods have been offered by philosophers of science and psychologists since psychology’s founding in 1879. Nevertheless, these methods have been consistently devalued and marginalized in psychology, and advocates have had little success motivating their broad institutionalization. Until recently, there has been no widespread acknowledgement of the value of qualitative methods in the psychology curriculum. An upsurge of interest in these methods has been taking place across the social sciences since the 1960s, but...
psychology has been late to join this movement. Why have sociology and anthropology been more receptive than psychology to the innovation, development, and widespread utilization of qualitative methods, and what has been animating the growing acceptance of these methods over the last fifteen years in an increasingly pluralistic psychological science?

Pioneers, leaders, and educators in the qualitative movement commonly argue that the adoption of qualitative methods is not simply an addition of technical procedures without any change in disciplinary values and goals. Continental philosophers of science, to whose work qualitative researchers in psychology have often appealed in articulating their importance, have emphasized the necessity of adopting a uniquely human science philosophy—both in epistemology and ontology. They have insisted that the subject matter of psychology, in contrast to that of the natural sciences, requires according qualitative research methods a primary place in the discipline. Despite such arguments for over more than a century, mainstream psychologists continued to minimize the scientific value of qualitative methods and to marginalize them in comparison to quantitative methods through most of the twentieth century. These epistemological and ontological rationales do not appear to have been successful in motivating a widespread adoption of qualitative research methods in psychology. I suggest that pragmatic, political, cultural, historical, and most fundamentally ethical interests are at the root of the recent change. Within this context, there has been fresh interest in philosophy and the nature of psychological science, including enlivened attention to the longstanding epistemological and scientific reasoning and justification of qualitative methods.

I approach the topic historically, first touching on the philosophical arguments for qualitative research in the late 19th century. Then I turn to the Gordon Allport’s mid-20th century scientific arguments for the increasingly mainstream adoption of these methods. Next I focus on the qualitative revolution in other social sciences, anthropology and sociology, and articulate its inner sociopolitical motivation. After briefly probing why psychology has not kept pace with these developments in other sciences, I document the recent upsurge of proliferation and institutionalization of the previously marginalized methods. Taking stock of the most prominent areas of the growing acceptance of qualitative methods in psychology reveals a motivation similar to other social sciences—practical and social. The thesis is that sociopolitical motives have been effective where philosophical and scientific arguments alone had failed to bring about an acceptance of qualitative methods. In searching for the unity of these interests and probing them more deeply, I identify a strong ethical concern at the heart of these developments. To better understand the nature of psychology’s ethical commitment and its relationship to the scientific project of true knowledge, I follow the continental philosophical turn from epistemology and ontology to ethics in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. By positioning ethics as first philosophy (i.e., as a foundation for epistemology and ontology) and thereby disclosing the ethical underpinnings of the epistemology and ontology in the human sciences, Levinas helps us understand how ethical desire, in enlivening psychology’s practical and social service, also grounds psychology’s quest for true scientific knowledge in the emerging methodological pluralism. It should be kept in mind that the rise of qualitative methods does not imply the exclusion of quantitative methods, nor that quantitative research may not be motivated by equally deep ethical values. On the contrary, this historical trajectory points to an increasingly inclusive methodological pluralism in a psychology whose values are shared by those using various methods and whose heterogeneous philosophies and unique scientificity may be unified.
At the time when psychology was founded and labs were spreading from Europe across the United States, prominent leaders as different from each other as William Wundt and Franz Brentano held that psychological subject matter uniquely demands methods different from those of the natural sciences. No one saw this more clearly than Wilhelm Dilthey. Before the turn of the century, Dilthey (1894) understood that the method of “theory-deductive-hypothesis-inductive test” is required in physical sciences. Because physical subject matter is external to experience, it requires inferential knowledge, and because the parts of physical nature are external to each other, the laws governing their relations must be constructed by a deductive system. The functional relations of physical variables, which cannot be observed directly, must be inferred by hypotheses and verified by quantitative tests. Dilthey recognized that this way of knowing is neither required nor appropriate in psychology because its subject matter is internal to experience and the constituents of psychological life are intrinsically interrelated and interwoven in mutual dependencies, implications, and interior relations of meaning. Therefore, psychological life requires a way of knowing that is different from that which is required by the physical world: “We explain nature, we understand psychic life” (Dilthey, 1894, p. 27).

Dilthey (1894) insisted that in the Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences), description must play a far more profound role than it does in Naturwissenschaft (natural science). It provides an “unbiased and unmutilated” (p. 51) view of psychological life in its complex wholeness. Interpretive analysis is required to distinguish parts and to grasp their meaningful interrelations within the larger contexts on which they depend. Psychological processes are intelligible by context and cannot be explained by universal laws. Dilthey notes the following intrinsic features of the structural unity of psychological life: teleological development, the role of learning and temporal context, the centrality of motivation and feelings, reciprocity and efficacy in relation to the external world, and the irreducibility of constituents (e.g., cognition, feeling, behavior). Based on these ontological characteristics of psychological life, scientific knowledge requires verstehen (understanding) in contrast to the quantitative, inductive analysis (explanation) required in the physical sciences of nature.

Consistent with Dilthey’s ontology and epistemology, continental thinking in the late 1800s has consistently insisted that physical and psychological realities are different kinds of being and therefore require different ways of knowing through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology; in many German schools of psychology (Giorgi, 2009); and in the existential, hermeneutic, linguistic, constructionist, and narrative turns in the 20th century. Whereas continental philosophers held that qualitative methods must be given priority in the human sciences, where inferential and hypothetico-deductive methods must be accorded a subordinate role, mainstream American psychologists consistently privileged hypothesis testing by quantitative analysis in a hegemonic methodological hierarchy with descriptive and interpretive methods at the bottom. Although a minority of psychologists has consistently argued on scientific grounds, in accordance with advancing 20th century continental thought, for the mainstream acceptance of qualitative methods, these voices were marginalized and had little impact on mainstream psychology (Giorgi, 1970).
In the course of its efforts to improve the quality of research in the social sciences during the 1930s, the Committee on Appraisal of Research of the Social Science Research Council called for a critical review of works in psychology using “personal documents,” defined as “account(s) of individual experience which reveal the individual’s actions as a human agent and as a participant in social life” (Blumer, 1939, cited in Allport, 1942, p. 21). In 1940, Gordon Allport volunteered to critically review psychological works that utilized autobiographies, interviews and other recordings, diaries, letters, expressive and projective creations, and questionnaires. Allport’s investigation, now out of print for more than four decades, provided a comprehensive inventory, analysis, and critique of qualitative research at the time.

Allport focused on psychologists’ use of qualitative methods, including the various types of first person documents, the procedures employed by researchers, and the value of such methods. Allport’s monograph is a passionate, sharp-minded, and intellectually courageous claim of scientific legitimacy for the qualitative research methods and a demand for their greater use in psychology. Allport’s assistant at Harvard, Jerome Bruner, has continued to advocate the use of narrative methods.

Although Allport recognized the brilliant and fruitful use of first person documents by such psychologists as William James and G. Stanley Hall, he found that most psychologists used first-person accounts in an uncritical manner. He was struck by the contrast between the prevalent increase of these methods in clinical case studies and the paucity of sophisticated discussions of their methodology. He called for a journal entirely dedicated to the case study with special attention to its methodology. Allport (1942) found the advent of critical use, a “motley array of studies, but in every case interesting” to have taken place between 1920 and 1940 (p. 36). He reported numerous psychological topics and goals including the practical, theoretical, interdisciplinary, and psychometric. Allport’s rationale for the legitimacy of these methods was primarily scientific: They prevent science from running “an artificial course,” accurately account for subjective meaning, and provide a “touchstone of reality” (p. 184). He found qualitative research to be useful not merely or primarily in providing hypotheses to be tested by behavioral observation and measurement, nor limited to illustrating knowledge previously validated by statistical procedures. The most important role of qualitative research, he concluded, resides in the process of discovery and its capability to fulfill the goals of objective psychological science. Allport also asserted that qualitative methods are uniquely capable of validating quantitatively established knowledge.

Allport outlined and addressed the criticisms against qualitative research and showed that many were irrelevant, trivial, and false. Moreover, he suggested that the genuine problems in applying such methods can be addressed by critical reflection and modifications within their use. He argued that their actual limits are no more absolute and scientifically problematic than those of quantitative and experimental methods. Allport elaborated a host of ways that validity is established. He contended that the validity of qualitative knowledge may rightfully exceed reliability or observer agreement in that various insights, even though different, can be equally valid. Allport held that psychological knowledge from multiple perspectives leads to greater truth. His conclusion was that bold and radical innovation in research using personal documents should be encouraged in conjunction with the exploration of alternative ways of writing reports, of organizing data, of validation, of prediction, and of interpretation.
Challenging the received methodological hierarchy, Allport (1942) wrote: ‘‘Strong counter-measures are indicated against theorists who damn the personal document with faint praise, saying that its sole merit lies in its capacity to yield hunches or to suggest hypotheses. . . . They fail to express more than a small part of the value of personal documents for social science’’ (p. 191).

Allport’s recommendations had little influence on the course of 20th century psychology. Reviewing the history of psychology since its scientific founding, Giorgi (1970) discovered, in virtually every period, numerous criticisms of psychology that have the common root in the discipline’s unquestioned adoption of the natural science approach. The protests documented by Giorgi had little to no impact on mainstream psychology through the 1970s. Around the same time, Kenneth Gergen (1973) argued that, unlike physics, psychological theory is history- and culture-bound; he questioned the appropriateness of seeking universally true knowledge. Gergen advocated practices of narrative interpretation that are more similar to studies in literature, history, and journalism. Polkinghorne (1983) provided an overview of diverse research methods, articulating various empiricist and qualitative methodologies and calling attention to the importance and value of the latter in view of their philosophical and scientific virtues. However, psychology has lagged behind other social sciences, which began the vigorous development and mainstreaming of qualitative methods in the 1970s that has culminated in a virtual methodological revolution in these disciplines.

**REVOLUTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

A distinguished tradition of qualitative research in such disciplines as anthropology and sociology is exemplified in the Chicago School of Sociology, which has thrived since the 1920s. Malinowski suggested that ethnographer’s goal should be grasping the ‘‘native’s point of view’’ (1922, cited in Tedlock, 2000, p. 457). Anthropologists Boas, Mead, Benedict, Bateson, Evans-Prichard, Radcliffe-Brown, and Malinowski developed qualitative fieldwork methods. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) note that this generative tradition has extended into education, history, political science, women’s studies, literary studies, business, medicine, nursing, social work, law, industrial and civil engineering, and communications. Psychology is conspicuously absent from their far-reaching list!

Over the past three decades, a ‘‘qualitative revolution,’’ which some observers consider ‘‘nothing short of amazing,’’ has profoundly transformed the social sciences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. ix). There has been an explosion of new journals, scientific associations, conferences, textbooks, prolific publications, workshops, training materials, computer software programs for data management and analysis, university courses, and faculty positions. The common core is a commitment to understand the world contextually from the point of view of the acting subject through rich everyday language and a broad range of other expressive vehicles. An examination of the rise of these new methods locates their origins less in the long-standing philosophical and scientific arguments expressed by Dilthey, Allport, Giorgi, and Gergen, and more in political interests in persistent unsolved practical problems, gender inequities, and cultural conflicts. This is not to say that previous philosophical considerations and scientific interests have not been involved in these changes, but they took on a new character in context of extrascientific challenges in the postmodern Zeitgeist. In historical accounts of these events, practical and social
concerns appear to be primary in a radical shift from the goal of disinterested objective knowledge of universal laws to the goal of emancipatory social change.

The qualitative revolution has been led by ethnography in anthropology and sociology, where scientists recognized how the dominant trends in Euro-American society conflict with such marginalized human beings as women, Americans in lower socioeconomic strata, stigmatized ethnicities, and third- and fourth-world peoples. In the course of the 20th century, these peoples—once the objects of scientific inquiry—have asserted their subjectivities, voices, and power, challenging and divesting the scientific investigators of their privileged position. Scholars of color began to protest not only racism and its social consequences but the nature of truth, reality, and science, from that standpoint of excluded minorities. These new voices were echoing those of marginalized philosophers and scientists that had been falling on deaf ears, but with a social, rather than primarily intellectual, force. In the face of increasingly empowered liberation movements, the hegemonic authority of traditional scientific methods began to give way to previously marginalized and silenced ways of knowing that asserted an equal and even superior value.

The History of Anthropology and Sociology

Vidich and Lyman (2000) provide an illuminating history of this disciplinary change in anthropology and sociology. Before its historical professionalization, atheoretical anthropological studies were provided by missionaries, explorers, buccaneers, and colonial administrators who embodied the confidence of the conquering civilization. During the 15th and 16th centuries, Westerners became interested in the origin of culture and civilizations in the New World and the South Seas. The conqueror ideology was eventually replaced by an evolutionary framework, in which history was conceptualized as steady progress leading to its highest point in the current successful dominance of Western culture. Vidich and Lyman dramatically document how the decolonizing, liberation movements in Africa and Asia during the 20th century led ethnographers to question and eventually to abandon the colonial and evolutionary viewpoints. By the 1960s, postcolonial arguments against Western ethnocentrism and its derogation of the "primitive" had produced a radical revolution in social thought (Vidich & Lyman, 2000).

A movement from dehumanization to emancipation took place in the twentieth century. Vidich and Lyman (2000) recount how, in the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair, Samuel Phillips Ver- ner showcased Ota Benga, a pygmy from the Belgian Congo, as a specimen of primitive humanity. He was then, in 1905, placed on exhibit in the Bronx Zoo’s monkey house. In 1911, Alfred Kroeber (an anthropologist) exhibited Ishi, the last survivor of the Yahi tribe, in the Museum of Anthropology of the University of California, where he died in two years. During the same period, sociologists focused on the process of civilizing the Native American population and acculturating urban ghetto populations of African Americans, as well as Asian and European immigrants, to the Protestant-based moral values of American society (Vidich & Lyman, 2000). Sociological research was guided by the ideology of the melting pot (competition and conflict giving way to accommodation and finally assimilation). However, by the 1960s, social research in urban settings—the Jewish ghetto, Chinatown, Harlem, hobo jungles, single room occupancies, gangs of teen agers—began to show the assimilation ideology to be futile (Vidich & Lyman, 2000). Powerful countermovements among marginalized peoples resisted
melting into the dominant culture and demanded a reconsideration of assimilation theory and an acknowledgment of the lack of sociologists’ understanding of America’s persistent race problems. In response, a disciplinary revolution began in the early 1970s. From 1970 to 1990, critiques and reforms of sociology and anthropology flourished. Their illustrative culmination may be seen in the eventual demands to return Amerindian museum holdings to Native Americans as an acknowledgment of their right to repossess their own culture. Strong protests against Eurocentric biases streamed forth with uncontested truth and justification. Vidich and Lyman insightfully locate the 1980s’ revitalization of qualitative scientific research in this emancipatory social movement. The political demand to honor multiple traditions and various indigenous points of view has animated the development of the methodological pluralism that now prevails. Scientists across a broad range of social disciplines increasingly immersed themselves in lives of diverse subject populations with the aim of deep understanding by means of various contextually sensitive, reflexive, self-critical methods (Vidich & Lyman, 2000). This transformation of scientific research methods in attempts to understand the meaning realities of those studied has continued to take quantum leaps forward in the last decade.

A Crisis of Authority in Science

These historical events were complemented and cross-fertilized by parallel reforms in the humanities, including the continuing voices of such continental philosophers as the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school and the poststructural analyst of social power Michel Foucault. The ferment led a growing realization in the academic circles of humanities and social disciplines that science is power and that there is no value-free inquiry. Research became viewed as entailing an implicit political agenda, an ideology, with differential benefit. The perspective of conqueror was revealed in early anthropology just as the Calvinistic mission of saving the immigrants’ souls was seen in sociology (Vidich & Lyman, 2000). As these ideologies fell, the scientific search for universal laws unified in grand theories became viewed as a dangerous imperialism that would benefit the powerful at the cost of the weak. Far-reaching methodological pluralism grew out of research aimed at helping disempowered peoples determine their own destiny by actively participating in and controlling the way they are studied. Research found new ways to honor diverse subjectivities that had previously been excluded from science practice.

There is a crisis of authority in the human sciences. Whose perspective will be privileged? Because perspective (including values and power) is part and parcel of human science, social science researchers have come to openly acknowledge and critically examine the interests that are served, as well as those interests that are opposed or ignored, by research. New questions arise about the consumers of research. Who is the audience of science? For whom is the research; who benefits? The suspicion has arisen and the accusation voiced that much research primarily benefits the researchers’ academic careers and establishments. Some social scientists reformed research as a two-way conversation with an emancipatory aim rather than continuing the disinterested verification of investigators’ theories. The objects of research have become viewed as subjects, as legitimate stakeholders in the institution of science, sometimes even assuming the role of co-creators of research who disrupt and end the imperialistic privileges of the traditional Euro-American scientific monologue.
These revolutionary methods often have an explicitly democratic, social action mandate. Research is created for and by participants. A critical reflexivity in research now asks who controls the study, who determines its topics, questions, findings, interpretation, and consequences. Scientists are allowing members of the community to take a greater role in what becomes a genuine partnership between scientist and nonscientist that fosters an emancipation and empowerment of the nonscientist (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Prolonged social engagement and collaboration in research methods are mandated as an antidote to the objectivistic verification of abstract theory, which in social reality amounts to an indifferent project of exploitation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A qualitative revolution has moved scientists away from the hegemonic goal of the mathematization of nature toward understanding the meanings and goals of ordinary people as expressed in everyday language and other cultural media.

Focus on Power Transforms Philosophy of Science

New epistemologies and research methods have emerged from previously silenced groups. For instance, there has been a call for “studies of Whiteness from the standpoint of color...a critical, counter-hegemonic presence in the research” (Olesen, 2000, p. 220). Inventing and prioritizing such methods, scientists have encouraged excluded persons’ speech to break through the silence imposed by the abstract formulae and calculations of scientific elite. “Standpoint” (e.g., Black feminist) research (Olesen, 2000) has moved social science away from the goal of universal knowledge, which is viewed as politically totalitarian. Research is no longer aimed at producing an idle collection of knowledge, but is a practice that is responsible for bringing about a freer and more genuinely democratic society. The scientist has become an advocate for those studied. In participatory research, participants, themselves, have served as researchers who are accorded the right of freedom of speech, self-representation, and ownership of data in the research process. Participants are allowed to provide input into or comment on interpretations, even to assume the position of an author of research reports. In feminist-communitarian research (Denzin, 1997), participants have an equal say in what is studied, how research is conducted—the methods, findings, validation, application, and consequences of study. As moral values are reinstated, science appears to become subordinated to political power. It will become clear in the following, however, that what may cynically appear to be reducible to sheer political power play and ideology, when cast in the light of an ethically grounded epistemology, may be better understood as an obligation required by authentic human scientific knowledge.

Multiple Viewpoints

Research no longer aims at establishing perspective-free, value-free facts. There is no single theory or paradigm. A panoply of social theories include constructivism, critical theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, cultural studies, semiotics, phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, narrative theory, and psychoanalysis. Where theories, hypotheses, measurements, and quantitative analyses of experts once prevailed, the nonscientist is now privileged. For instance, the two-ness of American Blacks, originally described by W. E. B. DuBois, has been epistemologically empowered by Lewis (1993) as a capacity to see farther and deeper, with heightened validity. A Chicana feminist epistemology focuses on reality with heightened ethnic
sensitivities (e.g., Espin, 1996). Alterity, once excluded, has been accorded a perspective advantage capable of reversing political, economic, educational disadvantage. Marginalized views have been applauded as offering a valid “wide angle vision” (Ladson-Billings, 2000, p. 262). Scientists are returning to everyday situations—to homes and workplaces—with methods enabling them to hear the others’ voices (Ladson-Billings, 2000).

This revolutionary new science is methodologically pluralistic. There is no privileged gold standard research method, no hegemonic methodological hierarchy. Received quantitative methods are employed alongside interviewing, participant observation, visual methods, interpretive analysis, personal experience, introspection, intensive self-reflection, gathering artifacts, reading in archives, and conversational analysis. Investigators self-critically choose from among multiple research traditions: neo-positivism, neo-pragmatism, ethnography, case study, phenomenology, grounded theory, biographical, historical, participatory, collaborative, action, clinical, performance, standpoint, prophetic, and postmodern. Participants often select the research topic, the questions asked, the direction and construction and collection of data, and even challenge each other in a “horizontal interaction” (Madriz, 2000, p. 840). Self disclosure, consciousness-raising, and transformation of both the researched and researcher may be included in the research process. The result is new kind of plural, multivocal knowledge.

The emphasis on values, power, and the perspectives of nonscientists also challenges and reverses the traditional scheme in which pure science precedes and guides applied research and practice. Research is viewed by many as fundamentally pragmatic; knowledge is subordinated to and derived from practical aims. Clinical research addresses life problems and interventions of all sorts—e.g., for heart attack survival, cancer prevention, and smoking cessation. Research questions emerge from clinical (often the patient’s) experience, and ownership of the research is shared with participants, undermining the dichotomy of the knowing expert and the diagnosed/treated patients that pervaded traditional practice settings (Miller & Crabtree, 2000). The voices of those receiving services have taken center stage in research that features their experience, for instance in nursing, primary health care, specialized medical care, administration and management, education, social work, family therapy, mental health care, public health, engineering, and law (Miller & Crabtree, 2000).

**PSYCHOLOGY’S RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AS A NATURAL SCIENCE**

Why has psychology, given its focus on human experience, not played a leading role in this revolution? Nothing has been more effective in psychology’s disciplinary success than its natural scientific status. In contrast to such other social sciences as history, anthropology, and sociology, psychologists are able to randomly assign units of their subject matter to experimental conditions, to manipulate variables, and to measure outcomes. Functional analysis is more feasible in the case of individual humans than in that of the subject matters of other social sciences—such as historical periods, cultures, and societies. Powerful institutions place high value on, accord privilege to, and reward research using methods that have achieved such tangible success in natural science and technology. By employing research methods of natural science, university departments of psychology have built laboratories, funded graduate assistants, and won economic support or research that is the exclusive privileges of the science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics (STEM) disciplines. Psychology’s aspiration to be a STEM discipline has always been strong and continues to become stronger.

Psychology’s longstanding resistance to methodological pluralization, and especially the suppression of qualitative inquiry, maintains the field’s identity as a natural science. From the naturalistic standpoint of policy makers, funding agencies, and psychology’s academic establishment, a research focus on subjective meaning suggests soft humanities, rather than hard sciences. The qualitative revolution in other social sciences has involved an influx of such humanitarian research practices as conversation, interpretation, narrative, and even artistic expression and performance. The qualitative revolution, which has opened the door to fiction, storytelling, poetry, film, theater, spiritual expression, photography and forms of criticism, has broken down the boundaries between the sciences and the humanities, arts, and even religions, from which psychology has long attempted to distinguish itself. Disciplines that embrace this revolution risk sliding down a slippery slope, far away from the traditional scientific identity. Social scientists in the qualitative movement risk appearing indistinguishable from humanists and artists. Interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and counter-disciplinary trends involving humanities undermine the hegemony of natural science, which remains a powerful beneficiary of our society’s resources. The qualitative revolution, inasmuch as it risks transforming psychology’s disciplinary identity, threatens the discipline’s cultural power and economic well-being.

Psychology’s relationship with social and economic conditions is exemplified by its battle with managed health care. The market success of clinical psychology is jeopardized by insurance and managed care organizations, which benefit from the elimination of unproven services. It behooves psychologists to assert the efficacy of their interventions using the authority of science. Early in the managed care crisis, the American Psychological Association’s (APA) Council of Representatives’ adopted, by nearly unanimous vote, the “Template for Developing Guidelines: Interventions for Mental Disorders” (APA, 1995). This template, conceived and written by experts in the area of scientific research methodology, made the randomized controlled trials (RCTs) the prime method for determinant effective treatment. Clinician’s wisdom and experience, all forms of qualitative research, theoretical and philosophical reflection, critical social theory, and the preferences of consumers were relegated to a low priority or left out of consideration altogether. In the same year, the APA Division 12 (Clinical Psychology) Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures identified 18 empirically validated treatments (EVTs) that met the RCT criteria and could be implemented by a manual (Chambless et al., 1996). To do good, professional psychology has depended on its scientific status as a key political and economic strategy.

Societal values are reflected in the esteem accorded to natural science and technology, with its emphasis on objectification, prediction and control and the myth of its universal applicability. There is a strong belief that natural science knowledge and practice is the panacea for human suffering (see Fishman, 1999), and this belief is assumed by powerful interests such as the health care industry, including drug companies with their strong lobbies. A psychology that defines itself by means of less dominant, even counter-cultural currents that emphasize the meanings experienced by individual persons, risks cultural marginalization and a loss of economic feasibility. Barlow (1996) expresses the situation well:

Arguments about philosophy, although popular in academic circles, are unlikely to affect Congress or health care policymakers at every level of government who long ago made the decision that health
care professionals must be accountable and demonstrate that what they do works. Furthermore, whether it is NIH, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, the National Institute of Education, or the Food and Drug Administration, these rules of evidence have been well worked out and rely on empirical demonstrations of relief of dysfunction or enhancement of functioning. It is unlikely that they would make an exception for psychotherapy. Although methods of evaluating psychotherapy are flawed and subject to considerable improvement...anti-science arguments have not been, and will not be, influential. (pp. 1052–1053)

A psychology not strictly and unequivocally modeled on natural science risks a loss of credibility and privilege as a service provider.

REVOLUTION IN PSYCHOLOGY

In the closing decade of the 20th century, the increasing presence of such countervailing and antiestablishment social movements as pragmatism, feminism, and multiculturalism have begun to institutionalize the qualitative movement in mainstream psychology, where the voices of philosophers and human science psychologists had hitherto remained an excluded minority. New psychological journals, textbooks, course curricula, professional organizations, and conferences have been devoted to qualitative research methods. Journal editors, seasoned researchers, instructors, practitioners, and even funding agencies are becoming knowledgeable about these methods and learning how they fit together with quantitative methods in a new methodological pluralism. Marecek, Fine, and Kidder (1997) documented the spread of qualitative research methods in the United States, following the lead of countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and countries in continental Europe. The American Psychological Association recently published a handbook on qualitative methods by Camic, Rhodes, and Yardley (2003). Qualitative Methods in Psychology has become the largest section of the British Psychological Society, with more than 1000 members. Its aim is to raise the profile of qualitative research methods in psychology research and teaching.

In 2008, Kenneth Gergen, Ruthellen Josselson, and Mark Freeman assembled a petition of 863 members of the American Psychological Association to establish a new division of qualitative inquiry in the APA (see Wertz et al., 2011). The initiative won strong support from divisions in the areas of counseling (17); theory and philosophy (24); humanism (32); women (35); psychoanalysis (39); and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered issues (44). Additional support came from industrial organizational (14), psychotherapy (29), religion (36), health (38), family (43), ethnic minority issues (45), media (46), group psychology and psychotherapy (49), and men and masculinity study (51). Although the majority of APA’s Council of Representatives did not vote for the new division, APA Division 5—Evaluation, Measurement and Statistics—welcomed the qualitative psychologists to join it as a section called the Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology (SQIP), and would promote both qualitative and quantitative methods. Psychologists on the SQIP e-mail list, now numbering 1,300, are joining Division 5 and making this prestigious and centrally positioned organization more pluralistic.

An examination of the areas in which qualitative methods have been instituted informs us of psychologists’ motivation to expand their methodology. Qualitative methods have been
successfully introduced in applied areas such as counseling, and educational and industrial psychology, where a holistic and contextual understanding of the individual’s first-person experience facilitates effective problem solving. Progressive political and practical interests, especially among women and persons of diverse ethnicities, have also led to a qualitative movement that is gaining tremendous momentum. In one of the first textbooks on qualitative methods, Hayes (1997) confirms practicality, women’s concerns, and ethics as underlying a shift from quantitative to qualitative research methods. The areas of professional practice, feminism, and multicultural psychology, which have resided at the discipline’s margins, far from its pure science core, are all interdisciplinary and tend to focus on social, rather than the strictly biological, issues, making them conversant with fields such as sociology, anthropology, and even the humanities, which have been promoting qualitative methods for some time.

Challenges of Professional Practice: Presence of Social Problems and Human Suffering

Strong arguments that parallel the paradigm shift called for by Amedeo Giorgi (1970) and Kenneth Gergen (1973) have arisen in applied psychology, where the presumed antinomy of the values of rigor and relevance in research is most pressing. Fishman (1999) documents this history by showing how the long-standing, enlightenment-modernist promise of increasing social progress through the expansion of natural science methods and the rational application of universal laws was questioned during the turbulent 1960s. He recounts how, by the 1970s, psychology’s delivery on the promise of objective answers and effective solutions to the complex, ambiguous problems of the social world became viewed as at best scant and as insufficient to justify its huge funding resources (Fishman, 1999, p. 3). Fishman depicts beleaguered practitioners caught between irrelevant, ineffective guidance from mainstream science and more promising practices that are suggested by experientially based reflection, not yet supported by a naturalistic research. The exclusive reliance on natural scientific methods of quantification and laboratory experimentation that had dominated psychology between 1879 and 1960 and that had marginalized methods from the humanities, field research, introspection, and self report, were not achieving their utopian promise. Critiques of positivism developed independently in both postpositivist Anglo-American philosophy and the continental European phenomenological, hermeneutic, and poststructural philosophies that converged with practitioners’ lament that the great experiment of applying natural science methods to complex social problems was a failure, indeed that the overdependence on theory-testing and the lack of more context-sensitive methods close to real world situations was the cause of that failure. In evaluation research, new, holistic methods that are responsive to the concerns of multiple stake-holders have drawn fruitfully on qualitative traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and pragmatism. New uses of verbal data and more reflective analytic procedures have begun to flourish in applied areas of psychology.

Complex problems in the social world have influenced psychologists to consider using and educating future professionals in contextually sensitive qualitative methods. The origin of one of the first textbooks on qualitative research methods, edited by Kopala and Suzuki (1999), is in applied psychology, motivated by the demands of professional practitioners. Kopala and
Suzuki were cochairs of the Special Interest Group on Qualitative Methods in Teaching and Research in APA’s Society for Counseling Psychology. The formation of this group followed repeated discussions in the Society’s executive committee meetings about the need for a comprehensive text on qualitative methods. Further evidence of the rising motivation of field problems and pragmatic professional interests is the disproportionate growth and acceptance of qualitative research methods in psychology’s professional schools, in comparison with that of arts and sciences departments including their undergraduate psychology curricula. Qualitative research methods are flourishing in professional schools of industrial-organizational psychology, counseling psychology, and educational psychology. Weinberg and Gould (2007) consider the growth of qualitative research methods to be one of the three most important contemporary developments that will shape the future of sport and exercise psychology.

In the last two decades, clear evidence of a spreading qualitative research movement appears in virtually every practice area where it has encompassed researchers, faculty, and students of all stripes. Scholarly articles tracking this “tectonic change” (O’Neill, 2002, p. 190) have appeared in the full range of professional areas including industrial-organizational (Cassell & Symon, 2006), counseling (Hoyt & Bhati, 2007), educational (Butler, 2006; Shank, 1994), school (Michell, 2004), health (Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, & Liamputtong, 2007; Hodges, Hernandez, Pinto, & Uzzell, 2007; Yardley, 2000), clinical child (Krahn, Holn, & Kime, 1995), community (Bayard & Miller, 1998), evaluation (Mark, 2002), sport and exercise (Weinberg & Gould, 2007), and general professional psychology (Goldman, 1993).

The area of clinical psychology has been the most resistant to qualitative methods as it has gone head-to-head with psychiatry by pitting psychotherapies against medication in RCTs. The evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP) movement has grown out of responses of psychologists to the “Template” (APA, 1995) and APA Division of Clinical Psychology’s effort to limit therapy to EVTs (Chambless et al., 1996). In the decade following the Template, there was intense effort to overcome the restriction of clinical psychology to a narrow list of manualized treatments that are empirically validated by strictly experimental research (RCTs). Inclusive dialogue culminated in a consensus document produced by the APA Presidential Task Force on Empirically Based Practice (2006) that explicitly broadens the boundaries of science and acceptable forms of evidence to include qualitative research, case studies, and even clinical observation. This document, drawing heavily on quantitative clinical research, documents the movement from the attempt to designate empirically supported treatments (ESTs) to EBPP, which places the person at the center of science and practice (APA Task Force on Evidenced Based Practice, 2006). “ESTs start with the treatment and asks whether it works for a certain disorder... EBPP starts with the patient and asks what kind of evidence (including relevant results from RCTs) will assist the psychotherapist in achieving the best outcome” (p. 273). The report documents the historical advances in psychology that have expanded the procedures of science so as to include multiple research designs and methods as well as the valuing of multiple forms of evidence as a basis for practice. “Qualitative research can be used to describe the subjective experience of people, including participants in psychotherapy” (APA Task Force on Evidenced Based Practice, 2006, p. 274). The document, which calls for mutual respect, open communication, and a collaborative relationship with patients, repeatedly emphasizes that “EBPP involves consideration of the patient’s values, religious beliefs, worldviews, goals, and preferences for treatment” (p. 278). Rather than rigidly maintaining the traditional
methodological hierarchy, this document explicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of a debate among scientists about the relative weight of different forms of evidence and advocates a broadened and variegated evidentiary scientific basis for practice.

Perhaps the central message of the task force report—and one of the most heartening aspects of the process that led to it—is the consensus achieved among a diverse group of scientists, clinicians, and scientist-clinicians from multiple perspectives that EBPP requires an appreciation of the value of multiple sources of scientific evidence. . . . Psychologists of good faith and good judgment may disagree about how to best weigh different forms of evidence. (APA Task Force on Evidenced Based Practice, 2006, p. 280)

Wendt and Slife (2007) quickly revealed and challenged the continuing favoritism toward positivistic research methodology in this document and called for the EBPP movement’s explicit affirmation of the philosophical diversity required to achieve the aim of a more inclusive evidentiary base in a clinical psychology supported by methodological pluralism. Professional practice values and motivations have opened the way for qualitative research methods, followed by reinvigorated philosophical and scientific arguments supporting them.

Challenges of Feminism: Increasing Presence of the Other Gender

Since the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s, feminists’ social concerns have become engaged across the full spectrum of academic disciplines. Women have increasingly entered the sciences, including mainstream psychology, where they have introduced new issues of concern to women, included females as participants in research, and contributed new empirical and theoretical knowledge. Grossman et al. (1997) have demonstrated how the goals of illuminating the lives of women and girls, giving voice to marginalized women, and reflecting feminist values in research entail a critique of psychology that focuses on its research methods and has led to the introduction of qualitative methods and a growing methodological pluralism in feminist psychology. Mary Gergen (2001) tracked the movement of feminist psychological researchers, some of whom adopted mainstream quantitative methods that were previously the privilege of men, in their battle with sexism in psychology. Gergen notes that other feminist researchers have resisted the dominance of experimental methods, with their manipulations and deceptions, over qualitative methods. They have developed and asserted the value of new modes of inquiry that they consider to be more respectful of persons. These researchers have opposed the “patriarchal” orientation in which “the researcher is master and the subjects are servants within the research design” (Gergen, 2001, p. 20). In Gergen’s view, the tendency of feminist psychologists to use quantitative methods has weakened in recent years as a shift from empiricism to feminine standpoint research has occurred. “Feminist standpoint psychologists are much more favorably inclined toward qualitative work, which is better designed to respect the integrity of personal narratives than analytical investigations” (Gergen, 2001, pp. 28–29).

Feminist psychologists have asserted that a psychology sensitive to women’s interests requires more than increasing the number of women in the role of researcher and more than merely testing hypotheses with received research methods on female populations. Women’s
research requires new ways of knowing, new approaches and new methods of science. According to Crawford and Kimmel (1999),

Feminists have expressed dissatisfaction with traditional psychological methods for good reason, and this dissatisfaction goes beyond simply eliminating the biases that pervade the traditional research process. However useful traditional methods may be in answering certain kinds of important feminist questions, other questions need to be addressed—questions about women’s lived experiences, how we think about our lives and ourselves, about the meanings of events and relationships in our lives, and how we differ in our constructions and interactions in the world—and such questions simply cannot be answered with old fashioned methods. (p. ix)

Feminists have been criticizing positivist science since the 1970s. Some radical feminists have “condemned science as incorrigible” (Crawford & Kimmel, 1999, p. 1), whereas other feminist scholars have continued to employ traditional scientific methods.

Feminist psychologists have developed and promoted the spread of qualitative research methods as part of the growing methodological pluralism in feminist psychology. Carol Gilligan’s (1982) research on women’s moral development has attracted great attention. Although her mentor Kohlberg (1958) employed excellent qualitative methods in developing his developmental theory of moral reasoning, he did not assert and develop his innovative methodological advances. Gilligan, especially in her collaboration with Lynn Brown and other colleagues, has developed interview-based research methods—voice-centered methods with explicit guides for listening on the part of researchers—that have been applied and extended to a wide array of psychological subject areas. These methods have proven to be of great value not only for women’s issues but in study with persons marginalized by their age, economic position, geographic location, and ethnicity (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Taylor, Gilligan, & Sullivan, 1995).

Methodological advances in feminist psychology are well exemplified in the excellent interview based research led by Mary Belenky on women's ways of knowing (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tartule, 1986). Among these, for instance, they traced silenced knowing on the part of some adult women to prior experiences of neglect and abuse in their families as well as to impoverished, extended social environments that did not offer opportunities for empowering girls’ and women’s speech as they developed. Belenky and her colleagues continued to study women’s ways of knowing in grassroots community contexts, neighborhood centers for women called public homeplaces, and to probe their potential for nurturing human development, empowerment, and social solidarity (Belenky, 1996; Belenky, Bond, & Weinstock, 1997). This research has produced valuable new psychological knowledge and its qualitative methods have contributed to strengthening the research participants’ sense of agency and activism in their families and communities, empowering them to positively transform the very oppressive social conditions revealed in the research.

Michelle Fine’s (1992) leadership in feminist research is exemplary. Through her participatory action research, she has contributed to the development and spread of qualitative methods. She noted that the incongruity between feminist social interests and mainstream psychology has led some women in academic positions to depart from psychology altogether and pursue social activism. In contrast, she chronicles her own work as a feminist researcher who has been consistently committed to developing methods beyond the laboratory that are able to probe the power asymmetries and meanings of women’s lived experience in contextually sensitive ways
(Fine, 1992). She has studied women's psychology in such naturalistic situations as school, physical disabilities, and sexual victimization. In her research, science and political activism have merged, and she has consistently challenged feminist psychologists to move from behind the walls of the academies into politically engaged research praxis. Her work has highlighted the interconnection between individual experience and political life, not only of women but of ethnic and sexual minorities. Like Belenky’s, her research has been knowledge-producing, socially critical, recuperative, and transformative of the lives of marginalized persons. In her foundation-funded, mixed-methods research about the impact of a college program on a women’s prison population, Fine invited both graduate students and prisoners to join the research team. The prisoners adopted positions of both researchers and research participants from the beginning of the project and were co-authors of the final research report (Fine et al., 2001). This research demonstrates the value of collaboration between professional psychologists and those outside of psychology in the process of research.

The performative research methods introduced in psychology by Mary Gergen (2001) represent one of the further reaches of the expanding methodological pluralism in psychology. Traditionally limited to fine arts, theatrical presentations have been developed as psychological research methods, leading to a “breakdown in the assumption of traditional science that language is an accurate reflection of reality” (Gergen, 2001, p. 167). Although the boundary between science and art may appear to be blurred in such innovative methods, performative psychology introduces new paradigms for science in which roles of the researcher, the researched, the reviewer, and even the audience become more fluid. Gergen asserts the valuable ways in which such methods integratively incorporate bodily, affective, intellectual and social processes in an “expansion of the range or possibilities for producing, interpreting, and displaying psychological research. Visual images, dance, poetry, role play, music, drama, and sounds, among other means, expand the rhetorical strength of the performance and allow the actors and audience to work intuitively as well as logically” (Gergen, 2001, p. 169). Psychology not only becomes closer to everyday lived experience in its research and theorizing but is also able to reach out, with its explorations and insights, to more diverse and broader public audiences.

The feminist origins of the contemporary motivation and legitimation of qualitative research in psychology may be seen in mainstream developmental texts (Brown, Debold, Tappan, & Gilligan, 1991) and in other mainstream venues that are influencing psychology broadly, such as APA’s handbook on qualitative research methods (Camic et al., 2003), which features Gilligan’s Listening Guide method (Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg, & Bertsch, 2003) and Fine’s participatory action research methods (Fine et al., 2003). These advances have great potential implications for the field’s disciplinary identity. As women’s issues continue to be a broad societal concern and as women psychologists link with the radical feminist theorists and philosophers in a growing self-consciously postmodern movement, qualitative methods are gaining wider acceptance. The socio-cultural participation of women psychologists, as new generations converse with the feminist epistemological and methodological advances and interdisciplinary developments, is likely to continue to energize and transform the qualitative movement in psychology. The research of such feminists as Fine, Gilligan, and Belenky has not limited itself to issues of gender on the part of women but has characteristically taken up issues of ethnicity and class, focusing more broadly on the psychology of disempowered persons with methods that allow for the fuller expression of marginalized voices in psychology. As a part of the larger democratic movement emancipating oppressed peoples with the aim of social justice, the
animation of this trend in psychology is bearing increasing resemblance to the astonishing
“qualitative revolution” in psychology’s sister social sciences and the humanities.

**Challenges of Multiculturalism and Globalism: The Presence of Ethnic Others**

Qualitative psychology has been recognized as a *movement*. Ponterotto (2002), from his perspective as an international leader in the growing field of multicultural psychology, has called the qualitative research orientation “the fifth force” (p. 394) and has predicted a disciplinary shift toward a qualitative research paradigm in the future of psychology. Multicultural psychologists have held, like feminists and other social scientists studying cultures, that to truly know different peoples, psychology must not simply find ways to test hypotheses on additional populations, even hypotheses that are more sensitive to them. Rather, respecting individuals from different cultures means honoring their indigenous points of view, including their own epistemological traditions, and allowing the full subjectivity of their experience to influence the way psychology is practiced. These previously excluded populations offer ways of knowing that differ fundamentally from Western scientific practices. The adoption of qualitative methods by multicultural psychologists is well illustrated in the recent APA publication on qualitative methods by the chapter on ethnographic methods (Miller, Hengst, & Wang, 2003), where the non-Western methodological developments of sociology and anthropology are self-consciously imported into psychology. Miller et al. (2003) note that the recent renewal of interest in cultural psychology makes timely the importation of qualitative ethnographic methods in a discipline that is otherwise dominated by positivism. In contrast with traditional hypothesis-testing, the ethnographic researcher engages extensively with research participants and deliberately learns from them how to shape research methods. Utilizing not measurement but *thick description*, ethnography interprets participants’ experiences within their own frame of reference. In view of what situations mean to participants, the ethnographer develops a holistic understanding. The rise of such qualitative research methods in cultural and multicultural psychology has been documented in mainstream journals by Kral and Burkhardt (2002), Ponterotto (2002), and Ratner (2008). Textbooks and handbooks in multicultural psychology are now including qualitative research methods (Lyons & Bike, 2010) and mixed methods (Plano Clark & Wang, 2010).

Qualitative research methods have dramatically emerged and play a central role in the emerging indigenous psychologies. Psychologists in non-Western countries, many educated in the United States and Britain, have become increasingly critical of the importation of Western psychology to their places of origin. They have asserted the need to develop different research methods, theories, and practices that reflect the traditions, ways of knowing, and self understandings of their own cultures. With the charismatic leadership of Virgilio Enriquez (1992), *Sikolohiyang Pilipino* (Filipino psychology) became a national movement in the Philippines (Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006). Such developments around the globe were initially reported in an edited volume by Kim and Berry (1993) and have been rapidly spreading and gaining attention through the first decade of the new century in Australia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Columbia, France, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, New Guinea, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela (Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006, p. xv). Allwood and Berry (2006) invited psychologists from more than a dozen countries to report on their indigenous psychologies and analyzed
the trends. Qualitative research methods are central in the research orientations of this international movement and are especially prominent in their innovations and future directions. Allwood and Berry report that many indigenous psychologists advocate the human science approach (preferring more qualitative methods) in contrast to the natural science approach. They cite, as one of the three major characteristics of indigenous psychologies, their rejection of traditional causal models of behavior and their association with new qualitative/discursive research methods, including those ranging from archival studies of ancient texts to phenomenology, which may be used along with positivistic and quantitative methods. Indigenous psychologies have been featured in international journals of psychology and in textbooks, handbooks, and encyclopedias in the areas of applied, social, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology (Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006, p. xvi). In 2010, Louise Sundararajan, current president of the Society for Humanistic Psychology of the American Psychological Association, formed an indigenous psychology task force in the Society that includes leading North American psychologists together with 30 leaders of the indigenous psychology movement from over 20 countries. This initiative aims to promote diverse approaches to psychology by means of conversations and exchanges within a global community of psychologists.

Rogelia Pe-Pua (2006) provides an excellent example of how indigenous psychologies have been developing their own innovative qualitative methods and exporting them to other countries. The indigenous movement in the Philippines began in the 1970s with increasing recognition that Western psychology was inappropriate and insignificant for local populations. Pe-Pua reports that the turning point in Philippine social science research and Sikolohiyang Pilipino involved the employment of a pakapa-kapa (suppositionless) approach in which the researchers’ hypotheses and ideation became subordinated to participants’ experience. It became increasingly important to gain psychological knowledge of the Filipino people “through the eyes of the native Filipino” (Pe-Pua, 2006, p. 129), a process of cultural revalidation that overcomes the misunderstandings and derogations of colonization. This effort has resulted in a host of original research methods and theoretical concepts. Central to Filipino values is pakikipagkapwa, “treating the other person as kapwa or fellow human being” (Pe-Pua, 2006, p. 129). Pe-Pua elaborates a number of distinctive research methods that have been developed in the multicultural Philippines, where psychologists seek to understand various indigenous tribes that are unfamiliar to them. For instance, variants of participant observation methods involve a kind of pagmamasid (observation) that requires nakikiugali (adopting the ways and experiences of a particular group as one’s own) in the process of data collection and as a prerequisite for analysis. Employing panunuluyan (residing in the research situation), researchers live with, sleep in the homes of, and dine with research participants, who are honored hosts of the researcher, who cultivates trust and in-depth understanding. Detailed manuals have been developed to guide this research practice. The tradition of pagtatanong-tanong (literally, “asking questions”) has been developed as a sophisticated, improvisational approach to interviewing that allows the participant, who is afforded equal status and power to the researcher, to structure the interaction with the researcher by determining its direction and duration. The procedure, which includes pakikipagkuwentuhan (storytelling) for sensitive and forbidden topics such as extramarital relationships, also involves the clarification, confirmation, and verification of data and its interpretation. The method of ginabayang talakayan is a free-wheeling focus group, a collective conversation among participants who share similar experiences. In ginabayang talakayan, participants collectively decide on the research topic(s). These research practices and principles feature good relationships and
equal power between researcher and participant, prioritizing the welfare and interests of participants throughout the research process, and respecting participants’ cultural norms. It is stressed that the trust and friendship necessary in research is not to be practiced as a manipulation that produces more valid knowledge on the part of the researcher, for responsible research practice includes the value and benefit of the research process and results to the participants. Even the validity (patotoo, “establishing the truth”) of knowledge requires experiential authentication by participants. The research methods of Sikolohiyang Pilipino have been adapted and employed in numerous research projects in the Philippines, and they have been exported to other countries, including Korea, Japan, Australia, Hawaii, Spain, and Italy.

UNDERLYING MOVEMENT: LIBERATION PSYCHOLOGIES

Watkins and Schulman (2009) have collected accounts of psychological practices that have led the way in addressing human suffering, especially among those who have been disempowered and marginalized. They tracked the work of applied and feminist psychologists through multiple cultural contexts in the United States and abroad. They name these compass points and orientations “psychologies of liberation” (p. 3), a phrase taken from the work of Ignacio Martín-Baró, the Jesuit priest, social psychologist, and chair of the psychology department of the University of Central America in San Salvador who was assassinated there in 1989. Martín-Baró (1994) was critical of Latin American psychology for mimicking North American psychology, which “looked to the natural sciences for a method and concepts that would legitimate it as a science. And in order to get social position and rank, it negotiated how it would contribute to the needs of the established power structure” (p. 20). Positivist epistemology made it “blind to the most important meanings of human existence” (p. 21). Martín-Baró advocated “a new way of seeking knowledge” (p. 27) in a liberation psychology that would adopt a new perspective and redesign praxes “from the standpoint of the lives of our own people: from their sufferings, their aspirations, and their struggles” (p. 25). The new type of research “transforms ourselves as it transforms reality” (p. 29). He argued that an educational psychology that includes the perspective of the community and an industrial psychology that includes the perspective of the unemployed, the workers, and the unions would be more scientific than one that excludes those without power and in need of the psychologist’s services. Watkins and Schulmann identify in many places and times a humanizing orientation that has been struggling to be born in the world.

While working to understand the interdependent relations between the intrapsychic, interpersonal, community, economic, and environmental contributions to the structure of experience, liberation psychologies turn to the larger frames of culture and history in which these are embedded. Here the psychological legacy of 500 years of colonialism and its evolution into transnational capitalism, and then twenty-first century globalization weighs heavily in the analysis. Such psychologies turn as well to the particular social an ecological location of individuals and their communities. . . . Psychological health is understood to emerge as capabilities to create meaning are reignited, hopes are rekindled, and actions forged for achieving peace and economic and social justice. (Watkins & Schulman, 2009, p. 10)

Psychology, in the context of multiculturalism and globalism, has been reordering its values and making social justice primary.
The increasing methodological pluralism that highlights the importance of qualitative research methods in psychology, as it has emerged in the applied, feminist, and multicultural areas, appears to have a motivation that is similar to the broader qualitative revolution across the social sciences. These advances appear to be part of a larger cultural historical movement that empowers and benefits suffering, oppressed, and marginalized persons and peoples. In these areas of research, the quest for scientific knowledge is being held accountable to those outside of science, whose values, empowerment, and liberation scientists desire to serve. Research methods and methodological norms have been reshaped by psychologists who have changed their existential stance from an authority to a responsive host. The shift of position underlying these revolutionary changes in science is an ethical one, one that places the well-being of those outside of science at the center of the practices of scientific inquiry. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has developed ethics as first philosophy—as a basis of ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. Levinas sheds light on the movement beyond the hegemonic rationality of modern science called for by the ethical relation. His work may contribute to the self-understanding of psychological scientists by clarifying the existential foundations of its trajectory into the 21st century that was traced earlier in this article.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), philosopher and Talmudic scholar, attended Freiburg University in 1928 to study phenomenology with Edmund Husserl and was also influenced there by Martin Heidegger. Levinas became a French citizen and, during World War II, a soldier and a prisoner of war in a German forced labor camp. His wife and daughter hid in a monastery during the German Occupation, and his family in Lithuania died during the Holocaust. Levinas’s philosophy is based on the phenomenological study of ethical responsibility in the face-to-face encounter. He insists that the knowledge of persons must first and foremost be ethical to be valid and true. His magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity*, was published in 1961. Levinas’ work has profound implications for scientific disciplines that involve human beings.

Levinas’s philosophy does not offer a moral theory, that is, principles of ethical conduct, or propositions about ethical norms. It is an analysis of the source of authority for any moral norms whatever. In his view, theory, principles and norms cannot assure the relational qualities necessary for ethical responsibility. Levinas’s concrete phenomenological analysis locates the ethical relation prior to ethical knowledge and rules for practice. To understand how the ethical relation grounds genuinely scientific knowledge, it is necessary to understand the social interdependencies that undergird knowing and acting in relation to human beings. For Levinas, cognition and power—human freedom itself, from the simplest action to the most ambitious scientific enterprise—rests on a social foundation and is accountable to a superordinate authority that is radically other than itself.

Dependent Egoism: Pre-ethical Totality—Freedom, Power, and Politics

Levinas (1960) expands the phenomenological notion of intentionality to include, at a level deeper than the cognitive positing of objects and the practical handling of equipment, what he calls “living from” (pp. 110–114), an intentionality involving one’s dependencies on the
world in such phenomena as enjoyment and nourishment. Prior to the knowledge or effective action of an isolated ‘I,’ human life involves a welcoming other who feeds, satisfies, and moreover provides a home in which the I emerges, thrives, engages in exchange, and knows the world. Levinas calls the ego that is originally dependent on this caring and generative otherness, *psychism* or *totality*. The being of the person depends on a world already prepared and made hospitable by the other. For Levinas, the ego depends on a welcoming home-maker. The nurtured human being becomes at home in the world by developing powerful agency of practical competencies that satisfy his or her desires. Although a person’s primordial upsurge in the world is dependent on the other, this hospitable world is viewed, acted upon, and known from the point of view of and for the sake of the same self, whom others serve. This preethical totality of the separate I (paradoxically dependent on and fed by the other) is the basis of the ethical relation. However, the ethical relation involves a person’s transcendence of the egoistic totality of the same. The ethical involves the person’s relation to what lies beyond totality, to exteriority, to the other, who now no longer serves the person but demands responsibility. Although the self originally requires the nurturance of the other, one remains in a totality composed of meanings and values for the self prior to the ethical encounter.

**Metaphysical Desire: Transcendence, Infinity, and Responsibility**

The ethical relation of the same to the other is rooted in a second nonobjectifying form of intentionality that also has an emotional origin. Levinas calls this emotion *metaphysical desire*, that is, the desire for an other radically beyond oneself. In the expressive face of the other, a person encounters something beyond one’s own totality. In the other’s expressions, we are faced with claims that exceed and can overturn our practical projects and knowledge. The other breaks up our internal frame of reference with a commanding voice that can never be entirely encompassed in our totality as long as we offer our ear. In the immediacy of the face and voice there lies, beyond egoism and its totality, infinity—absolute exteriority, an unencompassable other. In expression, the other overflows our representations, disrupts our power, and liberates itself from our grasp. In metaphysical desire we welcome a source of meaning beyond our own totality—infinity, an overflow of the same by the other.

Metaphysical desire is a desire for alterity. In contrast to Martin Buber (1923/1970), who emphasizes the reciprocity of the *I and Thou*, Levinas places priority on the other and calls attention to the asymmetry of the ethical relation. I am responsible to other beyond relations of reciprocity and mutuality, for in encountering the demand of the other I am determined by the other, who assumes, in vertical relation, a height and authority over me. In contrast to Sartre, who describes the objectification of the self in being for others, as one’s freedom is objectified and enslaved by the other, Levinas emphasizes the other’s solicitation of my freedom for responsibility, my being freely responsive to the other. The other does not conquer me but teaches me of an authority beyond myself, teaches me practical competencies and knowledge of truth to be just. Metaphysical desire entails a *responsible freedom* to act and to know, in which I remain the author of my existence, the master of my totality, an original seat of action and knowledge, but I now become accountable to the other. The paradigm for Levinas, in analyzing the ethical bond of self and other, is not reciprocal relation with the friend, the wife, the family member, or even the neighbor, but rather a subordinate relation with the orphan, the
widow, the stranger, and even the enemy—those beyond my totality, those who have nothing to offer me and who do not fulfill my need. The essence of the ethical relation is found in responsiveness to the marginalized other, the other who is outside the totality and representations of self.

In the ethical relation, we cannot know beforehand the nature of the other’s claim, which is at once a demand and a desired gift. Levinas rigorously refuses to predetermine what the face of the other expresses, or what specific conduct constitutes the moral good, because such specification would subordinate the other to a totalized representation outside of the concrete relation to which the other would be subjected. Levinas comes closest to specifying the general meaning of the other’s appeal in two non-literal prohibitions, “You shall not murder me” and “Don’t let me die alone,” meaning that in the ethical relation, the self must neither negate nor abandon the other. The content of responsible action, however, is determined only in the relation with the expressive other, who retains the position of authority.

An Ethical Basis for Western Rationality and Science

For Levinas, Western philosophy and science have traditionally privileged reason—knowledge and individual freedom—and have ignored the fundamental claim of ethics. The dominant conception of reason has led primarily to freedom and power, with responsibility occupying a secondary place. Ontology and epistemology reflect a totalizing intentionality in contrast to an obligation to the other beyond one’s representations. War, politics, and violence, as well as Western science, are totalizing movements in which power, practicality, and objective truth operate without any internal principle of accountability to a higher authority. Science has its roots in sensation, observation, rationality, objectification, explanation, intelligibility, facts—all totalizing relations from which their great power and effectiveness over the world have followed. What appears within the scientific worldview—in theories, hypotheses, operational definitions, manipulations, analyses, and reports—is a world objectified, represented, and subordinated to science. From the perspective of totality, ethics is an afterthought, a regulative prohibition within totality. The rationality of scientific knowledge is not necessarily and intrinsically accountable and responsible, for the other is given only from within the standpoint of the scientist.

In view of the interdependencies Levinas brings to light, it is not surprising that a totalizing science, which excludes those outside it, depends on its surroundings for its sustenance and flourishing. Scientists’ productivity and objectivity depend on and live from education, supportive funding—a nurturing world. The scientist’s practice is also conducted in the face of evaluations and critique by other scientists, whose sovereign exteriority constitutes a higher authority. A particular scientific work by one scientist and may be called into question by another, whose command and demand of responsibility has metaphysical priority in the very establishment of valid scientific work. This reality is embodied in the practical requirements, evaluations and decisions of supportive institutions, including funding agencies’ and journals’ peer reviews embedded in a vast network of social institutions. Scientific truth comes into being and is accountable to this exteriority. It is interesting to note that the agency within this network that assures ethical accountability, the institutional review board (IRB), typically requires the presence of a nonscientist lay person. However, the IRB typically does not
concern the methodological norms of scientific practice. Inasmuch as scientists are accountable only to other scientists in the crafting and implementation of research methods, inasmuch as this totality excludes those beyond the science itself, there is no formally established requirement of methodological accountability to non-scientist human beings presumably served by science. Objectivity established within the scientific community and its support network alone is incomplete and limited as long as it excludes relations with those who are strangers to science.

Human scientists have a crucial role in the family of sciences, for their science itself is about the persons and peoples of the world. In psychology, inasmuch as the desire for truth includes what Levinas calls metaphysical desire, the desire that transcends totality and is accountable to the stranger to psychology, then the psychologist is obligated to offer a welcoming hospitality to those persons and peoples outside of science, whose faces and voices may to be listened and responded to as authorities. The very objectivity of science, its genuine transcendence toward its subject matter, requires relations in which the scientist hosts the stranger as a face, a voice, an expressive authority.

ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE IN PSYCHOLOGY

Among the various sciences, the human sciences have a special ethical obligation because of their intrinsic relation to people outside of them. Psychological knowledge refers to human beings outside of psychology; its research engages them; and its practices concern them. Whereas the objects of natural science cannot talk back, psychology’s very constitution involves a relationship with others who may call the science’s knowledge and practices into question. Founded on the participation of others as research subjects, the extent and truth of knowledge depends on the freedom and significance of their expressivity in that participation. The qualitative movement has been motivated by what Levinas (1960) calls “metaphysical desire” (p. 42), the desire to be radically responsible to the other. Those served by psychology always exceed the psychologist’s knowledge and qualitative psychology has developed concrete ways of empowering those outside psychology to call the discipline to account. At the heart of this science is the desire and capability to respond to the needs and demands of those outside of psychology, a desire to see their faces, hear their voices, and respond to their expressions. The qualitative movement stems from psychology’s identity; its scientific objectivity in the broadest sense includes its social accountability.

Psychologists’ ethical stance, a detotalizing openness to others, is demanded by its scientific aims. A good relationship with human beings is required for the truth of psychological knowledge. The ethical bond of the psychologist with the nonpsychologist, embodied in the psychologist’s desire to know what is beyond preconception, is required as the ground psychological knowledge and effective practice. The pakapa-kapa (suppositionless) in Sikolohiyang Pilipino and the époche (bracketing of presuppositions, wonder) in phenomenology alike mark the detotalizing attitude of openness upon which the progress of knowledge of human experience depends. Gabriel Marcel (1935/1965) calls this attitude disponibilité (usually translated “availability”), which connotes the positive and even creative offering of one’s resources and powers for the sake of the other’s freedom. It is the antithesis of the technical and objectifying attitude we adopt toward physical objects and other people whom we subordinate to our power. The
person, for Marcel, is defined by ontological exigency, a struggling urge or appeal that expresses a demand, transcendence. Only by placing oneself at the other’s disposal and offering one’s resources for the sake of the other’s freedom does the researcher encounter and enter communion with the other, who is no longer alienated from science. Knowing the other as a human being requires creative fidelity, according to Marcel (1940/1964). These social practices that assure the other a continuing hospitality as a person link seamlessly with the ontological and epistemological insights of the continental philosophers who have emphasized the unique qualities of human beings in contrast to physical objects. Dilthey insisted that the person’s intrinsic teleological development, world-shaping reciprocity, and contextually meaningful holism cannot be deduced but must be beheld and understood in their emergent concreteness. For Allport (1942), a prime benefit of personal documents in research is their providing psychology a ‘‘touchstone of reality’’ (p. 184), the ontological bedrock that makes psychological knowledge less artificial, more genuine, more true to the human subject matter that intrinsically eludes its complete grasp. The ethics articulated by Levinas has been implicit in longstanding ontological and epistemological motivations, which have been strengthened and enlivened by the more recent emancipatory social movements. The scientific benefits of qualitative methods are not limited to research in practical areas or with suffering, marginalized persons; they are equally important in basic areas of psychology such as biological and cognitive psychology, and with participants who are representative of culturally dominant groups, for their perspectives also require suppositionless understanding.

The ethical motivations for qualitative research are, by no means, absent from the work of natural science psychologists in their research and practice. Natural science psychologists have beneficially addressed the exigencies of human existence, even when attitudes of pakopa-kapa, wonder, and disponibilité have not been formally acknowledged or institutionalized in their scientific and professional work. A methodological pluralism that includes qualitative methods formally builds into research practices an encounter with relatively unrestricted expression on the part of those outside psychology, thereby institutionalizing a more deliberate welcome of otherness and formal evidentiary basis for scientific and professional practice that facilitates emancipation and welfare. Psychological research that does not formally and methodically include the transcendent perspective of the other is by no means necessarily unethical, for an open understanding of persons as persons remains possible on the part of all psychologists, who existentially are social, relational beings. The mere employment of qualitative methods does not guarantee either ethical or true knowledge, which depend not only on metaphysical desire but on ethical behavior, intelligence, know-how, and existential authenticity in concrete practice. All scientific practice remains contestable. However, because the other can never be reduced to knowledge terms, psychology’s scientificity and utility can be enhanced by the inclusion of continual and methodical revisioning in an authentic relationship that welcomes, empowers, and honors. Qualitative practices can play a crucial role in informing, correcting and holding accountable the whole of scientific knowledge by virtue of their accessible relationship with those outside psychology. Persons, by their ontological nature, continue to stand over and above the psychologists’ methods and theories of various kinds, calling to responsible psychologists of all stripes to accommodate. Listening and hearing, hospitality to the expressions of all stakeholders’ and participants’ in research is an essential constituent of the science of psychology. Ethical responsibility and true knowledge are one and the same in psychology. A scientifically valid psychology entails
hospitality to the epiphany the other’s free expressions and demands in an ethical relation animated by metaphysical desire, love.

CONCLUSION

As urgent social problems, the rising tides of democratization, and social justice movements voice their claims outside of and within psychology, the discipline has been broadening and revising its methods of acquiring knowledge. Similar to its sister social sciences that have engendered a pluralization of research methods, psychology has followed suit by developing and incorporating qualitative methods that allow greater expression on the part of research participants and a more responsive relationship with them in the practice of research. Qualitative methods have become especially widespread in subfields involving professional practice, women’s issues, and multicultural concerns. Research has thereby hosted diverse, previously excluded stakeholders and its knowledge has become more faithful to the experiences of persons and peoples. These methods are responsive to human subjectivity and meanings outside of the boundaries of extant knowledge. As the development of methodological pluralism enacts ethical obligations that are deeply rooted in psychology’s identity, this pluralism also extends and enhances the scientific rigor and truth of psychological knowledge.

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REFERENCES


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