Passion and Qing: Intellectual Histories of Emotion, West and East

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Histories of emotion are of two kinds: The first explores emotions as lived in everyday life (e.g., Sterns, 2000); the second, which is the focus of this chapter, explores ideas about emotions, that is, explicit theories and teachings. Theories about emotions are not always congruent with the way emotions are experienced. It is reasonable to assume, however, that over time a dialectical relation exists between ideas and realities of emotion, such that each helps shape the other (Parkinson, 1995).

Given that the focus of the chapter is on the history of ideas, the question arises: Whose ideas? We juxtapose the history of Western thought about emotion with an equally venerable tradition, namely, East Asian, particularly Chinese. Paranjpe (2002) has noted a twofold gap when comparisons are made between Non-Western (“indigenous”) and contemporary Western (“scientific”) approaches to psychology. First, indigenous approaches typically draw on ancient texts and traditions which are often dismissed as irrelevant to a modern, empirically based science. Second, indigenous approaches are more closely allied with the humanities than with the sciences. We try to bridge these two gaps by drawing on ancient as well as modern texts, and on literary as well as scientific traditions.

We review, first, the ways emotions have been conceived at different periods of Western history, from ancient Greece to modern times; we then survey Chinese history over a similar span of time. Our purpose in juxtaposing these two histories is not simply to add an international flavor to the chapter; rather, mapping the development of thought, without limitations imposed by time or geography, can be, we believe, a potent catalyst for new ideas and approaches. We therefore
conclude the chapter by describing six antinomies of emotion—seemingly conflicting ideas that may help set the stage for a history of emotion in the 21st century.

Western Theories of Emotion

We divide the Western history of ideas about emotion into four epochs: The Classical age of Greece and Rome, beginning around the fifth century B.C.E.; the medieval period, from about 400 to 1500; the Early Modern period, beginning with the Renaissance and Scientific Revolution; and the Twentieth Century, following the founding of psychology as a scientific discipline. This is not to suggest that our knowledge of emotions has progressed in a linear fashion, from ancient to modern times. On the contrary: Similar themes recur throughout history, albeit in different guises. We focus on a few of those recurrent themes. Our intent is not to be complete, which would be impossible in a short chapter. We review just enough theories to provide a Gestalt of Western ideas about emotion. If the Gestalt has good form (Prägnanz), closure may be possible in spite of inevitable gaps.

Western Concepts of Emotion

Western history represents more than a temporal sequence; it also involves changes in language, geography, religion, and cultural orientation. This diversity is reflected in the terms that have been used to denote emotions.

The ancient Greek term for emotion was pathos, which could refer to any object, animate or inanimate, that was undergoing (“suffering”) change through the action of an external agent. A rock, for example, could suffer the blow of a hammer. Emotions in the contemporary sense were one category of pathos a person might suffer. Diseases were another category; Hence, from pathos
we get such medical terms as “pathology,” “pathogen,” “idiopathy,” as well as such emotional terms as “pathetic,” “empathy,” and “antipathy.”

A strict Latin rendering of path would be morbos, literally, “disease.” Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.), who was one of the persons most responsible for transmitting Greek thought to the Roman world, rejected such a literal translation (Lang, 1972). He considered the more turbulent emotions to be disorders of the soul (perturbationes animi), but not diseases in a strict sense. Nevertheless, a variation on the Greek root became common, namely, passio (from the past participle of the Latin verb pati, which means to suffer). Hence, the emotions, or at least the more turbulent emotions, came to be known as “passions.”

Another Latin term for emotion was affectus, from which we get the modern English term “affect.” Historically, “affect” and its cognates had a more inclusive and positive connotation than “passion” and its cognates.

Turning to modern European languages, emotion and its cognates are commonly used in French and German as well as English, particularly in the psychological literature. Etymologically, emotion stems from the Latin, e + movere, which originally meant to move out, to migrate, or to transport an object. Metaphorically, it was sometimes used to describe physical conditions, such as turbulent weather, or psychological states involving turmoil. It did not, however, become a common term for human emotions until about the middle of the eighteenth century.

In French, sentiment also refers to emotional phenomena generally, with a connotation similar to the English “feeling.” The French term émotion refers primarily to less cultured emotions that humans might share with infrahuman animals. In German, Gefühl and Emotion are common lay terms that correspond roughly to “feeling” and “emotion.” Affekt and, occasionally,
Gemütsbewegung are also found in the psychological literature. For related terms in other Indo-European languages, see Buck (1949).

The above terminological differences reflect more than multiple ways of expressing the same concept; they also reflect subtle differences in connotation and theoretical implication. Therefore, although we use “emotion” in a generic sense to denote the broad and heterogeneous class that includes such states as anger, fear, love, sympathy, and the like, we also indicate the more specific terms used by an author when a difference in connotation is implied.

The Classical Period: The Primacy of Reason

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of the Classical Period was a questioning attitude, epitomized by Socrates, and a conviction that the world could be understood through rational inquiry. Of course, not everyone shared this view, as the antics of Greek gods amply attests, not to mention the fact that Socrates was condemned to death in 399 B.C.E., ostensibly for casting doubt on the gods and corrupting the youth of Athens through his questioning. Nevertheless, theories of emotions (pathos) during this period can only be understood against the backdrop of generally high esteem accorded reason.

We owe to Plato (427-347 B.C.E.), Socrates’s most illustrious disciple, one of the most enduring images of the relation between emotion and reason. In the Phaedrus (pp. 246b, 253d, trans. 1961), Plato imaged a charioteer (Reason) attempting to control two unruly steeds, each representing a different class of emotion. One steed, the “spirited emotions” epitomized by anger, guarded against threats to the self, either from enemies without or impulses from within; if not reined in, however, this steed could itself usurp reason’s authority. The other steed represented the baser passions (sex, greed, etc.), which also need the guidance of reason lest they threaten the
good of the whole. It is an image that evokes not only the supremacy of reason, but of inherent intrapsychic conflict. A similar image was invoked over two millennia later by Freud, with the ego serving as charioteer, and the superego and id as the two steeds.

In a manner less allegorical, but still for reasons more symbolic than factual (Averill, 1974), Plato localized rational thought in the head, the spirited emotions in the region about the heart, and the baser passions in the torso below the midriff, as far from reason as they could be.

Like Plato, Aristotle (ca. 384-322 B.C.E.) envisioned a threefold division of the psyche; but unlike Plato, he interpreted the psyche in a more naturalistic fashion, specifically, as the capacity of a living body to engage in certain activities. To use one of Aristotle’s own analogies, if the eye had a psyche, its psyche would be seeing. Each organism has a psyche appropriate to its kind. Plants, for example, have the capacity to grow and reproduce; animals have, in addition, the capacity to perceive and move about; and humans have the capacity for rational thought.

The emotions are “located” in the sensitive faculty, common to humans and infrahuman animals. Aristotle’s most general definition of emotion was simply “feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b21, trans. 1947). Of course, not all pleasures are alike, nor all pains—different emotions arise depending on the eliciting event and the corresponding response. For example, anger is “an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends” (Rhetoric, 1378a30, trans. 1941).

The emotions have their proper place, according to Aristotle, provided they are experienced in moderation and in accordance with reason: “For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and
too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1106b20, trans. 1947).

It is clear that Aristotle left the relation between emotion and reason ambiguous. On the one hand, the emotions are treated as automatic responses to provocations that are perceived intuitively, at the sensory level of the psyche. On the other hand, as the above quotations suggest, emotions are inextricably linked to “higher” thought processes.

The above ambiguity was resolved by the Stoics. Stoicism was founded by Zeno of Citium (c. 340-265 B.C.E.) and was named after the open colonnade (*stoa*) in Athens where he taught. Stoicism flourished for over 500 years, ultimately becoming the dominant civic philosophy of the Roman Empire. Much of the writings of the early Stoics have been lost, so we draw here primarily on the work of the Roman Stoic, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 B.C.E.-65 C.E.).

The Stoics rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian division of the human psyche into parts; rather, they conceived it to be unitary, characterized by reason. This meant that the emotions, too, must be part of the rational faculty. Or, as Seneca put it, reason and passion are not distinct, but are “only the transformation of the mind toward the better or worse” (*Seneca, On Anger*, I. viii. 3). Take anger: “while it is the foe of reason, it is nevertheless born only where reason dwells” (*Seneca, On Anger*, I. iii. 4). And so it is with the other emotions. Only a being capable of making correct (rational) judgments is susceptible to false judgments; and emotions are just that—false judgments. It follows that the emotions are not commendable in moderation, as Aristotle asserted. To say that it is acceptable to be moderately emotional is equivalent to saying that it is acceptable
to be moderately wrong. For the Stoics, emotions were literally pathologies of the mind. To the extent possible, they should be cured, not moderated. The ways such “cures” might be effected compares favorably to contemporary cognitive-behavioral therapies (Nussbaum, 1994).

Among the objections to the Stoic thesis that emotions are “born only where reason dwells” is the fact that children before the age of reason and dumb animals seem to show signs of emotion; so, too, do Stoic philosophers when confronted, say, with life-threatening danger, even though philosophers presumably have learned to refrain from making irrational judgments.

To defend the notion that emotions are (irrational) judgments, Seneca—following the lead of earlier Stoics—made a historically important distinction between two kinds of assessments: (a) an initial appraisal that a thing is good or bad, and (b) a secondary appraisal that it is appropriate to react, either overtly or covertly, to that initial assessment. Fear, for example, involves an assessment that (a) danger threatens, and (b) it is appropriate to avoid the danger. The initial assessment may lead to a “first movement,” such as pallor or trembling; this automatic reaction is, however, preliminary to the emotion itself, which involves the additional assessment that one should flee.

Lest this answer appear to beg the question, note that some contemporary theories observe a similar distinction, but make the opposite identification. That is, the real emotion is identified with an immediate reaction that may last for only moments; subsequent cognitive elaborations leading to coping responses are dismissed as secondary elaborations. This reconceptualization of “first movements” as the real emotions has obvious implications for theories of emotion.

*The Medieval Period: Volition Rivals Reason*
The medieval period reflects the confluence of two main streams of thought, Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian. The merger was not easy. As described above, the Greeks and Romans generally considered reason to be the regnant faculty of the human mind. The Judeo-Christian tradition placed greater value on faith in God as revealed by the scripture. The idea that human reason is capable of comprehending an omniscient God was considered by early Christians as akin to blasphemy; yet, people of good will might believe or have faith in that which they could not fully comprehend. The will was thus elevated to a status commensurate with reason, although it, too, was recognized as limited. People cannot always do what they will, any more than they can rationally comprehend what they believe: Ultimately, faith depends on the Grace of God.

The shift from the Classical to medieval world views is well illustrated by the altered conception of “first movements.” Recall that the Stoics denied that initial stirrings to a provocative stimulus (e.g., pallor when faced with danger) were emotions per se; rather, they became emotions only when given assent. Under the influence of early church fathers, first movements became temptations, incipient emotions in their own right.

The early medieval period is best epitomized by St. Augustine’s (354-430) entreaty to God: “Grant me chastity and continency—but not yet” (Confessions, VIII, 7, trans. 1948). Augustine recognized a broad class of emotional phenomena—the affections (affectiones)—of which the passions are a subcategory. It is appropriate to experience affections, he argued, provided they are appropriately directed. Referring to the Stoic ideal of imperturbability, Augustine suggested that people who “are not roused or stirred, moved or swayed by any emotion (affectu) at all, they rather suffer a total loss of humanity than attain true tranquility. For it does not follow that if a thing is hard, it must be right, or that if it is inert, it must be healthy” (City of
Only the subset of affections called passions are contrary to nature and hence to be avoided.

It is to Augustine that we owe what is called the “principle of interiorization,” namely, that the soul has direct knowledge of itself: “Seek not abroad, turn back into thy self, for in the inner man dwells the truth” (*De vera religione*, cited by Ellenberger, 1970, p. 450). As far as the emotions are concerned, when Augustine turned inward, what he found was seemingly unfathomable: “Man is a great deep, Lord. You number his very hairs and they are not lost in your sight: but the hairs of his head are easier to number than his affections and the movements of his heart” (*Confessions*, IV, 14, trans. 1948).

How might the multiplicity of emotions be reduced to a more manageable number, one easily grasped by humans? Earlier, the Stoics had addressed this question by recognizing four fundamental emotions: desire, joy, fear, and grief. Augustine went a step further and reduced these four to a single underlying principle: love (*amor*): “[T]he love that is bent on obtaining the object of its love is desire, while the love that possesses and enjoys its object is joy; the love that avoids what confronts it is fear, and the love that feels it when it strikes is grief” (*City of God*, XIV, vii, trans. 1966). The goal of reducing various emotions to the vicissitudes of an underlying drive or motivational force has been a recurrent theme in Western theories of emotion. We will meet it again, for example, in the *conatus* of Spinoza and the *libido* of Freud.

Augustine’s life coincided roughly with the disintegration of the Roman Empire in the West. The ensuing middle ages have been described by some historians (e.g., Elias, 1978) as a period of emotional instability and the uninhibited expression of primitive impulses, reflecting a harsh and precarious existence. Other historians (e.g. Rosenwein, 1998) have questioned this
interpretation, noting that emotions that seem “uncivilized” by modern standards were actually well-attuned to, and helped reinforce the political culture of the time. Be that as it may, by the thirteenth century, the political and intellectual climate of Europe was beginning to change, as reflected in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). It was largely through Aquinas that the work of Aristotle was reintroduced to the Latin West, initially under the influence of Arabic sources.

Like Aristotle, Aquinas recognized three levels of the soul: the intellectual (uniquely human), sensitive (common to human and animals), and vegetative (common also to plants). The sensitive level included not only the ability to perceive objects but also to intuit their potential for benefit or harm, and to respond accordingly. To illustrate the process, Aquinas used the example of a lamb frightened by a wolf (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a. 78. 4, trans. 1970). The lamb apprehends the wolf not simply as an animal of a certain size, color, etcetera; it also recognizes the wolf as a “natural enemy” that portends harm, and hence the lamb experiences fear and flees.

In humans, with the power to reason and will, another complexity is added. A shepherd, for example, might decide to remain and protect his sheep in spite of the danger. Following a by now familiar tradition, Aquinas referred to volitions at the intellectual level as affects rather than passions (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a. 82. 5, trans. 1970). With regard to the passions proper, Aquinas made another historically important distinction, namely, between irascible and concupiscible emotions. This distinction was implicit in Plato’s division between the spirited and appetitive elements of the psyche, and it was made explicit by Aristotle, but not treated in a systematic fashion. Aquinas made it central to his classification of emotions (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a. 81. 2, trans. 1970).
Briefly, an object of emotion can be appraised not only as beneficial or harmful, but also as easy or difficult to obtain or avoid. If the object can be obtained or avoided without difficulty, the result is a concupiscible emotion, such as love or joy. If difficulties exist, the result is an irascible emotion. Anger (ira), from which the category receives its name, is the epitome of an irascible emotion, but other emotions, such as hope and despair, also belong to the category.

The distinction between concupiscible and irascible emotions is of more than historical interest. Some later theorists (e.g., Descartes, but especially following Darwin) have focused primarily on concupiscible emotions, that is, on straightforward impulses to action, whether of biological (“instincts”—McDougall, 1936) or psychological (Frijda, 1986) origin. Other theorists (e.g., Paulhan, 1887/1930; Dewey, 1894, 1895; Hebb, 1946; Mandler, 1984; Oatley, 1992) contend that emotions arise only when impulses are blocked or interrupted; that is, emotions are inherently irascible. Freudian psychoanalysis would also fall within the latter tradition, as will be discussed shortly.

The Early Modern Period: Mechanism Contra Humanism

The early modern era is marked by an emphasis on the Sciences and Humanities. Both trends originated in the Renaissance. Although of a common origin, the sciences and humanities have diverged over the centuries, resulting in what C. P. Snow (1963) has described as two cultures. Each “culture” also has had considerable impact on theories of emotion. Science has resulted in the mechanization of emotion; the humanities, a humanization of emotion.

The mechanization of emotion. Descartes (1596-1650) epitomizes the scientific approach. He professed to reject all teaching on emotion that came before. With hindsight, of course, Descartes’s rejection of tradition was not as radical as he believed. Most importantly, he retained
the fundamental distinction between actions and passions, as well as the notion that emotions are common to humans and infrahuman animals. The way he combined these two ideas was, however, unique.

Emotions, according to Descartes (1649/1968), are actions of the body that, when impressed on the mind, result in passions of the soul. More specifically, “animal spirits” (especially fine-grained substances) that arise about the heart and course through the veins, result in passions of the soul when they impact on the pineal gland, a small organ near the center of the brain. The entire process was conceived by Descartes to be strictly mechanical. The body of a dog, say, to the extent that it was similar to the body of a human, responded in a similar manner. Dogs, however, could not suffer passions of the soul, for the obvious reason (to Descartes) that they had no soul. By contrast, Descartes maintained that actions of the soul, which consist of deliberate, rational thought, are uniquely human and cannot be explained in strictly mechanical terms.

With regard to function, Descartes speculated that emotions helped to sustain motions of the body in the absence of external stimulation. Thus, the sight of a bear might cause a person to flee. But once the bear was out of sight, something else was needed so that the person did not stop running until safety was reached. The animal spirits, impacting on the pineal gland, served that purpose.

Descartes’s mechanization of the emotions was given a mentalistic twist by the British Empiricists, especially Hume (1711-1776). According to Dixon (2003) Hume was the first to use the term “emotion” regularly (albeit not consistently) to refer to the passions. Dixon further traces the use of “emotion” as it came to be preferred over “passion,” first among the Scottish moral philosophers (e.g., Thomas Brown) and later by such notables as Bain, Spencer, Darwin, and
James. We will have more to say about the last two theorists—Darwin and James—in a later section.

Dixon (2003) maintains that the contemporary concept of emotion is overly inclusive and has masked the subtleties in earlier conceptions (e.g., “passions,” “affections,” “sentiments”), especially with regard to the relation of emotions to reason, intellect, and will. In particular, he claims that the view of the emotions “as a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary feelings, is a recent invention” (p. 3). That may be true, but mechanization is not the only recent invention as far as the emotions are concerned.

_The humanization of emotion._ We have seen how, in the long sweep of Western history, the emotions typically have been treated as a reflection of the animal in human nature, or if recognized as human, then as irrational, misguided judgments. But there is a third alternative, namely, emotions are a hallmark of humanity, that which sets humans apart from infrahuman animals and complex but lifeless automata.

Two theorists epitomize the humanist movement at the beginning of the modern period: Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Erasmus was a Renaissance scholar whose work preceded the major advances that have come to be known as the Scientific Revolution. Nevertheless, he was wont to poke fun at the pretensions of those, including himself, who placed too high a value on the fruits of reason. One of his most popular works, _Praise of Folly_ (1508/1989), was a satire in which emotion (Folly) proves superior to reason as a source of wisdom.

Rousseau lived more than two centuries after Erasmus, and thus had a greater opportunity to witness both the advantages and disadvantages of scientific progress. He saw mostly...
disadvantages. His novel *Emile* depicts the ideal education of a young man and woman, an education focused, at least in the early years, on the cultivation and refinement of emotions (Rousseau, 1762/1911). But Rousseau was somewhat of an anomaly for the time in which he lived. For the most part, the eighteenth century is known as the Enlightenment, the motto of which, in Kant’s (1784/1986, p. 263) words, was *Sapere aude!*—dare to reason! Rousseau, however, was not alone in his critique of reason, and a reaction ultimately set in as the advancement of science led, not to greater prosperity and freedom for the majority, but to concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few, urban slums, child labor, degradation of the environment, and other social ills. Thus, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment gave way to the nineteenth-century Romanticism.

Romanticism was more a literary and social movement than a scientific one. Yet, its influence on the science of emotion can still be felt. Existentialism, for example, is part of that legacy (cf. Solomon, 1976); so, too, is the human potential movement in psychology (e.g., Maslow, 1971; Rogers, 1961) and its latest incarnation, “positive psychology,” which emphasizes the more functional aspects of emotion (Snyder & Lopez, 2002).

*Bridging the divide.* The division between mechanistic and humanistic orientations is overly simplistic. Many theorists do not fall easily into one group or the other. Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), a younger contemporary of Descartes, is an early—and still relevant (Damasio, 2003; Frijda, 2000)—example. Spinoza was much influenced by the advancement of science in his day, to which he contributed in a minor way, for example, as a lens grinder for scientific instruments and by conducting experiments in optics. Spinoza’s influence, however, has been greater in the humanities than in the sciences. Among other things, he is considered one of the
founders of hermeneutics (Curley, 1994), which involves the interpretation of texts and, in an extended sense, the interpretation of behavior conceived in narrative terms.

Spinoza’s (1677/1967) analysis of emotion is contained in his *Ethics*. As the title of Part Four of this work suggests, Spinoza considered the emotions to be a form “Of Human Bondage.” Freedom from that bondage is to be gained through reason, but not reason in the sense of a separate faculty distinct from the emotions. In contrast to Descartes, Spinoza rejected any dualism between mind and body, reason and emotion. There exists but a single substance, he argued, of which the mental and physical are but two aspects or manifestations. Like the convex and concave sides of an arc, the two aspects do not interact, although a change in one necessarily involves a change in the other. Analogously, a change in thought is necessarily associated with a change in the body, and vice versa.

Spinoza recognized three broad domains of emotion: Desire, Joy, and Sadness. Desire reflects the tendency (*conatus*) of each individual to persevere in his or her own being. Joy is the passion that occurs when one’s being is enhanced; sorrow, when it is diminished. Specific emotions arise when one or more of these basic passions is conjoined with an idea of an external cause. For example, lust is the immoderate *desire* for sexual intercourse; love is *joy* accompanied by the idea of an eliciting object; and hatred is *sorrow* accompanied by the idea of its provocation. Spinoza described numerous other, more complex emotions; but he did not try to be exhaustive; indeed, he recognized “that so many variations can arise, that no limits can be assigned to their number” (*Ethics*, Part III, Prop.LIX, Note). This is not as picturesque as saying that the emotions are more numerous than the hairs on a man’s head (Augustine), but the idea is similar.
If emotions are a kind of human bondage, as Spinoza believed, the question arises: How do we break those bonds. According to Spinoza (1677/1967), an emotion “ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (*Ethics*, Part V, Prop. III). Specifically, if we change our thoughts (increase our knowledge) about the causes of an emotion, the emotion is necessarily transformed from a more passive to a more active state.

Spinoza’s conception of emotion as inadequate knowledge is reminiscent of the Stoics and has similar implications for the treatment of emotional disorders. Looking forward rather than backwards in history, the philosopher Nietzsche could assert with reference to Spinoza, “I have a forerunner, and what a forerunner!” (quoted by Moreau, 1996). Freud, who in turn regarded Nietzsche as a forerunner, has also been described as a “crypto-Spinozist” (Neu, 1977). We will have more to say about Freud shortly.

**Twentieth-Century Developments**

In the preceding historical sketches, we took one or at most a few figures to represent entire epochs or movements. That clearly neglects the diversity of opinion that existed at any particular time. When we turn to twentieth-century developments, we try to capture some of that diversity. Specifically, we describe briefly seven current approaches to emotion: evolutionary, psychodynamic, dimensional, phenomenological, psychophysiological, behaviorist, and social-constructionist. Each approach represents continuities with the past, as though the contents of the previous 2,500 years were poured into the twentieth century, with some new ingredients added. We present the approaches in no particular order of importance.

*Evolutionary approaches.* Probably no earlier thinker has influenced twentieth-century ideas about emotions more than Darwin. His theory of evolution seemed to give scientific
legitimacy and rationale to the long tradition of treating the emotions as common to human and infrahuman animals (cf. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes). After Darwin, many theorists came to view emotions as instinctive reactions bequeathed to us through natural selection. Early in the century, William McDougall was a prominent advocate of this position. His *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, first published in 1908 went through 23 editions during his lifetime, the last in 1936, two years before his death—and it is still in print. In spite of its title, this is more a book on emotion than on social psychology. And although McDougall’s “hormic psychology” (as it came to be called) went out of fashion during the mid-decades of the century, many of the issues he raised have regained prominence—and controversy—in the fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.

Darwin’s *Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals* (1872/1965) also gave impetus to one of the dominant topics for empirical research during the twentieth-century, namely, expressive reactions (Ekman, 1984). Darwin argued that many emotional expressions are without adaptive value, being, rather, remnants of an evolutionary past or even the adventitious products of an overly excited nervous system. Subsequent research has indicated that expressive reactions have greater functional significance than Darwin assumed. As Fridlund (1992) has pointed out, Darwin made his arguments, in part, to counter the generally accepted belief that human and animal features are products of special creation, put there by God for the benefit of humankind. Darwin may have been wrong as far as expressive reactions are concerned, but the general thrust of his argument remains valid: Many anatomical and behavioral features of humans are inexplicable in terms of “Intelligent Design” (the contemporary version of the creationist thesis), but are readily
explicable as nonfunctional—even, in some instances, dysfunctional—remnants of our evolutionary past.

Darwin also gave new meaning to the idea of basic emotions. As long as there have been classifications of emotions, some have been considered more basic than others. For example, Aquinas included hope and courage among the basic emotions; Descartes included wonder; and Hume gave a prominent place to pride. Following Darwin, however, “basic” came to be used almost exclusively in a biological sense. In subtle ways, this has biased much of twentieth-century thinking about emotions. Most academic psychologists consider themselves to be “basic scientists.” It is only natural, therefore, that they should focus on emotions that are also considered “basic,” that is, biologically primitive.

Psychodynamic approaches. As it spans the twentieth century, the psychodynamic approach involves many noteworthy figures: Freud, Jung, Adler, Rank, Horney, to mention a few early representatives, as well as later ego-psychologists and object-relation theorists. Among the latter, John Bowlby deserves special mention for his influential work on vicissitudes of attachment (as opposed to sex) as a foundation for later emotional development, including separation anxiety, love, and grief (see Bowlby, 1969-1980). In spite of the diversity of theorists within the psychodynamic tradition, we limit our remarks to a few observations on Freud’s approach to emotion.

Freud, it has often been noted, had two intertwined theories. One, his “metatheory,” was modeled after late nineteenth-century physics and was couched in terms of causal mechanisms, energy distribution, cathexes, and the like. His “clinical theory,” by contrast, was couched in terms
of wishes, conflicts, subterfuges, and purposive behavior more broadly. The nature of this
distinction has importance beyond Freud, so we expand on it briefly.

Bruner (1986) has described two approaches to understanding human behavior, the
“paradigmatic” and the “narrative,” that help clarify Freud’s two theories. The paradigmatic
approach is scientific in the traditional sense; that is, it relies on general principles, cause-and-effect relations, logic, and objective data. The narrative approach is hermeneutic in an extended
sense: It seeks meaning in the stories people tell about themselves; revealing often hidden
intentions and desires; the goal is less to explain behavior in an objective sense than to establish
possibilities for new experiences. Put somewhat differently, “paradigmatic truth” sees a
correspondence between theoretical constructs and some external reality, whereas “narrative
truth” establishes coherence in the seemingly incongruent aspects of a person’s life.

Using Bruner’s terms, Freud’s “metatheory” was paradigmatic; his “clinical theory,”
narrative. Bruner’s distinction can also be applied cross-culturally. To anticipate discussion later
in this chapter, Western approaches to emotion generally have tended toward the paradigmatic,
whereas Chinese approaches have tended toward the narrative. But our concern at the moment is
with Freud.

Although strongly influenced by Darwin, Freud’s concept of instinct—or, more accurately,
drive (Trieb)—was so broad as to lose much of its biological implications. For example, in
conformity with social strictures libido can, according to Freud, be transformed into an indefinite
variety of emotional syndromes. Among the possibilities are transformations idiosyncratic to an
individual, namely, hysterical reactions. In Freud’s (1917/1963) own words, a hysterical reaction
is “a freshly constructed individual affect” (p. 396). Obviously, not all emotionally arousing
situations are idiosyncratic to the individual. Drawing on the view, common in his time, that experiences oft repeated could ultimately become inherited (a view, incidentally, shared by Darwin), Freud (1917/1963) described widely shared emotions (i.e., those recognized as standard within a culture) as hysterical reactions that had become part of our biological inheritance. The idea that acquired characteristics can be inherited has been discredited; however, Freud’s ideas regarding the malleability of emotional syndromes under social influence continues to be important.

Earlier, we cited Neu’s (1977) description of Freud as a crypto-Spinozist. That description extends beyond the similarity between Spinoza’s *conatus* and Freud’s *libido*, each of which could be transformed into an indefinite variety of specific emotions. More fundamentally, Freud, like Spinoza, believed the way to ameliorate a maladaptive emotion (passion, hysterical reaction) is through increased understanding of its causes; as Freud described the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, “Where id was, there ego shall be” (1933/1965, p. 71). Finally, with regard to method, as a founder of hermeneutics, Spinoza anticipated the kind of “narrative truth” implicit in Freud’s clinical theory and advocated explicitly by many contemporary psychoanalysts (e.g., Spence, 1982).

*Dimensional approaches.* Darwin was a biologist and naturalist; Freud was a neurologist and physician: Neither held an academic position. The most prominent academic psychologist at the turn of the twentieth century was Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920). Wundt originally viewed feelings (*Gefühle*), the presumed building blocks out of which complex emotional experiences are constructed, as an attribute of sensation. Specifically, in addition to quality and intensity, sensations could vary in feeling tone, from pleasant to unpleasant. In 1896, however, Wundt
separated feelings from sensations, treating them as a distinct class of elements within consciousness. This was equivalent to an internationally prominent chemist announcing a new class of physical elements, distinct from those contained in the familiar periodic table.

Feelings, Wundt (1897) now suggested, could be ordered within a dimensional space formed by three bipolar factors: pleasantness-unpleasantness (*Lust-Unlust*), excitement-inhibition (*Erregung-Hemmung*), and tension-relaxation (*Spannung-Lösung*). This tridimensional theory of feeling quickly became the subject of controversy. Introspective reports under controlled conditions suggested that the dimensions of excitement-inhibition and tension-relaxation could be “reduced” to bodily sensations, or else they were confounded with feelings of pleasantness-unpleasantness, or they were associated with other sensory attributes through past experience (Titchener, 1908). Only pleasantness-unpleasantness seemed to remain as an unalloyed dimension of feelings. But additional research suggested that it, too, might be reducible to organic sensations (Nafe, 1924).

Wundt’s tridimensional theory does not depend, however, on introspection, nor on an identification of emotions with feelings. Facial expressions (Schlosberg, 1954) and the connotative meaning of words (Osgood, 1969) also suggest that emotions can be arrayed in a three-dimensional space roughly equivalent to that proposed by Wundt. More recently, Russell (2003) has made a similar proposal, referring to the dimensions as “core affects.” Time will tell whether history repeats itself with regard to the fate of this newer tridimensional theory.

*Phenomenological/existentialist/cognitive approaches.* A different approach to feelings of emotion can be traced to Wundt’s contemporary, Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Brentano was an Aristotelian and Thomistic (Aquinas) scholar. The distinguishing characteristic of mental
phenomena, Brentano (1874/1971) argued, is that they take an object. When angry, for example, a person must be angry at something; when afraid, afraid of something; when in love, in love with someone; and so forth. The object need not actually exist; in a sense, it is created (actualized) in the act of becoming angry, frightened, or in love. Technically, the directedness of mental phenomena is known as intentionality.

Brentano’s major contribution to the psychology of emotion was through his students, among them Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, and Scheler, who applied phenomenological principles to the analysis of emotion. Contrary to Wundtian introspection, the goal of “phenomenological reduction” is not to break consciousness down into elements, but to analyze it without presuppositions. Through vicissitudes that need not concern us here, phenomenology became allied with existentialism, and the latter’s emphasis on freedom of choice. We will limit our few remarks to Sartre (1905-1960).

For Sartre (1948) emotions are ways of “magically” transforming the world to fit our needs and desires. To illustrate, Sartre retells Aesop’s fable of the fox and grapes. When the fox realizes that the grapes are out of his reach, he concludes they are sour. In phenomenological terms, the sour grapes are the intentional object, a product of the fox’s frustration and disappointment. An important implication of Sartre’s analysis is that emotions are a matter of choice, and hence we are responsible for what we do or think while in an emotional state (Solomon, 1976).

In addition to existential phenomenology, Bretano’s influence is perhaps most evident today in appraisal theory, introduced by Magda Arnold. Arnold (1960) acknowledged Sartre’s a “careful phenomenological analysis,” but criticized “his fascination with the way in which
emotion changes the world” (p. 170). She therefore undertook her own phenomenological analysis. An emotion, she concluded, is “the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as good (beneficial) or away from anything appraised as bad (harmful)” (p. 182, emphasis in original). By appraisal, Arnold meant a sense judgment, that is, an immediate, nonintellectual assessment of the potential benefit or harm a perceived object might have for the individual. This process occurs on the animal as well as the human level. Recall the example by Aquinas, cited earlier, of a lamb becoming frightened when it recognizes a wolf as a natural enemy. Indeed, Arnold’s approach, including her classification of emotions, owes much to Aquinas, as well as to Brentano and his followers.

Contemporary appraisal theory addresses two main issues: The first issue concerns the ways in which appraisals help distinguish among different emotions, or, in phenomenological terms, the link between an emotion and its intentional object. For example, anger and envy may both lead to aggression and have similar physiological accompaniments; what distinguishes them is how the person appraises the instigation—as an unjustified affront in the case of anger or an unfavorable comparison with the self in the case of envy. The link between an emotion and its object, it might be noted, is conceptual, not contingent; for example, appraising an event as an unjustified affront is part of what we mean by anger. However, empirical research can help identify the dimensions along which appraisals vary (Roseman, 1991).

The second issue addressed by appraisal theory concerns the processes or “steps” that lead from the initial rudiments of perception and memory to a full-blown emotional experience (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). With this issue, the study of emotion becomes thoroughly embedded in contemporary cognitive psychology.
Psychophysiological and neurocognitive approaches. Another early critic of Wundt was William James (1842-1910). In an 1887 letter to Carl Stumpf, James compared Wundt’s prodigious corpus of writings to a worm: When cut to pieces by criticism, each piece wiggles off in a new direction (in H. James, 1920, p. 67). James could have said the same about his own theory of emotion, the central thesis of which is that “bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (1890, Vol.2, p. 449, emphasis in original). When cut to pieces on physiological and conceptual grounds (e.g., Cannon, 1927), James’ theory simply wiggled off in different directions, for example, the two-factor theory of Schachter (1964), the facial feedback theory of Tomkins (1981), and the somatic marker theory of Damasio (1994). According to Schachter’s two-factor theory, physiological arousal provides an undifferentiated quale to emotional experience, whereas cognitive appraisals differentiate among emotions; according to Tomkin’s facial feedback theory, proprioceptive feedback from the richly innervated facial musculature helps differentiate among emotions; and according to Damasio’s somatic-marker theory, physiological reactions to emotional events provide information, without necessarily entering into conscious awareness, for further reasoning and action.

James considered his theory to be an original insight. It wasn’t. In addition to Descartes and Spinoza, Titchener (1914) quotes from 18 authors (e.g., Malebranche, LaMettrie, Cabanis, Bichat, Lamarck, Lotze) who had previously articulated a position similar to that of James. “All in all,” Titchener concluded, “James’ acceptance of the complete novelty of his theory must, I believe, be left to stand as something of a curiosity in the history of psychology” (p. 446).
James was generally quite careful in giving credit to others, as indicated by his inclusion of the Danish physician Carl Lange in what is now known as the James-Lange theory. But given the pre-Jamesian theories documented by Titchener, it is hardly surprising that post-Jamesian theories should also proliferate. There is, after all, an irrefutable grain of truth to the idea that bodily changes contribute to the experience of emotion. A grain of truth, however, does not make a loaf, and James’ theory is only a partial explanation, at best. James seemed to recognize this fact: In his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902/1961), one of the most provocative early twentieth-century works on emotion (not just religious), James found few occasions to refer to his own prior theory.

In recent decades the psychophysiological study of emotion has shifted from an emphasis on peripheral responses (visceral changes and expressive reactions) to an emphasis on central neural mechanisms. This shift, which reflects Cannon’s (1927) views more than James’s, is due, in part, to the development of increasingly sophisticated technologies (e.g., neuroimaging) to trace the activity of the brain during emotional episodes. As a result a new discipline, *cognitive neuroscience* (Lane & Nadel, 2000; Panksepp, 1998), is emerging, where “cognitive” means everything “mental,” emotions included.

As exciting and promising as these developments are, two cautions are in order: First, neurocognitive studies are necessarily limited to short-term emotions or to part-processes (such as the recognition of facial expressions) that can be studied under constrained laboratory conditions. The danger is that limitations imposed by methodology will impose limits on ideas about emotion. Second, we must be careful not to fall into what Uttal (2001) has called a “new phrenology,” replacing the question, What? with the more tractable question, Where?
Behavioral approaches. Behaviorism was initiated by John Watson (1919) who, by his own admission, was more comfortable doing research with animals than with humans. But unlike later ethologists (e.g., Tinbergen, Lorenz), Watson was more interested in learned than in inherited patterns of behavior. In this respect, he and other early behaviorists had their Russian counterparts, especially Pavlov (1926/1960). Behaviorism also owed a debt to psychoanalysis: If the major determinants of behavior occur below the surface of awareness, as Freud maintained, then conscious experience could not provide a firm foundation on which to build a science of psychology.

Although no longer considered fundamental on theoretical grounds, a distinction is commonly drawn between classical (Pavlovian) and instrumental (Skinnerian) conditioning. Except for a few “basic” emotions or primary drives, most behaviorists assumed emotions to be classically conditioned responses. This is yet another incarnation of the ancient distinction between passions (classically conditioned) and actions (instrumentally conditioned). Skinner, undoubtedly the most influential behaviorist of the last half of the century, broke with this tradition by interpreting emotions instrumentally, that is, in terms of what a person does rather than how a person feels or responds physiologically. Skinner (1963/1988) was particularly critical of the postulation of feelings as causes of behavior. Instead, he suggested that feelings be analyzed as a another form of behavior: To illustrate, a hallucination is a clear example of an experience that a person does; veridical perceptions are no different in principle, he argued, and neither are emotional feelings.

Social-constructionist approaches. Emotions do not exist only in the heart or mind of the autonomous individual. With few exceptions (e.g., some fears to immediate dangers), emotions
are inherently social phenomena and can only be understood as part the culture in which they have meaning. This is a central tenet of social-constructionist approaches (Harré, 1986). Like most contemporary approaches, social-constructionism has its roots in the nineteenth century and earlier. Conceptually, it is related to the sociology of knowledge (e.g., Marx, Mannheim) as applied to everyday life (Berger & Luckmann, 1966); empirically, it draws on cultural differences in emotional syndromes (e.g., as documented by anthropologists) and on individual differences in the way emotions are experienced and expressed (see earlier discussion of Freud and the psychodynamic tradition).

More specifically, from a social-constructionist approach, emotions are organized patterns of responses, no one component of which (whether feelings, thoughts, or behavioral reactions) is necessary or sufficient for the whole. To say that emotional responses are organized implies principles of organization. For some components, such as certain facial expressions, and even for some simple emotional syndromes, such as sudden fright, the primary organizing principles may have been hard-wired into the nervous system during evolution, as Darwin suggested. From a social-constructionist perspective, however, the primary organizing principles for most emotions are implicit beliefs or folk-theories of emotion.

Social constructionism also views emotional episodes as unfolding over time, sometimes lasting for hours, days, or even months or years (as in the case of grief or love). For all but the briefest episodes, emotional responses are constructed “on line,” drawing on the person’s unique talents, past experiences, and current concerns, as well as on the exigencies of the situation. In the process, a great deal of improvisation on culturally specified norms is possible, even inevitable.

Concluding Observations on Twentieth-century Ideas about Emotion
The above seven approaches (evolutionary, psychodynamic, dimensional, phenomenological, psychophysiological, behavioral, and social-constructionist) might seem like the work of the blind men of Indostan, each of whom examined one part of an elephant and concluded that the whole must be like the part. The analogy, however, is misleading. Each approach considers the emotional elephant in its entirety, but from a different angle. Thus, the approaches are not mutually exclusive; indeed, over the century they have intersected and enriched one another in many ways. However, like viewing an elephant with clear vision, but from different angles, the approaches do not allow easy synthesis into a single perspective.

This raises another issue. When reviewing the near (twentieth century) history of emotion, details loom large. If this chapter were being written in the twenty-fourth century, how many of those details would then seem relevant? Obviously, this rhetorical question cannot be answered with any certainty. However, a hint of an answer can be gained by taking into account psychology’s long history as well as its short past. Issues that have survived the tests of centuries are liable to remain important in the future.

Eastern Theories of Emotion

In contrast to our overview of Western theories, which straddled diverse cultures from ancient Greece and Rome to Modern Europe and America, we now focus on a single culture, namely, China. This limitation is due partly to space, but it also reflects our own expertise. (Louise Sundararajan, ne.Kuen-Wei Lu, was educated in Taiwan as well as the United States).

The overview of Chinese theories requires a somewhat lengthy introduction because of the unfamiliar intellectual terrain we are now entering. In the West, philosophy and, more recently, science have been major sources of ideas about the emotions. That is not as true in China.
Although the early texts came out of philosophical schools, similar in time to the Greco-Roman period in Western history, the successors to Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) were schooled in poetry more than in philosophical enquiry. By contrast, although literature, especially poetry, has influenced Western theories of emotion (cf. Romanticism), that influence has been mostly indirect and tangential.

**Chinese Concepts of Emotion**

Broadly conceived as a kind of feeling, *qing* (*ch’ing*) is the term closest in meaning to “emotion.” In its original sense, as documented in pre-Han texts (500-200 B.C.E.), *qing* meant “genuine,” “the facts,” or “what essentially is” (Graham, 1986, p. 63). As something genuine, *qing* and *xing* (nature) are overlapping concepts. *Qing* is often used in combination with *gan* to mean emotion in a more narrow sense (*gan qing* or *qing gan*). *Gan* is a verb meaning “affect”/“stir” or “affected”/“moved”. In still other combinations, *qing* can refer to mood (*qing xu*), personality or natural inclinations (*xing qing*), and circumstance or condition (*qing kuang*).

In early Chinese philosophy, the broad definition of *qing* as feelings in general was not a concern. At stake, was not so much the distinction between mental agony, say, and a toothache, but between a thing and its mental representation—its name/concept. In this philosophical context, the notion of *qing* gains importance because of its emphasis on experience in general. Hansen (1995) notes that *qing* serves as the “authentic standard” (p. 197). The implication is that without the “reality input” (p.198) of *qing*, names/concepts may become decoupled from experience. As a fundamental part of human nature, *qing* are presumed to be prior to culture. Thus, the seven “basic” *qing*—joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, hate, desire—are what humans are capable of “without learning” (Graham, 1986, p. 64). That feelings constitute the core of being
genuine is an assumption that runs deep in Chinese thought. Even the 20th century Chinese scholar Hsu Fu-kuan (1990) claims that “emotions are what is true in life” (p. 451).

What are the critical questions posed by the notion of feelings? One question is how the concept of emotion informs the experience of emotion. This is the question that drives formulations such as this: “the experience of emotion is a perceptual act, guided by conceptual knowledge about emotion” (Barrett, 2005, p. 256). The Chinese, however, are not concerned with the construction of meaning out of experience so much as the question of experience as mental representation, a concern best expressed by the semiotics of Charles Peirce (Colapietro, 1989): How does the mind present its constructed meaning to itself? This question is manifest in the self-reflexive tendency of the Chinese to render emotions the object of reflection. It is also manifest in the Chinese preoccupation with the different modes of emotion representation (experience proximate imagery versus experience distant conceptualization), as well as in their laborious deliberations over the different functions of emotion expression (to replicate or to explicate the experience). Examined in the following pages are these issues and concerns that drive the intellectual history of qing.

In presenting Western histories of emotion, we drew on the notion of a Gestalt or good form (Prägnanz) in order to fill in the gaps. We do something similar in presenting Chinese histories, but instead of speaking of a Gestalt we invoke the notion of “evocative image” (xing) to reinforce the shift in emphasis from a more cognitive-centered to a more affect-entered orientation.

We will have more to say about xing shortly. For the moment, we simply note that the image Westerners have of Chinese affective life is often incomplete, if not actually misleading.
For example, the anthropologist Potter (1988) reports that when Chinese villagers are asked how they feel about a particular event, a typical response might be, “How I feel doesn't matter.” She calls this attitude the “image of irrelevant affect.” Below, we offer a far different image, an affect central landscape the contours of which have been shaped by three schools of thought—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism.

**Emotion in Confucian Thought**

Whether or not we agree with some modern scholars that Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) is more legend than reality (Brooks & Brooks, 1998), his teachings are real, especially as transmitted by Hsün Tzu (c. 313-238 B.C.E.), Mencius (372-298 B.C.E.), and the Neo-Confucianists of the 12th century, such as Chu Hsi (1130-1200).

“In Confucianism we perceive a consistent and all pervading emphasis on the affective life of human beings. This emphasis on the feeling, emotional aspect of life was considered of primary importance in sustaining people in a human form of existence” (Berry, 2003, p. 96). Another pan-Chinese belief that finds an eloquent expression in Confucian philosophy is the profound “intercommunion of Heaven, earth, and humanity” (Berry, 2003, p. 97). This affective bond between ourselves and other things was the foundation for the “feeling of commiseration” or the “unbearing mind” (Fung, 1966, p. 283)—principles of sympathy that Mencius claimed to be innate, hence “the beginning of humanity.” For illustration, Mencius gave the hypothetical scenario of a child falling into the well:

Now, when men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with
the child’s parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity if they did not rescue the child]. From such a case, we see that a man without the feeling of commiseration is not a man... The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity. (Chan, 1969, p. 65)

In light of this affect-central perspective, the greatest contribution of Confucius to the Chinese civilization lies in his aesthetic vision of government (Hall & Ames, 1987) and his promotion of poetry (Sundararajan, 2002).

Confucian poetics. The text that sets the tone for centuries of Chinese literary thought is the Book of poetry (The She King, 1971), or the Odes, which was an anthology of over 300 poems allegedly edited by Confucius and included in his curriculum. The uniqueness of the Odes can be captured through one of its genres called “xing.” Xing literally means “stirring” or “arousing.” The arousing of one’s affectivity by poetry is considered by Confucius to be the fundamental first step, on the heels of which the rest of the Confucian program—rites and music—will ensue and complete the self-cultivation process:

Aroused [xing] by the Odes;
Established by the rites;
Brought into perfect focus by music. (Analects, 8/8, in Fang, 1954, p. ix).
In Chinese poetics, *xing* is a technical term that refers to one of the two types of indirect expression of emotions: *bi* (comparison) and *xing* (“evocative image”) (Wixted, 1983, p. 238). *Bi* is metaphor or simile, whereas *xing* has no western counterpart (Yu, 1987), although cognate ideas can be found in the Indian tradition of *dhvani* (Hogan, 1996). The major difference between these two tropes has traditionally been understood along the divide between explicitness and covertness. As metaphor or simile—such as “My love is a red, red rose”—*bi* is explicit in its signification. “Evocative image” in contrast does not have a clear connection between its source and target, thus it signifies in a “covert,” “latent,” or “concealed” way. Here is an evocative image from the *Odes*:

Kwan-kwan go the ospreys,

On the islet in the river.

The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady:--

For our prince a good mate she. (*The She King*, 1971, p. 1).

The connection between the ospreys and the prince’s sexual feelings is obscure, at best.

How does “evocative image” work? It works by the mechanism of priming. Owen (1992) claims that “Because the mechanism by which affective image [*xing*] functions is latent, its operations are interior and thus it works on the affections (ch’ing [qing]) directly, unmediated by the understanding” (p. 256). Thus the literary critic Chung Hung’s (469-518) definition of this term: “When meaning lingers on, though writing has come to an end, this is an ‘evocative image’ [*xing*]” (Wixted, 1983, p. 238).
Hsu (1990) claims that *xing*-based poetry is “purely expressive of emotions,” thus representative of what is unique about Chinese poetry (p. 105). How can a covert type of expression be most expressive of emotions? This makes sense when we realize that the best way, from the Chinese perspective, to convey what it is like to have certain emotional experience is to replicate, not explicate, that experience. Thus when moved by the stimuli, the poet uses imageries to evoke resonating moods and imageries in the reader; the reader/critic in turn can convey his/her understanding of the poem through resonating imagery (Yu, 1987).

As theory of emotion, the Confucian poetics makes three bold claims: (a) emotions entail not simply reactions to the vicissitudes of life but also actions initiated by the individual, as evidenced by the importance given to deliberate attempts to be “aroused” by poetry; (b) emotions are semiotic signs that inhabit the intersubjective space of a community of the mind; (c) better suited than symbolic thought, as exemplified by the use of metaphor (*bi*), for the illumination of emotions are the subsymbolic, nonpropositional processes of associative reasoning (Smith & Neumann, 2005), as exemplified by the use of imagery (*xing*). A cognate perspective is found in Western mysticism, which is well articulated by Rudolf Otto’s claim (1923/1970) that mystical experiences have no need for explications and explanations, but “can be firmly grasped, thoroughly understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the feeling itself” (p. 34).

*Emotion refinement.* Within the Western tradition, the regulation of emotion has been a consistent theme; within the Confucian tradition, it is more appropriate to speak of emotion refinement than regulation. One major difference between refinement and regulation is that the former does not necessarily imply the control of something bad, whereas the latter does. In
Confucianism, the assumption is generally made that human nature is intrinsically good, and that, by extension, the emotions (qing) are too. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. Hsün Tzu (c. 313-238 B.C.E.), for one, held that human nature is not all good, and hence some aspects of qing require regulation. According to Hsün Tzu’s formulation: “Nature is the tendency which is from Heaven. Qing is the substance of our nature. Desire is the response of qing in us.” (Hsün Tzu, ch. 24, adapted from Graham, 1986, p. 65, italics added). Desire needs regulation for two reasons: (a) it is one step removed from the source (human nature); and (b) it is a response to temptation, and hence corruptible. Thus, Hsün Tzu claimed that desires need to be kept in check as not to proliferate unnecessarily: “The desires of man’s qing are few, but everyone thinks that in his own qing the desires are many, which is a mistake” (Hsün Tzu, ch. 18, adapted from Graham, 1986, p. 65).

According to Hsün Tzu, the most important means of emotion regulation is li (rituals). He claimed that, as paraphrased by Fung: “the li provide regulation for the satisfaction of man’s desires.…But in the sense of ceremonies and rituals, the li . . . give refinement and purification to man’s emotions” (Hsün Tzu, ch. 19, in Fung, 1966, p. 147, emphasis added). Note that even in Hsün Tzu’s system, “regulation” tends to acquire the additional meaning of refinement: “The sacrificial rites are the expression of man’s affectionate longing. They represent the height of piety and faithfulness, of love and respect. They represent also the completion of propriety and refinement. . .” (p. 149, emphasis added).

Overall in the Confucian system it is difficult to make a compelling argument for the elimination or control of something intrinsically bad in emotions. For instance, desire is not intrinsically bad in the Analects of Confucius. To Confucius a desire is good or bad depending on
whose desire it is, a virtuous or a petty person. The main thrust therefore is on refinement, or self-cultivation. In its vision of the ideal state of emotions, refinement sets goals above and beyond regulation. The benchmarks of emotion refinement include more elusive goals such as creativity, growth and development. A case in point is Wang Fu-chih’s (1619-1692) vision of allowing emotions full sway: “Overcoming the restrictions of each of the four emotional activities [joy, anger, sadness, happiness], one allows these four emotions full sway; and moving freely within these four emotions, one prevents one’s own emotions from being clogged up. . . . The freedom of movement that man’s emotions enjoy knows no bounds” (cited in Wong, 1978, p. 142).

Emotion refinement differs from emotion regulation also in the locus of regulation: refinement is from within the emotion system; regulation is from without. In emotion regulation, automatically activated feelings are controlled or overridden by reason or cognition, by behavioral (e.g., relaxation) techniques, or even by drugs. In contrast, emotion refinement capitalizes on the mutual inhibition and constraint among multiple desires and motivations within the affective sphere. This principle of internal regulation that ensures the due proportion of things in their dynamic interaction is called harmony (Lu, 2004). In the Tso Chuan, Zen Tsu (died 493 B.C.E.) is quoted as saying “Harmony is like soup. There being water and heat, sour flavoring and pickles, salt and peaches . . . . The salt flavoring is the other to the bitter, and the bitter is the other to the salt. With these two ‘others’ combining in due proportions and a new flavor emerging, this is what is expressed in ‘harmony’ . . . .” (Fung, 1962, pp. 107-108, emphasis added). The same applies to the emotional stew, in which multiple desires interacting with one another may, if guided by the principle of harmony, congeal into a personality marked by four emotional tones: Wen, jou, tun, hou, which are feelings and thoughts “moderate, gentle, sincere, and deep” (Liu,
Hsu (1990) explains that emotions that strive against inextricable ties and inexpressible pains would eventually coagulate into a mild and gentle disposition: “Thus mild and gentle comportment has the compressed structure of sincere and deep emotions” (p. 448; for further details, see Sundararajan, 2002).

Harmony is the central theme of the classical text *Chung Yung* (*The Doctrine of the Mean*, 1971; Tu, 1989), attributed to K’ung Ch’i, the grandson of Confucius. The first term of the title, *chung*, refers to balance and moderation that ensure the due proportion of things; the second term, *yung*, refers to the ordinary or commonplace, in which the Tao is supposed to reside. This notion has far reaching implications for emotion refinement.

*Self-Reflexivity and second order awareness.* Confucius allegedly said in the *Chung Yung*, “The path [Tao] is not far from man” (ch. 13, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, 1971, p. 393). Since the Tao is immanent, rather than transcendent like the Christian God, such that all forms of life necessarily follow the Tao, the difference between the uninitiated and the sage is in levels of consciousness—the former follows the Tao unknowingly, whereas the latter knowingly. The main thrust of the Confucian pedagogue was therefore to raise consciousness to a second order awareness so that people will know that they know, or in the words of Fung (1966), “to give people an understanding that they are all, more or less, actually following the Way [Tao], so as to cause them to be conscious of what they are doing” (p. 175).

The centrality of second order awareness in traditional China is manifest in the proliferation of the so-called “second order desires”; that is, the ability to evaluate one’s own desires. Of particular importance is a second order desire known as savoring (Sundararajan, in press; Sundararajan & Averill, in press). One of the earliest references to savoring is found in the
Chung Yung, which states that “There is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors” (The Doctrine of the Mean, 1971, p. 387). The knowing involved in savoring is a second order awareness: In contrast to the first order experience of tasting the flavors in food, savoring entails knowing that one knows the flavors so as to be able to manipulate the experience by prolonging it, making fine discriminations, etcetera. Furthermore, as second order awareness, savoring is different from the garden variety of self reflections: it is experience proximate, more akin to the Buddhist practice of mindfulness than to the experience distant type of self reflections such as self-analysis or self-understanding.

One of the most important theorists of savoring is Ssu-k’ung T’u (837-908) (Sundararajan, 2004; Owen, 1992), whose notion of savoring differs from the typical Western formulation as well as the Indian rasa. The Western formulation entails relishing a positive experience in the here and now (Bryant, 1989); the Chinese savoring includes negative experiences as well, and has a relatively wider scope of temporality that extends to both the after taste of an experience (Eoyang, 1993), and the subtle incipient phase of things (Sundararajan, 2004). Lastly, whereas rasa seeks to transcend the individual self (Dehejia, 1996), savoring in the Chinese tradition is a means of refining, not eliminating, the idiosyncratic tastes of the individual.

Emotion in Taoist Thought

In Confucianism, the Tao (Way) is a system of moral truths; in Taoism, it is nature (heaven) in the most fundamental sense—eternal, nameless, indescribable. As a way of life, the Tao implies simplicity, tranquility, and nonaction (wei wei) or letting nature take its course. Lao Tzu (c. sixth century B.C.E.) is considered the founder of both philosophical and popular Taoism. Although the so-called popular Taoism has much to say about emotion in traditional Chinese
medicine (see, for example, Wu, 1982), it is not reviewed here due to limitation of space. In this chapter, we concentrate on classical Taoist thought.

Whereas a central theme in Confucianism is suffering (Tu, 1984), that in Taoism is freedom. This keynote of freedom is articulated by Chuang Tzu’s (born c. 369 B.C.E.) claim that the sage has no emotions. In his own words: “[The sage] has the shape of a man, but without qing” (Chuang-tzu, ch.5). This enigmatic statement has generated much speculation throughout Chinese history. Presented below are three major perspectives on the question of freedom and emotions.

**Beyond Culture.** The first perspective is found in the dialogue between Chuang Tzu and Hui Shih. When queried by Hui Shih as to how the sage could be without qing, Chuang Tzu replied that “judging between right and wrong is what I mean by qing. What I mean by being without qing is that a man does not inwardly harm himself by likes and dislikes, but instead constantly follows the spontaneous and does not add to what is natural in him” (adapted from Graham, 1986, p. 62). This discussion is obviously an extension of the nature versus culture debate that looms large in Taoism. The Taoist back-to-nature position intends to recover the original innocence in emotions by divesting of qing all the vestiges of “conceptualization, convention, society, and language” (Hansen, 1995, pp. 200-201). This proposition has far reaching implications: the relatively simple and intuitive appraisals are privileged as the hallmarks of spontaneity, and genuineness; the more cognitively elaborate appraisals are distrusted for their calculativeness and value judgments. The former was referred to by the Neo-Confucianist Chou Tun-yi (1017-1073) as “vacuous in quiescence and straightforward in movement” (Fung, 1966, p. 290), as exemplified by the immediate impulse to save the proverbial child falling into the well.
Fung (1966) explains that if one does not act on his first impulse, but pauses instead to think the matter over before coming to the child’s rescue, “he is motivated by secondary selfish thoughts and thereby loses both his original state of vacuity in quiescence and the corollary state of straightforwardness in movement” (p. 272).

“Disperse Emotion with Reason”. The second perspective is that the sage has no emotions because her mind is like a mirror. This interpretation also finds support in the text of the *Chuang Tzu* (ch. 7): “The mind of the perfect man is like a mirror. It does not move with things, nor does it anticipate them. It responds to things, but does not retain them. Therefore the perfect man is able to deal successfully with things but is not affected by them” (Fung, 1966, p. 287). This is the rational approach, or what is referred to in Taoism as “dispersing emotion with reason.” One way to attain a mind that approximates “the emptiness of a mirror and the evenness of a balance” (Fung, 1962, p. 183) is to take an objective perspective, as advocated by the philosopher and literary critic Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692): “those who are not reduced to helplessness by ch’ing [qing], they recognize that when they are sad, things can still be happy, but this does not alter the fact that they are themselves sad; when they are happy, things can still be sad, but this does not alter the fact that they are themselves happy” (Wong, 1978, pp. 128-129).

The romantic spirit. The third attempt to answer the koan posed by the *Chuang Tzu* is to modify the original statement from having no emotions to having emotions but without ensnarement. This was the exegesis of Wang Pi (226-249) on the *Chuang Tzu*: “That in which the sage is superior to ordinary people is the spirit. But what the sage has in common with ordinary people are the emotions. . . . and therefore cannot respond to things without joy or sorrow. He responds to things, yet is not ensnared by them. It is wrong to say that because the sage has no
ensnarement, he therefore has no emotions” (Fung, 1966, p. 238). How does one have emotions without ensnarement? The answer from Neo-Taoism of the 3rd and 4th centuries is *feng liu*.

_Feng liu_ means literally “wind and stream” and is rendered by Fung (1966) as “the romantic spirit” (p. 231). According to the Neo-Taoists, _feng liu_ derives from _tzu-jan_ (spontaneity, naturalness), and is in opposition to morals and institutions (Fung, 1966, p.240). Its essential quality is “to have a mind that transcends the distinctions of things and lives in accord with itself, rather than with others” (Fung, 1966, p. 291). The main source on _feng liu_ is _Shih-shuo hsin-yü_ (Mather, 1976), or _Shih-shuo_ for short. The colorful anecdotes of the Neo-Taoists as recorded in the _Shih-shuo_ suggest an alternative approach to theory, an experience proximate approach in which one lives one’s theory instead of constructing it intellectually.

Whereas authenticity is a main concern of the Confucian tradition (Sundararajan, 2002), novelty constitutes the key element of _feng liu_. In the following episode from the _Shih-shuo_ (Ch. 23), the Neo-Taoist Liu Ling (c. 221-c. 300) was considered _feng liu_ not because of his nudity, but because of his novel take on it: Liu had a habit of going completely naked in his room. To his critics he said, “I take the whole universe as my house and my room as my clothing. Why, then, do you enter here into my trousers?” (Fung, 1966, p. 235).

And it is novelty in a radical way: One is to transcend all given norms, from the biologically given sensory experiences to the socially given codes of conduct. The result is what may be called a cult of spontaneity, characterized by a paradoxical combination of impulsivity, on the one hand, and “a more subtle sensitivity for pleasure and more refined needs than sheerly [sic] sensual ones. . .”, on the other (Fung, 1966, p. 235). Thus individuals of _feng liu_ “acted according to pure impulse, but not with any thought of sensuous pleasure” (Fung, 1966, p. 235). A good
example of refined sensitivity is the artist Wang Hui-chih (died c. 388). One night, when awakened by a heavy snowfall, Wang Hui-chih thought of his friend Tai K’uei. “Immediately he took a boat and went to see Tai. It required the whole night for him to reach Tai’s house, but when he was just about to knock at the door, he stopped and returned home” (Shih-shuo, Ch. 23, Fung, 1966, p. 235). To those who were puzzled by his action, Wang’s explanation was: “I came on the impulse of my pleasure, and now it is ended, so I go back. Why should I see Tai?” (Fung, 1966, p. 236).

Paradoxes abound in Taoism. The immediacy/impulsivity celebrated by the Neo-Taoists may best be understood as “mediated immediacy” or controlled impulsivity, just as bonsai is not raw but cultivated nature. The key to the “refined pleasure” of Wang seems to lie in the virtuosity of his controlled processing that selectively activated one impulse (paying someone a visit) and inhibited the other (seeing someone), thus defying the ordinarily tight coupling of theses action tendencies in the goal oriented thinking that Taoism never tires of disparaging.

With the “romantic spirit,” the question of ensnarement of emotions is no longer whether to have emotion or not, but how: How are emotions to be expressed, with refined sensitivity and rare insight, or not. Emotions are no longer the problem, since it is insight and sensitivity that count.

*Emotion in Chinese Buddhist Thought*

With Confucianism and Taoism the floor plan is laid. The Buddhist influence since the first century C.E. added a few wings, but did not change the basic architecture of Chinese thought.

Buddha, the “Enlightened One,” is the name given to Siddhartha Gautama (563-483 B.C.E.) from North India, whose teaching centered on enlightenment and compassion as means to end
suffering. From India, Buddhism spread to Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, etc.) and northward to the Far East (Tibet, China, Korea and Japan). By the third century C.E., many Buddhist concepts were aligned with those of Taoism, and a recognizable school of Chinese Buddhism emerged.

With its conceptualization of emotions far more psychological and analytical than the Chinese indigenous variety, Buddhism expanded not only the Chinese vocabulary of emotions, but also insights into the nature of emotions. The following are some Buddhist notions of emotions that we shall mention but not explore, due to limitation of space: passion (klesa, or fan-nao), with a pejorative coloring (Galik, 1980) not found in the indigenous qing; suffering (dukkha, or ku), and emptiness (sunyata or kong). In addition, there are the wrong cognitive sets responsible for our suffering—delusion, and ignorance (de Silva, 1995), and a more fine grained analysis of desire into the notions of “contact” and “clinging.” Contact (phassa) refers to the notion that due to ignorance we are attached to things we experience through our senses. Clinging (upadana) refers to an adhesiveness, or fixation—the holding onto the object of desire (de Silva, 1995).

There is a tendency under the Buddhist influence to dichotomize human nature and feelings along the divide of good and bad. For instance, the Confucian philosopher Li Ao (died ca. 844) stated that “The feelings are the evil that is in the [human] nature” (Fung, 1953, Vol. 2, p. 420). Fung (1953) points out that what Li called “nature” is akin to the Buddhist notion of the “original mind”, while his concept of feelings resembles the Buddhist notion of the “Passions” (fan nao or Klesa) (Vol. 2, p. 414). The notion of impermanence of things and the corresponding ideal of detachment or not “clinging” also help to add another nuance to the “mind as a mirror” metaphor. The Neo-Confucianists, under the influence of Buddhism, “argue that there is nothing
wrong with the emotions *per se*; what is important is simply that they should not be a permanent part of the person who sometimes expresses them. . . . This is quite different from the ordinary man, whose anger, being a part of him. . . still remains after those objects have passed away. . .” (Fung, 1953, Vol. 2., p. 526).

According to Abrams (1976), there are two antithetical metaphors of mind: mirror—“comparing mind to a reflector of external objects”; and lamp—comparing mind “to a radiant projector which makes a contribution to the objects it perceives” (p. 48). More than the mirror, the mind as a lamp is the line of thinking that benefited the most from the Buddhist influence. As a radical rendition of the lamp metaphor, the Buddhist perspective, in a nutshell, is that the world is a projection of the mind such that different states of consciousness result in different “mental worlds” (*jing* or *jing-jie*) or *Visaya* in Sanskrit. The notion of emotion as having the power to reveal the “world” one is in shares some affinities with Heidegger’s notion of “mood” (Smith, 1981). But whereas the Heideggerian mood is characterized by “thrownness,” that is, one finds oneself always already in a mood-disclosed world, the Chinese *jing-jie* or “mental world” is supposedly a matter of attainment in spiritual development or self cultivation on the part of the individual (Yeh, 2000, Vol. 1). One of the first literary critics who developed a theory of the “mental world” is Ssu-k‘ung T’u (837-908), whose masterpiece is a collection of twenty-four poems (*Erh-shih-ssu Shih-p‘in*) (Ssu-k‘ung T’u, 1992) that delineated as many categories of the mental world or “modes of being” supposedly characteristic of great poetry (Sundararajan, 2004).

**Twentieth-Century Developments**

Recent history is characterized by three trends. The first is a continuation of the best in Confucian poetics, with its emphasis on the authenticity of *qing*, and the semiotic approach to
emotions as signs that are best communicated through “evocative images,” which enable the reader to participate in the “mental world” of the writer through resonance and association. This trend is exemplified by the literary critic and philosopher Wang Kuo-wei (1877-1927, see Yeh, 2000, Vols. 1 & 2). Although influenced by Western philosophy, especially by Schopenhauer, Wang’s literary criticism (1977) is primarily Confucian and Buddhist in persuasion, and best known for its significant contribution to the further development of the notion of the “mental world.” His now classic definition of the term is as follows: “The world [jing-jie] does not refer to scenes and objects only; joy, anger, sadness, and happiness also form a world in the human heart. Therefore, poetry that can describe true scenes and true emotions may be said to have a world; otherwise, it may be said not to have a world.” (Wang, 1977, p. 4, emphasis in original).

The second trend in contemporary Chinese research is an analysis of indigenous emotional syndromes, using approaches based on Western social sciences. Examples include filial piety (e.g., Ho, 1998), the Chinese notion of face (e.g., Jia, 2001), and studies of indigenous forms of emotional disorders (e.g., Tseng, 1975).

The third trend involves laboratory and field studies of presumably pancultural aspects of emotion, such as the evolution of behavior, peripheral physiological changes, expressive reactions, neurocognitive mechanisms, and social influence. For the most part, this research is indistinguishable from that being conducted in the West. Thus, much of what we said earlier about twentieth-century trends in the West could be applied mutatis mutandis to twentieth-century trends in the East. Even the psychodynamic approach, which is perhaps the most culturally specific of the approaches we reviewed earlier, has its East Asian counterparts (see, for example, Doi’s, 1973, analysis of the Japanese emotion of amae.)
Discussion: Six Antinomies of Emotion

Histories of ideas are important, if for no other reason than to satisfy one of the most fundamental of human emotions: curiosity. But histories of ideas gain added importance when they raise issues or provide guideposts for future research. With that in mind, we present six antinomies of emotion. An antinomy consists of two conflicting or incompatible beliefs, each reasonable in its own right. We make no pretense at resolving these antinomies. We present them, rather, as a way of summarizing some of the salient points from our historical reviews, and as goads to further thought.

I. The antinomy between action and passion: Emotions are things we do, versus Emotions are things that happen to us. An emotion is a passion, something that seems to happen to a person; however, unlike tripping over a chair, or coming down with the flu, an emotion is also an action, something a person does. The connotation of passivity—of being acted upon—was well articulated by Plato and Aristotle, and it has remained central to Western theories of emotion, even when changes in terminology (e.g., from “passion” to “emotion”) have tended to mask the original connotation of “suffering” or undergoing change. The passion versus action conundrum is less acutely felt in the Chinese tradition, primarily for two reasons. First, the Chinese term, gan (to be affected), that implies the patient role has a positive connotation in the context of intersubjectivity, where the self functions as a tuning fork that needs to be affected and in turn affects others to keep the interconnected web of life going (or, as the Chinese put it, to keep the cosmic qi circulating). Secondly, the Chinese predilection for self-reflexivity yields a large stock of second order desires (such as savoring), which, as self-initiated rather than reactive emotions, help to restore to passion its beleaguered sense of agency.
II. The antinomy between the extraordinary and the ordinary: Emotions are intense, episodic occurrences, versus Emotions are an ever-present background to all experience. Western history is often woven around the exceptional deeds of “great” men and women, whereas Chinese history, following the Doctrine of the Mean, puts a premium on the commonplace, where the Tao is supposed to reside. This difference in emphasis is reflected in our presentation of Western and Eastern histories of emotion—our Western history focused on specific individuals (e.g., Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Spinoza, Darwin, Wundt), whereas our Eastern history focused on general movements (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism). This difference in orientation is not limited to historical accounts. In literature, for example, it is the difference between the drama of epic poetry in the West and the subtlety of haiku in the East. And on the level of emotional experience, Western theories tend to emphasize episodic perturbations, whereas Chinese analyses favor the rippling eddies of affect, both in the pre-perturbation phase, as evidenced by attention to “the subtle” (Sundararajan, 2004), and in the post-stimulus phase, as evidenced by savoring the after taste of an event.

This difference in emphasis has far reaching implications. The Chinese notion of emotion as a pervasive, ongoing process that evolves continuously and does not have a clear demarcation of beginning and end implies that “refinement” is part of emotion, rather than a post-emotion development as is assumed by the episodic perspective. This is an important point, so let us phrase it differently. The regulation of emotion has long been a concern of Western theorists. Often, this has involved increased understanding of the causes of emotion (e.g., the Stoics, Spinoza, psychoanalysis). In the Chinese tradition, the emphasis is more on savoring than abstract knowledge, on refinement more than regulation (e.g., Ssu-k’ung T’u).
III. *The antinomy between intuitive and intellectual judgments:* Emotional appraisals are immediate and unpremeditated, versus Emotional appraisals are basically rational. Appraisal theory—the basic idea of which is that emotions depend on judgements—dominates much of contemporary psychology. Paralleling the contemporary distinction between early perceptual processing of stimuli and latter conceptual processing, the Stoics made the distinction between “first movements”—those initial impulses to action when a threat is first appraised, and “second movements”—more complex appraisals, the kind only a rational being could make (albeit mistakenly). The rationality of emotional appraisals is receiving increased attention among contemporary theorists (e.g., Solomon, 1976; de Sousa, 1987). But the most radical advocates were the stoics, who claimed that the intuitive “first movements” were not emotions at all. By contrast, the Chinese tend to privilege intuitive appraisals. Both Confucianism and Taoism frown at the complex appraisals, because of their contamination by the intellect. The Chinese view experience-distant intellectualizing tendencies as posing the danger of distorting the intent of emotions. Intuition, by contrast, seldom raises a red flag for the Chinese thinkers, who take it for granted that the most valid kind of reasoning is reasoning with the heart.

IV. *The antinomy between nature and culture:* Emotions are innate responses common to humans and animals, versus Emotions are part of our cultural heritage. What would emotional life be if it were divorced of language and culture? Throughout history, West and East, this question has yielded conflicting answers, depending on presuppositions about what it means to be human. On the one side, the seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously suggested that, without the benefits of society, human existence would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” On the other side, we have seen how that paragon of eighteenth-century Romanticism,
Rousseau, argued that society oppresses and distorts human nature. In contrast to either of these extreme positions, nature and culture are not terms impervious to each other in China, where the cultivation of nature is highly prized from *bonsai* to the making of a Confucian gentleman. Thus it is not considered contradictory for a Chinese to tout the innateness of *qing* on the one hand, and to insist on its refinement through *li* (propriety), on the other.

**V. The antinomy between feeling and emotion: Emotions are a kind of subjective experience, versus Emotions are a kind of behavior.** Although the terms “feeling” and “emotion” are often used interchangeably, they are not synonymous. Feelings are only one of the multiple components (e.g., feelings, physiological change, overt behavior) of an emotional syndrome. In the West, the assertion that emotions are feelings has often been a stopping point, letting the part stand for the whole. The Chinese notion of *qing* also places emphasis on subjective experience, similar in some respects to the “embodied view of emotional processing” (Barrett, 2005) in contemporary psychology. However, covert feelings accessed through the priming of imagery (*xing*) seem to involve information processing strategies distinctly different from talking about “feelings” in the West. Not surprisingly, Kleinman (1986) found that Chinese patients are not good at analyzing, differentiating or talking about their “inner feelings”—tasks that entail the elaboration and retrieval of memory in contradistinction to the pre-attentive priming capitalized by the *xing* tradition.

**VI. The antinomy between emotional stereotypy and emotional creativity: Emotions are fixed and few in number, versus Emotions are flexible and indefinite in number.** Many theorists view emotions as fixed patterns of response, impervious to change except for their external expression. But some (e.g., Augustine, Spinoza) have also recognized that emotions are indefinite
in number and subtle in variety, which implies the possibility for creative change. Although not absent, the seeming contradiction between emotion and creativity is more muted within Eastern traditions. For example, the notion, espoused by Ssu-k’ung T’u and others, that emotion should be savored, not explained, results in the privileging of “endocepts,” that is, imageries that are pregnant with highly suggestive ideas but are incomplete in terms of their explicitness as concepts. Whereas the Western notion of endocepts takes the incompleteness of a concept in imagery as a way station in the creative process (Arieti, 1976), in Chinese poetics it is a matter of conscious choice and rigorous discipline for the individual not to drift into the mode of conceptualization (for more on East-West differences in emotions and creativity, see Averill, Chon, & Hahn, 2001; Sundararajan & Averill, in press).

Concluding Observations

The above antinomies could easily be multiplied, but we leave that to the interests of the reader. Moreover, each antinomy can be found within a cultural tradition, as a contrast between major and minor themes. But what is a minor theme in one culture may be a major theme in another. In presenting the antinomies, therefore, we have focused on differences between rather than within cultures. This makes it more difficult to dismiss either pole of an antinomy as of secondary importance. Also, as stated earlier, we make no pretense of solving the antinomies. Indeed, they are not meant to be solved. Their existence helps ensure the diversity and richness of ideas that provide the foundation for future developments.

In concluding, it is worth reiterating that our history of Western theories incorporated ideas from different countries as well as times (Greece, Rome, Germany, Britain, France, the United States, among others), whereas our history of Eastern ideas has focused primarily on one
country—China. If we had included other East Asian countries—Japan and Korea—the diversity of ideas discussed would have been greater. And, needless to say, equally rich intellectual traditions exist in the countries of South Asia, especially India.

As psychology becomes increasingly international, it is important that it not become homogenized. Especially in an area such as emotion, a diversity of ideas and approaches is essential. More than most psychological phenomena (e.g., memory or perception), emotions embody deeply held but often contradictory views of what it means to be human. As we have seen, for example, emotions are often depicted as alien forces that lead a person astray; yet, a person devoid of emotion is viewed as shallow, at best, and little better than a beast or automaton, at worst. In a rapidly changing world, the last thing psychology needs do is narrow the meaning of what it means to be human.
References


