The Veil and Veracity of Passion in Chinese Poetics

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How you anger me! Says the Lord God. You have done all this like the imperious whore you are. . . . I will gather all those lovers to whom you made advances. . . . Then I will hand you over to them. . . . They will bring up the mob against you and stone you, they will hack you to pieces with their swords. . . . Then I will abate my fury, and my jealousy will turn away from you I will be calm and will no longer be provoked to anger. (Ezekiel, 16: 30-43)

Yahweh’s rant against his faithless people of Israel finds no counterpart in Chinese poetics. Consider “A lament for Ying,” written by Ch’ü Yüan (343?-278 B. C.) during his exile, when he was banished by the king of Ch’u who had succumbed to the slander of other courtiers against the poet:

Promptly I was sent away when I failed to gain his trust;
Since then nine years had elapsed without my being recalled.
I was overcome by a pent-up sadness that suffocates;
Thus dispirited and distressed, I had been filled with grief.
Outwardly they put on pleasing manners to curry favor,
And he was too meek and softhearted to hold his own,
Imbued with loyalty, I would fain present myself,
But their jealousy ran rampant and barred my path.

....
I stretch my gaze to look hitcher and thither;
I hope one day to return, but when would it be?
The birds fly back to their old roost,
And dying foxes lay their heads on the mound.
Truly, it wasn’t my fault that I was discarded and exiled.
Day and night, how could I ever forget my pliant? (Tr. W. C. liu, in Liu & Lo, 1975, pp. 25-26)
Couched in the metaphor of a jilted lover smitten with jealousy and outrage, the Chinese poem tells a similar story about anger. But a totally different story it is, so far as the tenor and texture of its anger is concerned. Averill and Nunley (1992) consider it a mark of “emotional creativity” to be able “to be angry without being malevolent . . . to be envious without being vicious, to be jealous without being vindictive, to be outraged without being revengeful . . .” (p. 170). To the traditional Chinese critics, this poem is a fine example of expressing anger without losing one’s “gentleness, pliancy, sincerity, and graciousness [wen, rou, dun, hou],” the ideal comportment of the Confucian “gentleman” (Chu, 1964, p. 133). Thus the ideal poetry is speech that capitalizes on indirection, avers the literary critic Yang Tsai (1271-1323): “Sorrow and grief are held in reserve and no pain is expressed; praise and attack are indirect and not obvious” (Owen, 1992, p. 444).

Ever since the beginning, poetry had played a very important role as a means of indirect communication. Watson writes that “during the Spring and Autumn period, statesmen and diplomats were in the habit of quoting the Odes as a means of expressing their opinions discreetly and with becoming indirection. The Tso chuan is full of descriptions of meetings and diplomatic conferences at which the exchange of ideas is carried on almost exclusively in this medium (and woe to the statesman who failed to recognize an allusion and interpret it correctly!)” (1962, p. 211). This convention is alluded to in the The Great preface (to the Odes): “They sang their feelings to criticize those above” (Owen, 1992, p.47); and “the one who speaks it has no culpability, yet it remains adequate to warn those who hear it” (Owen, 1992, p. 46). When Confucius allegedly edited the anthology of Odes (also known as the Book of Songs), he made it clear that the Odes had set the standard for indirect expression of emotions, especially anger: “The Odes will . . . . show you the way of resentment” (Fang, 1954, p. ix). This premium placed on the suppression of open expression of emotions is consistent with the hypothesis of the IND-COL (individualism versus collectivism) theory, which predicts individuals in COL cultures to suppress personal feelings in order to maintain “harmony” of the group. But there is another vein.

When Confucius included music and poetry in his curriculum, he had in mind the building of character. “Without character you will be unable to play on that instrument, or to execute the music fit for the Odes,” says Confucius (cited in Fang, 1954, p. xvi). To
spell out more fully the vision of the Confucian poetics, my argument is presented in two parts: part one proposes the Novelty- versus Authenticity-focus hypothesis, which is a reformulation of the IND-COL theory, a reformulation that does not contradict the findings in the IND-COL literature, but sheds light on new issues, makes radically different predictions, and is consistent with the data that paint a more nuanced picture of indirect communication of emotions in the Confucian context. Part two presents data to show that indirect communication has a twofold function in the Confucian tradition: a. as anti-exploitation device to screen out those who don’t belong to the in-group, and b. as a means to achieve inter- as well as intra-personal “harmony.” Implications for future research will be discussed in the concluding section.

THE NOVELTY-FOCUS VERSUS AUTHENTICITY-FOCUS HYPOTHESIS

Put simply and straightforwardly, my hypothesis is that cultural and individual differences can be explained by two universal dimensions along which a person’s intra- and inter-personal transactions may vary, namely, (a) differentiation and (b) degree of involvement. The dimensions of Differentiation and Involvement can be interpreted on the intra-personal (subjective) as well as inter-personal level of analysis, but their meaning is easiest to illustrate in the context of interpersonal relationships.

**Differentiation**, the horizontal axis in Figure 1, is anchored at the high end by perceived differences between self and others, and at the low end by perceived similarities. For instance, people with highly differentiated sense of self perceive themselves as unique and different from others.

**Involvement**, the vertical axis in Figure 1, is anchored at the high end by a sense of solidarity or integration with others, and at the low end, by a sense of separateness. People who perceive themselves as unique (highly differentiated) may still be highly involved in the lives of others; conversely, people who perceive themselves as similar to others (low differentiation) can nevertheless be socially disengaged or uninvolved. Hence, the two axes are depicted as orthogonal in Figure 1.

The intersection of these two axes results in four conceptual spaces, of which Novelty and Authenticity prototypes occupy quadrants 3 and 1 respectively (the other two quadrants are examined elsewhere, see Sundararajan & Averill, 2002). **Novelty**
(Quadrant 3) is characterized by low involvement (psychological distance, instrumentality, objectivity, etc.), and high differentiation (difference, uniqueness, etc.). In contrast, Authenticity (Quadrant 1) is characterized by high involvement (participation, solidarity, integration, etc.) and low differentiation (similarity, redundancy, etc.). I propose further that Individualism (IND) and Collectivism (COL) can be seen as consequences of Novelty and Authenticity being privileged differentially in different cultures, with IND having a Novelty-focus, and COL an Authenticity-focus. The Novelty versus Authenticity hypothesis predicts that IND cultures put a premium on difference and emotional disengagement, whereas COL cultures gravitate toward similarity instead of difference, and value high instead of low emotional involvement in the self-to-self as well as self-to-others transactions. This reformulation of the IND-COL model is compatible with extant literature in cross cultural studies.

The binary opposition between Authenticity-focus and Novelty-focus is compatible with the distinction made by the anthropologist Edward Hall between “high involvement” versus “low involvement” cultures (1959), otherwise referred to by him as “high context” versus “low context” cultures (1966, 1976). It is also compatible with the observation of Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) that COL cultures are characterized by “the permanent bonds formed among similar others,” whereas IND cultures by “temporary relations formed in complex societies among dissimilar others” (p. 3, emphasis added). My formulation of the Novelty-focus is consistent with the finding that IND cultures are characterized by “smaller investment in related others and greater need to impress and compete with others for resources” (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002, p. 116). It is also in keeping with notions of the atomic self in IND societies, a self sustained by difference and distance from the other, as Fingarette says so well, “I stand apart from all others, protected against them, entitled to make demands upon them, concerned with my personal choices, my personal aims or fears as over against any other who may threaten to frustrate me” (1991, p. 192). So far, no surprises. But new territories await us if we apply the formulation of Authenticity-focus to an analysis of China.

The Authenticity-Focus Hypothesis of Confucianism

The Authenticity-focus hypothesis proposes that COL cultures gravitate toward
similarity instead of difference. The similarity theme has many variants, chief among which is what Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) refer to as transaction with “similar others,” a transaction based on the principle of “kin selection,” namely “treating others as equivalent to oneself” (Fiske, 1992, p. 716). Another formulation of the same principle is Aron’s “including others in the self,” which is considered to be characteristic of close ties: “much of our cognition about the other in a close relationship is cognition in which the other is treated as self or confused with self” (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991, p. 242). Aron’s formulation is akin to Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) notion of the “interdependent self” characteristic of COL cultures: “for the interdependent self, others are included within the boundaries of the self” (p. 245). The authors go on to say that “The notion of an interdependent self is linked with a monistic philosophical tradition in which the person is thought to be of the same substance as the rest of nature” (Markus, & Kitayama, 1991, p. 227). This holistic version of the similarity theme finds an eloquent expression in the Chinese philosopher Wang Yang-ming’s aspiration to form “one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, a condition that is originally so” (Neville, 1996, p. 210).

Affectively, the Authenticity-focus entails high involvement and participation in the group, a phenomenon referred to by Durkheim as “group effervescence.” Even in modern times, high emotional investment in close ties remains top value for the modern Chinese. Triandis et al. report that “To have a few good friends, who are extremely close and are willing to do anything for me” (Triandis, Bontempo, Leung, & Hui, 1990, p. 309) was a value ranked higher by Hong Kong Chinese than by Americans. Conversely, the top disvalue among the Hong Kong Chinese was “To belong to many groups, but not be too involved in any one of them” (Triandis, et al., 1990, p. 312). This Chinese abhorrence toward low emotional investment in social relations has deep historical roots. Mencius once argued against the Moist ethics of universal love. He insisted on the distinction between in-group and out-group, which the universal love of the Moists threatened to undermine by advocating “treating people on the street as dearly as one would treat one’s father” (Tu, 1985b, p. 243). Tu points out that the reason behind Mencius’s objection is not the refusal to extend one’s love for kin so much as the horror of emotional disengagement—to reduce the richness of the father-son relationship to the
“one-dimensional encounters we normally have with people on the street, our good
intention of caring for strangers as dearly as we care for our parents may result in treating
our dear ones as indifferently as we treat strangers” (1985b, pp. 243-244).

By bringing to the fore the premium placed on similarity and involvement in the
Chinese culture, the Authenticity-focus hypothesis is a reformulation of the IND-COL
type theory that has two important consequences: a. it makes a radically different prediction
about the role of the self in the Confucian tradition, and b. it discloses a so far neglected
ritual space.

Centrality of the Self

In the following discussions of the self, I discard the Western notion of the atomic
self to follow instead Kierkegaard’s purely structural definition of the self: “The self is a
relation which relates itself to its own self” (cited by Neville, 1996, p. 204). On this
view, the self is not necessarily a noun, an aggregates of attributes so essential to the
Western self-concept, but rather a verb—where there is self-reflexive consciousness in
evidence, there the self must be. This definition of the self is more congenial to the
Chinese tradition.

Chinese classic texts are replete with self-reflexivity. Here is one instance from
Mencius: “He who is sincere with himself is called true” (Tu, 1985a, p. 96, emphasis
added). Cua investigated reflexive binomials such as tzu-locutions in ancient texts, and
came up with: “examine oneself, reproach oneself, disgrace oneself” (The Analects);
“do violence to oneself, nourish oneself, realize [tao] in oneself” (Mencius). He observed
that in Hsün Tzu, one passage on heart-mind (hsin) as the “ruler of the body” contains six
tzu-locutions: “the mind itself issues its own prohibitions and commands, makes its own
decisions and choices, initiates its own actions and omissions” (1996, p. 187, emphasis
added). Neville has noted that in the writing of many Chinese scholars the term “self” is
“nearly always used simply in its reflexive form, as in self-cultivation, self-criticism, and
so forth, not as a noun substantive” (1996, p. 216, note 1). Indeed, “we would do better,”
For instance, instead of “examine my self” or “govern the self,” the text should be
rendered “examine myself,” “impinge on oneself,” “govern oneself,” “sacrifice oneself,”
and so on (1991, p.198).
The ubiquitous presence of the self-reflexive expressions in classic Chinese texts is consistent with the Authenticity-focus hypothesis that predicts high involvement of the self with similar others—the self being the self-same other, the “other” that is most similar to oneself. This heightened sense of self and subjectivity is a direct contradiction to the IND-COL hypothesis that predicts a relatively marginal role of the self in collectivistic cultures. But centrality of the self has been the observation of many scholars on China. Tu states the matter in no uncertain terms: “Confucians, as opposed to collectivists, firmly establish the ‘subjectivity’ of the person as sui generis. No social program, no matter how lofty, can undermine the centrality of selfhood in Confucian learning” (1994, p. 184). In contradistinction to the received wisdom that the primary focus in COL societies falls on the collective life of the group, Tu claims that in the Confucian tradition, “The ultimate purpose of life is neither regulating the family nor harmonizing the father-son relationship, but self-realization” (1985b, p. 243). This self-reflexive orientation is referred to by Tu as “authenticity”: “the word ‘authenticity’ . . . seems to me more appropriate than narrowly conceived moralistic terms such as ‘honesty’ and ‘loyalty’ to convey the original Confucian sense of learning for the sake of the self” (1985a, p. 52).

In a similar vein, Hall and Ames (1987) point out the importance of personalization in ritual action, which is “truly meaningful only as a particular and personal disclosure of meaning” (1987, p. 274). They argue that “Ritual action” (li) is best translated as “propriety” meaning “to make one’s own,” for “appropriate” ritual actions require “a personalization and a making over fitting to one’s own specific condition” (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 274). But the classic text shall have the last word. Hsiin Tzu cites three responses, reflecting three levels of moral understanding, to the question of Confucius: what is the jen (authoritative) person like? Tzu-lu replied, “one who causes others to love him”; Tzu-kung replied, “one who loves others”; Yen Yüan replied, “an authoritative person is one who loves himself” (Ames, 1991, p. 106). Ames’s exegesis is illuminating. He suggests that the first level of moral understanding as indicated by the first answer entails “a selfishness”; the second level as indicated by the second answer is higher, “but is self-effacing.” Ames concludes: “The highest level, then, is necessarily reflexive” (1991, p. 106).

Rite is right
The second consequence of the Authenticity-focus hypothesis is the disclosure of a ritual space. In contradistinction to the secular space inhabited by the modern West, the ritual space is sustained by the two cardinal principles of the Authenticity-focus—similarity and emotional involvement. As we shall see shortly, the principle of similarity, known as “categorical correspondence” (lei), lies at the very core of ritual efficacy in the Chinese tradition. As for emotional involvement, it is considered by Confucius to be the sine qua non of ritual action. Thus his recommendation that “in funerals, be deeply sorrowful rather than shallow in sentiment” (Analects, 3/4, Tu, 1985a, p. 89). This affectively charged ritual space is very different from the secular space inhabited by the atomic self with its “rational mastery” which Goldberg (1998) refers to as “mastery at a distance” in the sense that “the space that separates the object world and the rational subject is the space of instrumentality. Galileo’s telescope is the operative metaphor for this stance of disengagement” (pp. 33-34).

In contrast to the utilitarian orientation of the secular worldviews, the ritual perspective is essentially aesthetic (see Dissanayake, 1992). Thus rites are supposed to function in tandem with the arts, especially poetry and music, in the Confucian curriculum the goal and objective of which is for one to be, in the words of Confucius: “Aroused by the Odes; established by the Rites; brought into perfect focus by Music” (Fang, 1954, p. ix). This helps to remind us that whenever we seek to investigate poetry or music in ancient China, we have entered the ritual space of that tradition. Lastly whereas acquisition of knowledge is the reigning passion of the secular age, ritual action is not motivated by epistemology so much as by ontology. Thus as alternative to social and economical explanations, I shall invoke difference in ontology for the observed difference in in-group and out-group relations between the IND and COL cultures (see Matsumoto, 1990, and Gudykunst, Gao, Schmidt, Nishida, Bond, Leung, Wang, & Barraclough, 1992).

The lack of clear distinction between in-group and out-group relations in the postindustrial West—where a cosmopolitan is “at home everywhere and nowhere, capable of a rapid if sometimes superficial intimacy with and response to everyone,” as one keen observer puts it (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 47)—can be attributed to the objective, homogenous space-time of the secular worldview. In sharp contrast is the ritual space, a space
governed by the ontology that perceives being as unevenly distributed, with the highest concentration of quality located at the center. This centripetal configuration of being is reflected in the Chinese social structure which is “determinate and focused at the center,” which is inhabited by the self and its biological extension--the family, “but becomes increasingly vague as it stretches out . . . as a society full of ‘uncles’ and ‘aunties’” (Ames, 1996, p. 226). This centripetal tendency of being to curdle in the middle as it were not only explains the sharp distinction between in-groups and out-groups in COL cultures, but also points to a more fundamental distinction in the traditional societies: that between the “inner” and the “outer” self.

**The Rhetoric of Interiority**

A sharp distinction between the “inner self” and the “external” behavior/appearance is found in the Book of Rites. In describing the filial son in mourning, the text has this to say: “The severest vigil and purification is maintained and practiced in the inner self, while a looser vigil is maintained externally” (Fung Yu-lan cited in Tu, 1985b, P. 235). Parallel to the well known distinction between the two types of “face”--lien (having to do with moral integrity) and mien-tzu (having to do with social status), Hsün Tzu draws a number of binary oppositions: intrinsic honor versus extrinsic honor; intrinsic or just shame versus circumstantial shame (Cua, 1996, p. 196, note 48). A gentleman may have circumstantial shame, but not intrinsic shame, for “the former is a matter of circumstance beyond one’s power or control, while the latter has a source within oneself” (Cua, 1996, p. 183). One implication that flows out of this rhetoric of interiority is that one’s “true worth” always lies “within” like a hidden treasure. This seems to be the moral of the story about Pien Ho, the man who had an eye for the best quality jade. The legend has it that when Pien Ho “tried to present a precious piece of jade matrix to two successive kings of Ch’u before succeeding with the third king [he] was not distressed at the amputation of his feet [by the previous kings who mistook him for a swindler]; he was distressed only because a precious treasure had been called a common stone and because the purity of his intention had gone unrecognized” (Henry, 1987, p. 8).

While the hidden (true) self runs the risk of not being recognized for its worth, privacy is not without its advantages. First, the rhetoric of interiority cordons off certain
unshared aspects of the self and declares them private and inviolable. It is interesting to note that along with the dissolution of the distinction between the in-group and the outgroup in the postindustrial West goes the obliteration of privacy. What used to be considered private matters are now talk show fodder, purveyed by “celebrities as well as noncelebrities discussing their sex lives, childhood traumas, favorite foods ...” (Mestrovic, 1997, P. 63). Second, the rhetoric of interiority seems to contribute to autonomy of the self. The “inner self” may serve as “home ground” whence the individual can “negotiate subjectively meaningful compromises with respect to the prescriptions of the social world” (Greco, 2001, p. 483). Thus Greco claims that “the inner life is like a ‘buffer zone’ that affords the subject a higher degree of flexibility and autonomy with respect to changes that occur in the external environment . . .” (2001, p. 483). This seems to be one of the coping mechanisms recommended by Confucius, who suggests that when misfortunes strike one look inward to see whether one has done anything wrong to have caused it. “If, on examining himself, a man finds nothing to reproach himself for. What worries or fear can he have?” (Analects, 12/4, Cua, 1996, p. 195, note 37). A peaceful conscience is its own reward, or so it seems.

The dichotomy between the inner (true) self and the outer self has its corollary in a series of other binary oppositions—implicit versus explicit codes of communication; incipient versus full blown action tendencies; and at the ontological level, potentiality versus actuality—all of which are encoded in the Chinese epistemology of “knowing.” As Henry points out, the concept of “knowing” (chih) has its roots in prognostication. A passage in the I-Ching reads: “. . . Does not he who knows [chih] the springs of things possess spirit-like wisdom? . . . Those springs are the slightest beginnings of movement, and the earliest indications of good fortune” (Henry, 1987, p. 14). The ability to detect the incipient impulses is central to the Confucian introspection. Thus the twelfth century philosopher Chu His writes, “When a man is alone, he himself knows what others do not know. Hence he must be careful in examining his incipient tendencies (chi)” (Cua, 1996, p. 182). Cast in the interpersonal framework, the ability to “know” the “inner” self beneath the veneer of social appearances is the hallmark of the “knowing other,” “Chih-chi,” “a person who knows one’s inmost self” (Henry, 1987, p. 10). Thus Pao shu-ya was able to recognize the talents in Kuan Chung long before the latter became a famous
statesman, so the story goes: “Others looked at the deeds of Kuan Chung and saw greed, stupidity, ineptitude, cowardice, and shamelessness. Only Pao shu-ya saw that these were merely transient appearances having nothing to do with the inner man” (Henry, 1987, p. 8).

This rhetoric of interiority has important ramifications for emotion expression. As part and parcel of the “inner” self, emotions can be known only by the in-group—“those who know me,” not by the out-group—“those who do not know me.” This theme is well expressed by a poem from the Odes:

That wine-millet bends under its weight,
That cooking millet is in sprout.
I go on my way, bowed down
By the cares that shake my heart.
Those who know me
Say, “It is because his heart is so sad.”

Those who do not know me
Say, “What is he looking for?” (Henry, 1987, P. 15, emphasis added)

The logical conclusion of this rhetoric of interiority seems to be indirect communication: there is no need to spell things out—those who do not know me will not get it anyway, whereas those who know me should be able to read my mind without my saying a word. In the next section, we look at some supporting evidence for this line of thinking.

The Harmony that is Music

The “knowing” other is also referred to as the “sound knower.” A popular folktale goes something like this (Henry, 1987, pp. 9-10): Yü Po-ya was a great official; Chung Tzu-ch’i a woodcutter. They met by chance when the woodcutter recognized the musical talent in Po-ya, who tried to amuse himself by playing the zither as his boat was moored beneath a mountain in a wilderness. They had but a single night to appreciate each other’s skills before Po-ya must continue north to report to his sovereign in Chin... When Po-ya returned to the wilderness on the anniversary of the occasion, his friend was dead. It was said that after the woodcutter died, Po-ya smashed his zither and played
no more, “for he did not think it worthwhile to exercise his gift for the uncomprehending” (Henry, 1987, p. 9).

This story gives dramatic expression to all the essential elements of indirect communication in close relationships. First, it underlines the centrality of “mind reading”—it is said that when Po-ya played the zither, Chung Tzu-ch’i could always tell from the sounds what Po-ya was thinking of. Second, Po-ya played his zither neither to inform nor to influence his audience—he did not know he had any. Sharing of information, acquisition of knowledge, mastery and control of resources, be they objects or people—none of these familiar themes of the Western epistemology loom large in the narrative landscape under consideration. It is not epistemology but ontology that takes center stage here.

This ontology starts with the claim that music is primarily a means of self expression. Music is said to be sound patterns that “arise from the human heart . . . to channel all our ‘seven feelings’ into their proper courses” (Tu, 1985a, p. 98). Thus the Book of Documents states: “Poetry gives expression to one’s dispositions, songs draws out one’s expression in chant . . .” (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 276). And self expression is supposed to be intrinsically pleasurable. Hall and Ames note that “Confucius saw communication through language and, ultimately, music as a medium for achieving self-expression and its attendant enjoyment” (1987, p. 277, emphasis added).

Self-expression entails primarily a self-to-self transaction, which according to Gendlin is a component even in self-to-other communications: “We use symbols not only to tell others what we mean; we tell ourselves” (1997/1962, p. 120, emphasis added). The other way around is also true—the self-reflexive self does not preclude the other. Quite on the contrary, as Huang points out, “Self-expression has always been associated with the idea of seeking the understanding in a person who can appreciate one’s value and virtue” (1998, p. 97). “Why is it,” asked the great historian Ssu-ma Ch’ien, “that Po Ya never again played his zither after Chung Tzu-ch’i died?” And he answered his own question: “A gentleman acts on behalf of one who knows him, as a woman adorns herself for one who delights in her.” He goes on to say that the one thing “without which it is impossible to act” is “the presence of a knower” (Henry, 1987, p. 12). This “validating” relationship (Derlega, 1984, p. 4) between the self and the “knowing” other
brings into sharp relief the ontological dimension of the so-called “interdependent self” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus the famous statesman Kuan Chung allegedly spoke of his indebtedness to Pao Shu-ya, his “sound knower,” in terms comparable to his natural parents: “Those who bore me were my mother and father, but the one who knew me was Pao Shu-ya” (Henry, 1987, p. 8). Henry explains that “to know a person is to bestow upon the one known an awareness of life without which life is worth nothing; no one can live, except in the literal and miserable biological sense, until known by another” (1987, p. 9).

Lest we become complacent with the “interdependent self” theory and fail to look beyond it, it is well to remember that the premium placed on the “knowing other” does not necessarily detract the importance of the self. To borrow an analogy of hatching from the I-Ching (hexagram 61), the “awakening” of life by the “knowing other” is akin to outward action applied to “awaken” the “germ of life” inside an egg, “but there must be a germ of life within,” to begin with, “if life is to be awakened” (Wilhelm, 1950, p. 235).

Lastly, the legendary friendship between Po-ya the musician and Chung Tzu-ch’i the woodcutter sheds much light on “harmony.” The Chinese notion of harmony is different from the Western notion of dialogue. Dialogue presupposes difference, and requires the other to retain his or her difference, as Friedman, reiterating Martin Buber’s philosophy, points out, “We can enter into relationship only with being that has been set at a distance from us and thereby has become an independent opposite” (1965, p. 11). But harmony capitalizes not on difference so much as on similarity/affinity. This theme finds a dramatic expression in the enshrouding darkness that conceals all difference in social status between the musician and the woodcutter, and thereby bringing to the fore their resonating affinities. What lies at the core of this affinity-based communication is the principle of “ganlei”—“responding according to categorical correlations” (Goldberg, 1998, p. 35). Commentary on the I-Ching attributed to Confucius says it well: “Things that accord in tone vibrate together. Things that have affinity in their inmost natures seek one another. Water flows to what is wet, fire turns to what is dry...” (Munakata, 1983, p. 106). Another ancient text Lieh nü chuan puts it this way: “When an ox lows and a horse makes no response, it is not because the horse does not hear the noise; it is because it belongs to another species” (cited in Henry, 1987, p. 27).
This harmony as affinity-based communication is not to be confused with its stereotype found in the IND-COL literature. The IND-COL framework tends to support a conflict-based version of harmony, harmony that capitalizes on the maintenance of status quo, and that requires subordination of individual interests to those of the group. In this framework, indirect communication serves to play down individual differences in order to maintain group “harmony.” As we have seen, a very different notion of harmony is found in Chinese folklores of the “sound knower,” where harmony is not a static order, but an emergent resonance among individuals of kindred spirit. In contrast to its conflict-based counterpart, the affinity-based harmony capitalizes not on conformity so much as resonance. Furthermore, these different conceptualizations of “harmony” predict different responses. The harmony among dissimilar others requires self-effacement—suppressing one’s individuality in order to maintain group “harmony.” The response warranted by harmony among similar others, in contrast, is “responsiveness”—a participation that requires all the skills one can muster as a “sound-knower.”

It is significant that music has been the medium of communication between Po-ya and his “sound-knower.” This folktale reiterates the Confucian notion of music-- broadly defined by Confucius to include “not only instrumental music but poetry and dance as well” (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 276)--as “the paradigm for correctly understanding the nature of language and communication” (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 255). Notions such as conformity and suppression of individual talents are out of place in the framework of music: the fact that music “can give rise to a harmonious and meaningful relationship in the present moment” (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 276, emphasis added) shows that Confucius has in mind a dynamic notion of harmony, harmony that is not to be found in the existing reality, but in a reality that is to be created each and every time by the individuals concerned. To paraphrase Scheibe (2000), for music to be effective every performance has to be the first performance. The same may be said of the dynamic, emergent harmony in affinity-based communications.

One take home lesson from the above investigation is the importance of context for any functional analysis of communication: whereas “harmony” in the context of conflict-based communication spells conformity among dissimilar others, that in the context of affinity-based communication signifies resonance among similar others. The
stage is now set for an exploration of the function of indirect communication in the context of self-to-similar-others transactions.

THE FUNCTION OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

The centrality of indirect communication to the in-group transactions can be predicted by the “selfish-gene” theory (Dawkins, 1976). On this view, in order for altruism to be adaptive, cooperative communities need to protect themselves against exploitation. One such anti-exploitation device is indirect communication, in which the exchange of information tend to be “subtle, with both parties benefiting from producing brief, discrete signals that do not inadvertently provide important information to third-party competitors” (Owren, & Bachorowski, 2001, p. 162). The selfish-gene theory also predicts relatively higher vulnerability to exploitation to correlate with more stringent standards of authenticity. Let us review some supporting data.

Authenticity—East and West

A good place to start is “strategic self presentation,” a communication strategy concerning which Chinese and American values are in sharp conflict. “Strategic self presentation” is formulated by Snyder in terms of “self-monitoring” (Snyder & Campbell, 1982). The goals of self-monitoring are speculated to be a. “to communicate accurately one’s true emotional state by means of an intensified expressive presentation;” b. “to communicate accurately an arbitrary emotional state which need not be congruent with actual emotional experience;” c. “to conceal adaptively an inappropriate emotional state and appear unresponsive and unexpressive;” d. “to conceal adaptively an inappropriate emotional state and appear to be experiencing an appropriate one;” and e. “to appear to be experiencing some emotion when one experiences nothing and a nonresponse is inappropriate” (Snyder, 1974, p. 527). These aspects of “self-monitoring” can be divided into two broad categories: “masking” and “expressive confidence.” “Masking implies a perceived discrepancy between inner experience and outer expression that results from attempts to conceal one’s inner feelings for self-presentational purposes” (Gross & John, 1998, p. 186). This would include (c) and (d) above, both having to do with concealing inappropriate emotional states. “Expressive confidence” “involves the skillful production of situation-appropriate emotion expressions” (Gross, & John, 1998,
skills that involve exaggeration of an emotion for display purposes as in (a) above, or fabrication of emotions as in (b) and (e). These skills contribute to “social surgency”—“extraversion, social self-confidence, and instrumentality” (Briggs, & Cheek, 1988, p. 671), a highly desirable trait in the West. While “expressive confidence” is considered adaptive and “masking” maladaptive in the contemporary West (Gross & John, 1998), the other way around seems to be the case in traditional societies. One wonders whether their traditional values may have contributed to the reported tendency of Asian Americans to exhibit less expressive confidence and more attempts at masking feelings (Gross & John, 1998). In the following paragraphs, I examine first what Confucius condemns—skills of “expressive confidence,” and next what he condones—“masking” feelings.

From the Confucian perspective, skills that fall under the category of “expressive confidence” are tantamount to cheating. The profile of the high self-monitor—“skilled in pretending, verbal and talkative, is facially and/or gesturally expressive” (Briggs, & Cheek, 1988, p. 671)—fits well Mestrovic’s caricature of the postmodern personality, one equipped with “a vast array of superficial emotions that are as easy to slip on as off, depending on circumstances” (1997, p. 49). Confucius seems to share the same bias against the high self-monitor: “Rarely indeed is the person of clever words and pretentious appearance authoritative (jen)” (Analects, 1/3, Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 276). More specifically, he is against mimicry:

Detestable is the substitution of purple for vermillion; detestable is the pollution of elegant classical music with the sounds of Cheng; detestable is the subversion of family and state by glib talkers. (Analects, 17/18, Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 276)

Lau points out that “each of the things Confucius detested bore a superficial resemblance to the proper thing, and it is because of this superficial resemblance that the specious can be mistaken for the genuine. Confucius’ abhorrence is directed against this spuriousness” (cited in Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 279).

To understand Confucius’ abhorrence of emotional counterfeit, we do well to follow Fingarette’s (1972) lead in locating the efficacy of ritual action in that of magic. The basic principle of magic is “like produces like, effect resembling cause,” a principle summed up by the Chinese term “kan-lei” (Munakata, 1983, p. 107), which means
literally, “similar natures or kinds [lei] mutually influence or respond to each other” (Goldberg, 1998, p. 36). For illustration, consider the ritual for rain:

The leading principle in organizing this ritual [Asking for Rain] was apparently that everything in the ritual should be of ‘similar kinds’ in order to get a ‘sympathetic response.’ Since the basic nature of rain is ‘water’ with the force of yin, the things related to water, and things which are yin, feature prominently in the components of the ritual. (Munakata, 1983, p. 110)

Imagine what happens if one of the ingredients of this elaborate preparation turns out to be a sham. From the perspective of sympathetic magic, the problem with simulacrum lies in the fact that it has the appearance of the “real thing” but can not effect a “sympathetic response” from the “real thing,” due to its lack of “inner” substance. That is why “hollow form is not merely trivial–for Confucius, it is insidiously deceptive” (Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 279).

The simulacrum par excellence is the village worthy, one who shows outer conformity but lacks the inner spirit. Thus Confucius has said: “The village worthy is the thief of virtue” (Ames, 1996, p. 236). And again, “I dislike weeds lest they be confused with grain. . . . I dislike the village worthy lest he be confused with the virtuous” (Ames, 1996, p. 237). Mencius explains: “If you want to condemn the village worthy, you have nothing on him; if you want to criticize him, there is nothing to criticize. He chimes in with the practices of the day and blends in with the common world. Where he lives he seems to be conscientious and seems to live up to his word, and in what he does, he seems to have integrity. His community all like him, and he sees himself as being right. Yet one cannot pursue the way of Yao or Shun with such a person” (Ames, 1996, p. 236). In the final analysis, the village worthy, according to Ames (1996), is a case of lack of creativity: “the creative element necessary for his personalization and renewal of the exemplary role is absent. He has no blood. He is a hypocrite because he has nothing of quality to contribute on his own ...” (Ames, 1996, P. 237).

So much for “expressive confidence” as an index of inauthenticity. “Masking” feelings, in contrast, is considered a hallmark of the emoter’s authenticity. This needs to be understood in the context of the authenticity indexes for indirect communication.

Sender’s authenticity Index
As a hallmark of the sender’s authenticity, suppression of emotions signifies two “critical symbolic dimensions for the affirmation of relationships”—“work” and “suffering” (Potter, 1988, p. 198). It is work, because suppression of (inappropriate) emotions signifies the individual’s effort and thoughtfulness for the maintenance of ritual propriety. At the same time, consistent with the well documented connection between suppression and sympathetic activation (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1997), suppression of emotion signifies personal suffering. In fact, the Chinese seem to believe that emotional “depth” can be measured in direct proportion to “the agony of wanting to say something but cannot” (Chu, 1960, p. 397). Thus symptoms of “pent up” emotions as a result of inhibition in direct expression are considered evidence of “depth”—“If it’s not pent up, then it’s not deep; if it’s not deep, then it’s not sincere” (Chu, 1960, p. 399). In “A Lament for Ying,” the maligned poet Ch’ü Yüan (343?-278 B.C.) wrote about his exile as a result of the king’s misunderstanding: “I was overcome by a pent-up sadness that suffocates” (Liu & Lo, 1975, p. 25). The literary critic Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692) claims that “the essential lesson of poetry is to make words last long and extend sighs in order to describe brooding feelings all wound up inside a person” (Owen, 1992, p. 480). This makes sense from the “selfish-gene” point of view. Both effort and suffering drive up the cost of emotional signaling, thus help to prevent dishonesty in the communication of emotions. Furthermore, the sublimation required for “pent-up” emotions to become art instead of clinical symptoms may constitute a “handicap” that only the “fittest” can afford to sport (Owren, & Bachorowski, 2001).

Receiver’s Authenticity Index

Communication in traditional China is receiver-centered (Gabrenya, & Hwang, 1996). Mind-reading is a highly prized decoding skill in China and apparently other East Asian countries. In Japan “it is considered virtuous to ‘catch on quickly’... to adjust to someone’s position before it is logically and clearly enunciated” (Mushakoju, cited in Okabe, 1983, p. 37). Gabrenya and Hwang refer to this as the “anticipatory communication” strategy: “Chinese expect people to anticipate others’ needs or to know their feelings without asking or being told; to do otherwise indicates poor social skills or a characterological deficit” (1996, p. 315). Hall has made a similar observation about “high context” cultures: “When talking about something that they have on their minds, a
high-context individual will expect his interlocutor to know what’s bothering him, so that he doesn’t have to be specific. The result is that he will talk around and around the point, in effect putting all the pieces in place except the crucial one. Placing it properly--this keystone--is the role of his interlocutor. To do this for him is an insult and a violation of his individuality” (1976, p. 98).

There seems to be a parallelism between the “anticipatory communication” strategies of East Asians and “selectivity” of resource exchange in close relationships. Miller and Berg (1984) claim that in bestowing benefits on the other, people in close relationships tend to choose “selective benefits” that meet the other’s “desires, needs, and preferences” (p. 170). The tendency to pick up subtle cues about the other seems to correlate with the closeness of the relationship. Buck (1984) reported a study showing that marital satisfaction was significantly correlated with the wife’s sensitivity to expressions which others could not decode (pp. 269-270). Mind-reading skills make sense from the selfish-gene perspective: these skills may function as markers to identify “similar others,” those “others” who are on the same “wave length” with the self.

Between the sender’s indirect expression and the receiver’s “mind reading” skills there may be an arms race that results in ever subtler cues encoded in emotion expressions, on the one hand, and not taking things at face value on the other, with both parties agreeing on the same code of “less is more.” Matsumoto et al. found that in Japanese culture a similar code is used in response to weak stimuli: “On weak expressions, the Japanese rated internal experience higher than external display. . . . suggesting that for weaker expressions, Japanese may assume that a display rule is operating and may thus infer more emotion being felt than is actually displayed” (Matsumoto, Franklin, Choi, Rogers, & Tatani, 2002, p. 118). Commenting on the “reserved” style of Chinese poetry, Owen also alludes to this code, when he states that “one may make no reference to a feeling of unhappiness, but unhappiness is revealed as the ground on which one speaks of something else. The withholding (holding in “reserve”) of feeling--the fact that one does not or cannot talk about something--becomes itself part of the code of the intensity of feeling” (1992, pp. 328-329). This “less is more” code may be operative behind the art of “savoring” in Chinese poetics--the art of making fine discriminations of emotional nuances in the text (see Sundararajan, 2001).
Attunement as “Safeguarded Communication”

According to the “selfish-gene” theory, since altruism is vulnerable to exploitation, for cooperative communities to be adaptive there needs to be a mechanism by which both parties can use to identify each other. Owren and Bachorowski have speculated about a “safeguarded communication” that makes sure that “the feedback loop facilitating growth of mutual positive affect between two individuals would be created” only when both parties have a signaling mechanism that can produce an authentic signal and is also responsive to such signals (2001, p. 171). Intimations of such a “safeguarded communication” can be found in the imageries and folklore of close relationships, relationships characterized by the experience of dynamic harmony mentioned in the foregoing analysis (Part I).

A primordial image of harmony is found in the “Chung Fu” hexagram (61) of I-Ching (Wilhelm, 1950, p. 237):

A crane calling in the shade.
Its young answers [ho] it.

Note the Chinese term for “answering” is “ho” (harmonizing). The instinctual response of the young to the call of its mother may be understood in terms of a hypothetical “biologically shared signal system involving both sending and receiving mechanisms,” suggested by Buck (1984, p. 6). This is borne out by two salient features of the crane image: a. the instantaneous signal pick up between the two parties suggests the possibility of sending and receiving being “integrated functions of a unitary mechanism” (Owren, & Bachorowski, 2001, p.172); b. the reverberating response “in kind” is indication that both parties belong to the same species—a reasoning that finds expression in the principle of “ganlei”--“responding according to categorical correlations” (Goldberg,1998, p. 35).

A similar pattern is observed by Stern in the mother and infant interaction. He refers to the echoing and pattern matching between mother and infant as “attunement” (1985). Here is an example: a nine-month-old infant is playing with his toy, and “begins to bang and flail with it happily.” Mother then approaches him from behind and putting her hand on his bottom, “gives it an animated jiggle from side to side. The speed and intensity of her jiggle appear to match well the intensity and rate of the infant’s arm
movements and vocalizations, qualifying this as an attunement” (Stern, 1985, p. 150, emphasis added). From a totally different perspective, Hall and Ames have come up with a similar definition of attunement: “Attunement occurs when one first listens and places oneself into a position of potential harmony, then brings what is given to completion by adding those elements to the situation which maximize harmony” (1987, p. 283). The mother who first listens/observes, then “brings to completion” the infant’s play by nuanced pattern matching serves to illustrate another observation of Hall and Ames. They claim that the language of Confucius is that of “deference.” “The language of deference” is one in which “meaning is disclosed and/or created by virtue of a recognition of mutual resonances among instances of communicative activity” (Hall & Ames, 1987, pp. 294-295). All these accounts of “attunement” share in common with the bird call to its young two salient attributes of the hypothetical “safeguarded communication”: instantaneous signal pick up, and recognition of mutual resonance. It is tempting to conclude that the social skills of emotional attunement function to mimic the “biologically shared signal system” of animals.

To elaborate on this theme, let me resume and complete the I-Ching passage on the crane that I cited at the beginning of this section:

A crane calling in the shade.
Its young answers it.
I have a good goblet.
I will share it with you. (Wilhelm, 1950, p. 237)

The commentary tells us that “The crane need not show itself on a high hill. It may be quite hidden when it sounds its call; yet its young will hear its note, will recognize it and give answer. Where there is a joyous mood, there a comrade will appear to share a glass of wine” (Wilhelm, 1950, p. 237). Two imageries are juxtaposed here: the instinctual attunement of the animal world and the human capacity for emotional resonance—the former is used here as a metaphor for the latter. Thus the commentary on “Its [the crane’s] young answers it” reads: “this is the affection of the inmost heart” (Wilhelm, 1967, p. 701). Maybe that is why the text has led us gently from the imagery of nature to culture, from the bird call to a social setting where a joyous mood is shared and celebrated by kindred spirit.
So far the harmony under consideration is interpersonal, ranging from the mother-infant interaction to wine toasting in a social setting; and so far the emotional expressions under consideration are mostly non-verbal, ranging from the bird call to music. In the next section, I extend this investigation to intrapersonal harmony, and to the role of language, with special focus on poetry, as means to intrasubjective, emotional harmony.

The Harmony Within

The notion of intrapersonal harmony is best expressed by the Chung-Yung: “Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called centrality. When the feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony” (Tu, 1976, p. 2). On this view, emotional harmony is analogous to a symphony, which comes about when a diversity of musical notes “each and all attain due measure and degree.” As the Book of Documents puts it, “The eight notes sustain the harmony without overwhelming each other, and man and god alike thereby are harmonized” (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 276). But before the symphony of emotions is created, one has a long way to go. As the Chung-Yung reminds us, before emotions are aroused, the heart/mind is in a neutral, readiness-to-respond state called “centrality.” Emotions of joy or anger result from perturbation or activation of the heart/mind. From the activation of the response readiness, i.e., the heart/mind, to the expression of emotions, a lot can happen in between, it is safe to assume, because there are multiple intervening variables such as moral judgment, thoughtful deliberations, and will. This view may be summed up in the words of the twelfth century critic Ch’en Ch’un: “Take for example that something is encountered. The master inside that controls is the heart-and-mind (hsin). As it is activated to become joy or anger, that is feeling. That which is inside that can be activated is nature. To operate the mind and to consider to whom the joy or anger is to be directed is yi. When the heart-and-mind is directed to the person who is the object of joy or anger, it is will (chih)” (Cua, 1996, p. 179). These multiple intervening variables are part and parcel of the Chinese “folk psychology” of emotions. For instance, “Yi “ refers to “thoughtful consideration of the proper expression of feelings, involving an appraisive judgment which furnishes the object of will, and it is often accompanied by the intention to carry out in actual performance” (Cua, 1996, p. 180). Without going into details of these mediating variables, let us simply note the
The general thrust of this picture: between emotions experienced and emotions expressed there spans a universe of regulations, transformations, and ultimately personal creativity.

It is from the perspective of this folk psychology of emotions that the following statements of Tu (1985b) are to be understood: “Confucius instructs the filial son to endure only light physical punishment from an enraged father. To run away from a severe beating, the argument goes, is not only to protect the body which has been entrusted to him by his parents but also to respect the fatherliness in his father that may have been temporarily obscured by rage” (p. 239). Not directly responding to the raging father does not mean not taking emotions seriously as Potter has intimated in her interpretation of this passage (1988). It is more appropriate to situate this scenario in the context of the Chinese penchant “to consider the long view of things and think of consequences,” as Hsün Tzu puts it (Ames, 1996, p. 178). On this view, emotions are transient phenomena always capable of further development and transformation. Theoretically at least, at which point of this ongoing process of transformation does one wish to “cash in” on the response or expression of emotions is up to the individual’s choice and discretion. With the raging father, it is best not to “cash in” on emotional expression or response at the moment, but later--when the reigning emotion of rage has a chance to relax and evolve into a more complex tapestry of, say anger intermixed with love and sadness, a dynamic complexity of emotions “each and all attain due measure and degree.” Another example of emotional harmony is found in the following claims about poetry by Yang Tsai (1271-1323): “One investigates the ultimate affections of the human mind; one describes the subtle thought in strong emotions” (Owen, 1992, p. 444, emphasis added). Intrapersonal harmony names this capacity and skill to keep things in due proportions so that the whisper of subtle thoughts is not drowned by the clamor of strong emotions. Toward the attainment of emotional harmony, indirect communication, as exemplified by poetry, plays an important role.

Poetic Language and Emotion

The literary critic Yeh Hsieh (1627-1703) claims that it is indirect communication that brings emotions to perfection: “if a poem concerns itself with emotions that can be fully described” it is “the work of an ordinary scholar,” says he. Great poetry, in contrast, deals with “reason that cannot be explicated by words, events that cannot be verified by
eye sight, and emotions that cannot be expressed by direct communication,” for only then will its reason become “dim and obscure,” its events “imaginary,” and its emotions “vague and indistinct.” Only then, avers Yeh Hsieh, do you have “words that are the perfection of principle [reason], the perfection of event, and the perfection of affection/circumstance” (Owen, 1992, 538). It is noteworthy the fact that “perfect” expressions of emotions are not supposed to be explicit and clear, but “vague and indistinct.” This is consistent with Averill’s conceptualization of the “endoceptual” emotions, emotions that are not ready made but in the making hence amorphous and ill-defined (see Averill, Chon, & Hahn, 2001).

Toward the development of “endoceptual” emotions, suppression of direct expression serves the important function of calling for a moratorium on “pre-packaged emotions” (Mestrovic, 1997). The social pressure against direct and open expression of emotions forces creative individuals to give up ready made emotional concepts, such as anger, love, etc., and search harder for innovative expressions. We learn from clinicians that rumination in ready-made emotional concepts gets one nowhere (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). Rather, as Johnson points out in the context of couples therapy, “it is the discovery and development of new or unrecognized emotional experience that is useful . . .” (cited in Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001, p. 202). It is precisely to help emotions in the throes of articulation to reach certain degrees of clarity that is the contribution of literature, avers the eighteen century critic Yun Jing, who draws a distinction between ideas and emotions—the former depend on intelligence for illumination, whereas the latter on literature: “the objective of intelligence is to comprehend ideas difficult to understand; that of literature, to bring to light emotions difficult to manifest” (Chu, 1960, p.383).

But why is literature particularly suited for the elucidation of emotions? Referring to literature as “words of emotion,” Yun Jing attributes its efficacy to its indirection. He draws the distinction between “words of reason” which excel in explicit and direct expression, and “words of emotion” which excel in taking a circuitous route: “Words of reason are like fire that sheds light on everything above and below without a trace; words of emotion are like water that meanders and diverges, filling up gutters and crevices, following a trajectory remote in its origin and unpredictable in its destination” (cited in
Chu, 1960, p. 385). To understand the alleged efficacy of indirect expression as medium for the illumination of emotions, I resort to the insights of Dissanayake (1992), who has suggested an intimate connection between aesthetics and ritual action.

**Indirect Expression as Ritual Action**

According to Dissanayake, rituals “pattern and manipulate emotions” by means of “shaping and elaboration” (1992). More specifically, “The ritual creates and molds the appropriate emotions . . .” (Dissanayake, 1992, p. 129). In what follows I explore the possibility that the indirect expression in poetry functions as ritual action to “create and mold” emotions.

Let us start with a concrete example of ritual action in the Analects:

When carrying the tablet of jade, he [Confucius] seems to double up, as though borne down by its weight . . . His expression, too, changes to one of dread and his feet seem to recoil, as though he were avoiding something. When presenting ritual-presents, his expression is placid. At the private audience his attitude is gay and animated. (Tu, 1985a, p. 98).

Drawing on the close connection between ritual and dance (Dissanayake, 1992), I believe that what Mallarmé says about dance can shed some light on the measured rhythm and cadence in the movements and expressions of Confucius in the passage cited above. Mallarmé claims that the ballerina “is not a girl dancing,” but rather a girl “writing with her body,” for “she suggests things which the written work could express only in several paragraphs of dialogue or descriptive prose. Her poem is written without the writer’s tools” (cited in Dissanayake, 1992, p. 166). In this light we may say of the ritual dance of Confucius that he is writing poetry with his body when “carrying the tablet of jade,” and so on. Indeed this analogy can be extended: just as (ritual) dance is writing with the body, writing poetry is (ritual) dance with words. This formulation can shed some light on the following advice to writers by Yang Tsai (1271-1323) in his “Poetic rules of the masters”: “It is necessary that . . . the diction be gentle and gracious; it moves back and forth with ease, stately and never pressed” (Owen, 1992, p. 444). These prescribed movements of thought are reminiscent of ritual act with its characteristic tempo, rhythm and grace that Confucius has demonstrated so well in the above quotation from the Analects. Consistent with the ritual orientation, Yang Tsai’s concern is not the “what” so
much as the “how” to express oneself (see Okabe, 1983, for a similar observation concerning the Japanese communication). He asks not what emotions one may express, only that one’s expressions be couched in words “gentle and gracious.” Of course, what Yang Tsai is getting at is not simply refined speech. “Gentle and gracious” are hallmarks of successful character building through poetry and the rites, as Chu points out, “The principles of Gentleness, pliancy, sincerity, and graciousness [wen, rou, dun, hou] are at once the teaching of the rites and that of poetry” (1964, p. 133). Thus what we have here is another case of sympathetic magic--“like produces like, effect resembling cause” (Munakata, 1983, p. 107): since a gentle and gracious person would express his/her emotions in a gentle and gracious manner, the other way around should also work—express your emotions in a gentle and gracious manner, and you are likely to become such a person.

Thus to correct [the appraisal of] achievements and failures, to move Heaven and Earth, to stir the gods and spirits, there is nothing more apposite than poetry. By it the former kings managed the relations between husbands and wives, perfected the respect due to parents and superiors, gave depth to human relations, beautifully taught and transformed the people, and changed local customs. (The Great Preface, Owen, 1992, p. 45)

The Great Preface cited above concerns the “regulatory function of poetry,” which is outlined by Owen as follows: “Not only does poetry result from the affections being ‘moved,’ poetry ‘moves’ others as well . . . Poetry ‘stirs,’ as well as originating from some stirring. . . . Considering this power, the ‘Great Preface’ shifts from poetry as the involuntary manifestation of a state of mind to poetry as an instrument of civilization . . .” (1992, p. 45). Owen goes on to say that “Poetry occupied a very important place in the Confucian cultural program, but its instruction is not supposed to be coercive. . . . when combined with music, the poems of the Book of Songs [the Odes] were supposed to influence people to good behavior unconsciously: listeners apprehended and thus came to share a virtuous state of mind, and the motions of their own affections would be shaped by that experience” (p. 45). The above observations of the “regulatory function” of poetry in the Confucian tradition are in perfect accordance with the claim of Dissanayake (1992) that the arts are “molders of feeling. The performance of a play, a dance, or a
musical composition manipulates the audience’s [and we may add, the artist’s own] response: expands, contracts, excites, calms, releases. The rhythm and form of a poem do the same thing” (p. 46, emphasis added).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A reformulation of the IND-COL hypothesis is proposed to anchor cross-cultural differences along two universal dimensions, differentiation and involvement. The intersection of these two axes, it is hypothesized, constitutes Novelty-focus and Authenticity-focus, with the former being privileged in individualistic cultures, and the latter, collectivistic cultures. While compatible with findings in the IND-COL literature, the “Authenticity-focus” hypothesis of traditional China challenges the received interpretations of collectivistic cultures. More specifically, data that support the “Authenticity-focus” hypothesis have implications that a. render superfluous the conventional dichotomies in the IND-COL literature—such as the self versus the group, and independence versus interdependence of the self; b. make radically different predictions—such as centrality of the individual and emotions to the Confucian tradition; and c. open up a ritual space, within the context of which indirect communication of emotions can be properly assessed. The Authenticity-focus hypothesis sheds light on two major functions of indirect expression of emotions: a. as anti-exploitation device, with the sender’s skills consisting primarily of suppression of emotions; and the receiver’s skills, mind-reading and attunement. b. As means to achieve inter- and intra-personal harmony, with poetry in particular functioning as a “ritual dance with words” to shape and mold emotions.

Lastly, this paper challenges the conventional dichotomy of expression versus inhibition in emotion research (see for example, Pennebaker, 1985). The data presented here show that indirect expression of emotion functions like a veil that reveals and conceals at once the truth of the emoter. In light of the distinction made by Consedine et al. (Consedine, Magai, & Bonanno, 2002) between inhibition of experience and that of expression, the Chinese data show that indirect expression of emotion in poetry is a creative combination of inhibition of expression (in the self to other communication) on the one hand, and articulation of emotional experience (in the self to self communication)
on the other. Furthermore, consistent with the more differentiated picture of the inhibition-health relationship adumbrated by Consedine et al. (2002), the Chinese data challenge the connection suggested by King and Emmons between illness and ambivalence toward emotional expression (1990). While supporting the claim made by Kennedy-Moore and Watson (1999) that the inhibition-illness connection is mediated by beliefs and meanings ascribed to inhibition of emotions, the data on Chinese poetics point to a direction of inquiry beyond the inhibition-health framework, a direction suggested by Averill who avers that “Physical and mental health come from neither emotional inhibition nor exhibition per se, but from flexibility” (1994, p. 102).

By way of conclusion, I adumbrate a few implications for future research:

1. The importance of creativity for cross-cultural studies. Creativity is seldom taken into consideration in cross-cultural studies, unless it constitutes the central theme of the study (for instance, Averill, et al., 2001). By giving due attention to Chinese poetics, this paper reiterates the point made by Hall and Ames that the use of the Songs [Odes] as “cultural scripture” by Confucius “dramatically demonstrates the extent to which personal creativity must be accounted for in a fair appraisal of his thought” (1987, p. 67). Consistent with the insight of Confucius that no culture can sustain itself without the creativity of its participants, the findings of this paper suggest that studies that do not take into consideration the creative dimension of a tradition, even in the case of COL societies, are missing something vital and important for our understanding of that culture.

2. The importance of contexts and implicit codes of the culture. So far as the functional explanation of emotion is concerned, context is essential. As we have seen, “harmony” means different things in different contexts: it spells conformity with the connotation of suppression of individual differences in one context (difference-based communication), and resonance that underscores individual differences in attunement in another (affinity-based communication). The implicit codes of indirect communication outlined here challenge the suppression of individuality argument (Matsumoto, 1989, 1990), and offer an alternative explanation for the difference in emotion expression between the IND and COL cultures.

Taking into consideration the implicit codes of a culture is in keeping with the recommendation of Fiske not to impose our own categories on other cultures: “We must
transcend our ethnocentric framework and not just study how other cultures differ from
the United States but explore what they are intrinsically” (2002, p. 87). This sensitivity
to implicit codes can improve our predictions. For instance, Chinese participants may
answer the following question in the predicted direction: “Suppose a relative of yours
failed in an important task. What are the chances that you would pretend that nothing has
happened?” (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995, p. 263). But the picture is not
complete. A more culturally sensitive questionnaire would tap into the “selectivity”
(Miller & Berg, 1984) dimension of transactions in close relationships and include items
such as the following: “Even though I may not say anything, I will do something special
for a relative going through a hardship, such as taking him or her out to dinner.”
Likewise, consistent with the finding that contemporary Chinese reported greater
confidence in their ability to predict other people’s behavior based on indirect expressions
in romantic relationships than do Caucasian Americans (Gao, Ting-Toomey, &
Gudykunst, 1996), the data presented here suggest that experimental studies on
contemporary Chinese would do well to shift their focus from strong to weak stimuli.

This study rests squarely upon the assumption that the impact of religious
traditions runs deep (see Sampson, 2000). The fact that contemporary Chinese may not
necessarily subscribe to the teachings of Confucius, and the fact that college students in
the US may know more about market “profits” than “prophets” in the Judeo-Christian
tradition do not seriously damage the claim that the difference in cognitive and affective
styles of these populations may be attributed to that in their respective traditions. To test
this hypothesis empirically, it is necessary to render the codes of the traditions explicit so
that the hypothetically corresponding cognitive or affective styles can be experimentally
induced (see for example Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). This study has taken the first
step of spelling out the implicit codes of the Confucian tradition on emotional expression
in the hope of contributing to the development of more culturally sensitive experimental
studies.

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