Asian Epistemologies and Contemporary Social Psychological Research

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January 22, 2009


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The author wishes to acknowledge the generous comments made by Dharm Bhawuk, K.K. Hwang, Isamu Ito, and Shu-hsien & An-yuan Liu on previous drafts of this chapter; also Norman Denzin and Alison Jones for incisive and helpful reviews.

Historical Background

Any analysis of Asian epistemologies and their influence on contemporary social psychological research in Asia should begin by situating itself within recent flows of world history where Western science, industry, and political, economic and military power have dominated the globe. Global forms of both natural and social sciences have had their origins in Western epistemologies and social practices. Social sciences like anthropology, sociology, and psychology all emerged in European societies in the 19th century, which was perhaps coincidentally the peak of Western nationalism and imperialism. Not coincident to this, elements of racism were both implicitly and explicitly embedded within early theories and practices of social science (Smith, 1999).
It took the global cataclysm of World War II and all its aftermaths for racism to be put to bed as a legitimate basis for social science theorizing (Cartwright, 1979).

Given this type of “societal anchoring” (Moscovici, 1961/2008) in a particular historical moment where one civilization had apparently achieved ascendency above all others through a particular formula of success, it is not surprising that social scientists in Asia found themselves in the position of having to react to forces put into motion by Western societies. First, social sciences in Asia (as in Western societies) have been and continue to be poor cousins to natural and physical sciences in terms of funding and visibility concerning national priorities. Second, “modernization” has provided a master set of discourses and practices whereby importation of Western ideas and practices is taken for granted as necessary in order to increase national strength and autonomy (see for example Pandey, 2004). Within these overarching frames, following Western universities by importing logical positivism (an epistemology itself borrowed from the natural sciences) as the basis for Asian social sciences occurred largely without debate. Not only epistemology, but the structure and content of Asian social sciences were borrowed wholesale from the West as Asian universities were established throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. In most disciplines in most countries, the first textbooks were translations of standard texts from North America and Europe.

This was the historical situation, and given continuing disparities in power, prestige, and influence distributed between developed and developing societies, between Western and non-Western scholars, and between English and non-English speakers (Moghaddam,
1989; Moghaddam & Taylor, 1985, 1986), it is not surprising that in the main, Asian social sciences remain for the most part thoroughly situated within Anglo-empiricist global norms positioning the social sciences within epistemologies, or theories of knowledge, and practices drawn from the natural sciences.

If historical differences in power and prestige between Asia and the West were responsible for the structural foundation and mainline development of Asian social sciences, then the subsequent rise of Asian societies such as Japan, China, India, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea as indispensible components of the global economy have served as the impetus for an important countermovement. This is the rise of Asian epistemologies and Asian forms of psychological knowledge that emphasize cultural differences with the West rather than imitation (Liu, Ng, Gastardo-Conaco, & Wong, 2008). While decidedly less central than the first movement, this countermovement contains potentiality for the future, because the world is moving towards both economical integration and the distribution of political, military, and economic power across multiple cultural centers.

A Survey of Recent Developments in Psychology

The necessarily simplified introduction provided above sets the platform to launch a focused discussion of how Asian epistemologies have and will influence the theory and practice of psychology and especially social and cross-cultural psychology. Different patterns may be prevalent in other social sciences like sociology or anthropology. In psychology, cracks in the edifice of borrowing from the West became visible in the
1960s, with the emergence of the sub-discipline of cross-cultural psychology. Cross-cultural psychology began in the 1960s out of shared interest among scholars in both Western and non-Western societies (the latter who frequently began their careers by attaining doctorates in Western universities and then returned home) to (a) empirically test the generality and transportability of theories of psychology, and (b) develop theories and constructs better suited to explain and predict behavior, cognition, and emotion in non-Western societies (see Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992; Ward, 2007). While initially situated across sub-disciplines in psychology, a cross-cultural approach has been most influential in social and personality, perhaps as a result of empirical demonstrations of the limitations of the “transport and test” model (e.g. Amir & Sharon, 1987), and then powerful theories that began to emerge to account for cross-cultural differences. In the 1980s, the seminal *Culture’s Consequences* by Geert Hofstede (1980/2001), with its statistical analysis of survey data from countries around the world, found dimensions of cultural variation that located Western societies’ psychological profiles not as universal, but as culture-bound syndromes most notably characterized by individualism and low power-distance (see Smith & Bond, 1993 for an update of this literature).

This trend of making psychological phenomena contingent on culture through scientific arguments has continued to the present day. Markus and Kitayama (1991) famously made virtually all theories in social and personality psychology contingent on the construal of self as independent or interdependent (this making an element of culture into a discrete variable amenable to experimental manipulation). On-going published dialogue between North Americans and East Asians, mainly Japanese and then Chinese,
has become a major feature of cross-cultural psychology. Examples of recent issues that have engaged attention is the question of whether the requirement for positive self-esteem is universal (see Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999 versus Brown & Kobayashi, 2003). Recently, the flagship Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology achieved an impact rating of 2.0, marking an unprecedented level of influence according to such indicators\(^1\), while the International Journal of Intercultural Relations has also been an important contributor to the profile of the sub-discipline (with an impact factor of 1.0 in recent years). Perhaps because of this success, there has been little influence of social constructionist epistemologies on cross-cultural psychology. The majority of its adherents appear content to operate within empiricist practices and scientific discourses that have become the norm in this growing field (for a brief discussion see Liu et al., 2010; for a comprehensive overview see Berry, Poortinga, Pandey, Dasen, Saraswathi, & Kagitcibasi, 1997).

Following from cross-cultural psychology, the Asian Association of Social Psychology held its inaugural conference in 1995, and established the Asian Journal of Social Psychology in 1998. Recently, an influential former editor of the journal wrote that “In a nutshell, AJSP is able to promote research that addresses cultural issues, and the Journal seems to have developed a reputation as a ‘cultural’ journal” (Leung, 2007, p. 10). But on the downside, “No obvious theoretical framework comes to mind when one thinks of Asian social psychology. Except for the indigenous psychologists, most Asian social psychologists work on topics that are popular in the West.” (Leung, 2007, p. 11).

\[^1\] While there is considerable debate about the value of such indices, an impact rating in the 2’s is comparable to top journals in anthropology and approaches those for sociology, whereas an impact factor of 1 or higher is very respectable (impact factors less than 1 are less prestigious).
term “indigenous” in psychology is used to refer to an intellectual movement that arose in reaction to the Western mainstream, and seeks to reflect the social, political, and cultural character of peoples around the world (Allwood & Berry, 2006). This movement has been especially prominent in Asia, as part of an intellectual decolonization of psychology in countries that have already achieved political independence. It for the most part does not refer to a psychology of first peoples, that is, a psychology of aboriginal peoples positioned as minorities within a politically dominant Western majority. Nikora, Levy, Masters and Waitoki decried this as “the ‘natives’ were being put upon yet again” (pg. 255, Allwood & Berry, 2006) in their vignette on indigenous psychology for Maori, who are first peoples of New Zealand. But they wrote further that “Terminology aside, the objectives of an indigenous psychology are agreeable: That is, to develop psychologies that are not imposed or imported; that are influenced by the cultural contexts in which people live; that are developed from within the culture using a variety of methods; and that result in locally relevant psychological knowledge” (see Nikora et al.’s excerpt in Allwood and Berry, 2006).

Indigenous psychology movements sprang up in India, Taiwan, and the Philippines in the 1970s and in Korea in the 1980s under the leadership of charismatic leaders that strongly influenced social science agendas in these and other Asian societies (Sinha, 1997). Whereas cross-cultural psychology has been and continues to be strongly influenced by positivist forms of empiricism dedicated to testing the generalizeability and applicability of psychological theories to different populations, indigenous psychologies have been more varied in terms of their philosophical, epistemological, and political stands.
concerning the production and use of social science knowledge. Several overlapping
definitions of indigenous psychology have been offered by major Asian protagonists (see
Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006 or Allwood & Berry, 2006 for overviews). Enriquez (1990)
described indigenous psychology as a system of psychological thought and practice
rooted in a particular cultural tradition, while Kim and Berry (1993), defined it as “the
scientific study of human behavior (or mind) that is native, that is not transported from
other regions, and that is designed for its people” (p. 2). Among its more
epistemologically and philosophically oriented advocates, Ho (1998a) views indigenous
psychology as “the study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural
context that relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other
resources indigenous to the specific ethnic or cultural group under investigation” (p. 93).
The most influential programmatic developer of indigenous psychology, Kuo-shu Yang
(2000) defined it as “an evolving system of psychological knowledge based on scientific
research that is sufficiently compatible with the studied phenomena and their ecological,
economic, social, cultural, and historical contexts” (p. 245). All the major protagonists
agree that indigenous psychology involves knowledge and practice native to or rooted in
particular societies and/or their cultural traditions. They vary in their commitments to
global science on the one hand, and locally informed action on the other.

The differences between Taiwan and the Philippines, where indigenous psychology has
been most prolific (each with large regular meetings attended by hundreds of scholars)
are instructive as to variations in theory versus practice. Both emerged in the late 1970s
under the auspices of a talented, energetic founder capable of mobilizing both people and
funding towards the enterprise. While the tenor of their research aims were similar, Enriquez’ (1990; 1992) vision differed substantially from Yang’s (1999; 2000) with respect to focus of application. While not opposed to natural science epistemologies in principle, in practice Enriquez thought that they were often inappropriately applied: he wrote extensively about the process of the indigenization of psychological science (Enriquez, 1990), both by adapting Western scientific constructs to the local culture and by developing local systems of psychological knowledge on its own terms (indigenization from without and within). The Philippines has been and continues to be a developing nation, with a current GNP of less than $2000 US per capita and a transparency rating putting it on the bottom quartile along with other countries in the world struggling with endemic corruption. In this societal climate, Filipino indigenous psychology is highly engaged with communities on a myriad of issues that is published mainly in Tagalog (the Filipino national language that is especially dominant in Luzon, see Enriquez, 1992). It has a thriving relationship with other academic disciplines, government ministries and non-government organizations (NGOs) that results in what could be described as participant action-oriented research (McTaggart, 1997) or community-based participatory research (Minkler & Wallerstein, 2003). As such, ethnographic (qualitative field-based inquiry) is its predominant method of choice. Enriquez (1992) refers to this as “indigenization from within”. Its outputs are mainly in monographs (e.g., Aguiling-Dalisay, Yacat & Navarro, 2004) and internal reports for the commissioning agencies that use primarily qualitative methods developed indigenously (see Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000 for a recent English language overview). Publications in international journals are rare, but at least as frequent as for other
developing nations in Southeast Asia. The work could be described as highly applied, with development focused on content and ethnographic methods (e.g., how to work with illiterate sex workers) without concurrent development of an epistemology grounded in indigenous philosophical traditions. This pattern of focusing on applied research using the local language without taking a strong position on epistemology would be characteristic of much of South-East Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, but these latter nations would be less coherent in terms of the use of indigenously compatible theory, practice and methods compared to the Philippines. Most of this work flies under the radar of the international scholarly community as it is published mainly in monographs, funder-mandated reports, and local journals.

Filipino indigenous psychology had the misfortune of having its charismatic founder die young (Virgilio Enriquez passed away in 1994 at age 52, leaving a huge void that has not been filled), whereas Kuo-Shu Yang has been and continues to be active in shaping Chinese indigenous psychology from Taiwan for more than 3 decades. In contrast to the Philippines, Taiwanese indigenous psychology has been more consistent with the norms of research practice prevalent in cross-cultural psychology, which are highly empiricist and quantitative but use paper-and-pencil surveys rather than being based on laboratory experiments as in mainstream psychology. Taiwan is a newly industrialized economy, where GNP and living standards are comparable with the lower half of the OECD. It is also a newly democratizing society, having achieved significant advances in free elections, gender equality and the development of civil society over the last 2 decades: this together with the weak version of the “publish or perish” academic culture prevalent
in North America helps account for an alternative pathway for the development of indigenous psychology taken here compared to the Philippines (see Allwood & Berry, 2006 for a global perspective on this).

Chinese indigenous psychology is internationally one of the more visible among all the indigenous psychologies in the world (see for example Yang, 1999 or Hwang, 2005a for accounts; see Bond, 1996 for a more cross-cultural approach to Chinese psychology). Chinese indigenous psychology has its own journal, which has been published regularly in Chinese from Taiwan for 2 decades, and regular conferences attended by many hundreds of scholars that often involve mainland China and Hong Kong. In his most ambitious statement, Yang (2000) offers a program of development in indigenous psychology capable of unifying cultural psychology (derived from anthropology see Cole, 1995) with its commitment to qualitative methods and “human science” epistemologies and cross-cultural psychology with its focus on quantitative and “natural science” epistemologies. He views psychology as consisting of a hierarchically organized system of indigenous psychologies: “Beyond the imperative of indigenization, no other restraints need to be imposed upon activities of indigenous research… Psychologists in any society may legitimately strive to construct an indigenous psychology for their people that is as comprehensive in scope as the current indigenous American psychology... For example, some indigenously-oriented Chinese psychologists have set their hearts on developing an indigenous Chinese psychology comparable to the North American one in scope and depth” (p. 246). It is understandable given their
population size and time-honored philosophical traditions that Chinese people might have higher expectations for their indigenous psychology than many other peoples.

Most Asian indigenous psychologists in practice prefer particular methods (e.g., Yang is survey oriented, Enriquez was ethnography oriented), but in principle they do not regard their activities as constrained by methods warranted by a Western form of epistemology. For Yang (2000), who draws liberally from Enriquez’ thinking, the key concept is ‘indigenous compatibility’, defined pragmatically in terms of “empirical study … conducted in a manner such that the researcher’s concepts, theory, methods, tools, and results adequately represent, reflect, or reveal the natural elements, structure, mechanism, or process of the studied phenomenon embedded in its context.” (p. 250). He offers several do’s and don’ts rather than a philosophically-oriented system to achieving indigenous compatibility. For example, “Don’t uncritically or habitually apply Western psychological concepts, theories, methods, and tools to your research before thoroughly understanding and immersing yourself in the phenomenon being studied”, “Don’t overlook Western psychologists’ important experiences in developing their own indigenous psychologies, which may be usefully transferred to the development of non-Western indigenous psychologies”, and “Don’t think in terms of English or any other foreign language during the various stages of the research process in order to prevent distortion or inhibition of the indigenous aspects of contemplation involved in doing research” (p. 251). Do “tolerate ambiguous or vague states and suspend decisions as long as possible in dealing with theoretical, methodological, and empirical problems until something indigenous emerges in your mind during the research process”, “Do be a
typical native in the cultural sense when functioning as a researcher”, “Do take the
studied psychological or behavioral phenomenon and its sociocultural context into
careful consideration”, “Do give priority to culturally unique psychological and
behavioral phenomena or characteristics of people in your society, especially during the
eyear stages of the development of an indigenous psychology in a non-Western society”,
and “Do base your research on an intellectual tradition of your own culture” (p. 251).

This highly pragmatic approach, rooted in research practices rather than epistemology
can be said to characterize the modal Asian indigenous psychology response to issues
involving the social construction of knowledge. Indigenously-oriented East Asians in
economically developed societies like Taiwan (or Korea and Japan) as a rule have not
used theoretical race, gender or ethics critiques to challenge prevailing empiricist norms
for the practice of psychology. Rather, all of these issues have been examined within an
overarching empiricist umbrella that favors quantitative, but also makes use of qualitative
methods. There are exceptions that will be detailed later, but Kashima (2005) has argued
that this approach is deeply rooted in Asian traditions of knowledge that may give them
an advantage in examining questions that fundamentally involve complexity and
multiplicity at their very root, like culture. He challenges Clifford Geertz’s (2000 – page
ref needed) assertion that “bringing so large and misshapen a camel as anthropology into
psychology’s tent is going to do more to toss things around than to arrange them in
order”. Although this is simplifying his argument considerably, Kashima (2005) locates
contemporary epistemological struggles between hermeneutic and empiricist schools of
thought within a Western dualist ontology that separates mind from matter, human nature
from material nature. He claims that “If we take a view that intentionality is materially realized, meaning is part of a causal chain, and social scientific investigation is also part of complex causal processes, we can adopt a monist ontology, in which human nature is not distinct from, but continuous with, material nature.” (p.35)

*Implications of Chinese Epistemologies for Social Psychological Research*

Being understandably better versed in Western philosophy than contemporary Chinese philosophy (which until recently has only been available in Chinese), Kashima (2005) states further that “What we need is a monist ontology that is not the materialist ontology of the Enlightenment. It is difficult to speculate what it looks like until some philosophical investigations clarify this.” (p. 36). In fact the great neo-Confucian philosopher Mou Tsung-san (or Zongshan)(1970) used Immanuel Kant, one of the Enlightenment philosophers who contributed to the emergence of Western dualism, as a starting point to develop an autonomous moral metaphysics (see S.H. Liu, 1989 for an English language review of neo-Confucianism). While epistemology was not a central concern for ancient Chinese, Mou’s work is emblematic of contemporary Chinese philosophers carrying their intellectual inheritances forward into dialogue with Western thinking. Unlike most Western philosophers, Mou allows for the possibility of the “intuitive illumination” of the cognitive mind (i.e. enlightenment in the highest sense, whereas Kant allowed only sensible intuition).
Kant followed from and expanded upon Descartes’ mind-body dualism by formulating a dualism of phenomenon and noumenon (thing-in-itself). Kant was convinced that only God has intellectual intuition (noumenon, thing-in-itself), while humans have to rely on sensible intuition (or evidence from the senses). Pure Reason can only construct knowledge of the phenomenal world. According to Kant, human beings cannot know things-in-themselves (noumenon), and hence it is impossible for us to have knowledge of metaphysics because this would end in antinomies. Mou, by contrast, reinterprets “intellectual intuition” to mean “intuitive illumination” (following Eastern traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism) which humans are capable of, no matter what their faiths. He proposes a transcendental dialectic where the mind, while unable to produce acceptable proof of the metaphysical ultimate, nevertheless can realize the thing-in-itself as “thusness” or “suchness”, the exact opposite of phenomenal knowledge constructed by the cognitive mind, bound in time and space. Because Mou’s transcendental dialectic does not deal with empirically verifiable knowledge, it is similar to Kierkegaard’s position that “Subjectivity is Truth”. However, it nonetheless describes a rational process that departs radically from Kierkegaard's irrational approach and hence avoids dualism.

Western enlightenment thinkers influenced by Christian traditions saw the metaphysical ultimate as God, and tended to view it (as Kant and Descartes did) as transcending the phenomenal world. For Kant, Freedom of the Will, Immortality of the Soul, and Existence of God are postulates of Practical Reason. Following from these, an

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2 Antimonies are fundamental contradictions between two sets of laws, each of which are reasonable given their premises
epistemology emerges consistent with a dualism between mind and matter and a division
between natural and human phenomenon, because for Christians like Descartes and Kant,
it was important to maintain their religion as a valid system of knowledge in the face of
their own logic and rationality.

As culture’s effects are largely implicit, Kashima’s (2005) point is that without
necessarily being aware of it, contemporary Western social scientists have maintained an
unnecessarily sharp division between natural and human phenomena as part of their
particular cultural program (see also Kim, 2000), with some carrying on with a natural
science paradigm in an Enlightenment vein and others reacting against this as an affront
to human agency and dignity. As most social scientists are not philosophically trained,
they have a tendency to translate their cultural ontology into an almost religious
commitment on methodological issues that might be described by philosophers as
“methodolatry”: the conflation of ontological issues with methodology. As Tillich (1951)
observer, value must have an ontological basis. The value of scientific observations
formalizing sensible intuition compared to the phenomenology and hermeneutics of
intuitive illumination cannot be reduced to any formula involving emotive responses or
subjective utilities, and cannot be deduced or induced by any form of logical or empirical
proof. Hence, to privilege one set of research practices that are derived from a particular
value system associated with a particular ontology as providing “the answer” to all the
social sciences’ contributions to the human condition is methodolatry.
In general terms, Asian philosophical traditions allow for human beings to have the ability to grasp ontological reality, though they may reach radically different conclusions about what this might be. This means that rather than seeing methodology as the solution to problems involving the privileging of different value systems in social science research (methodolatry), Asian implicit theory (or folk beliefs) are based on holism and perpetual change where “a tolerance of contradiction, an acceptance of the unity of opposites, and an understanding of the coexistence of opposites as permanent, not conditional or transitory, are part of everyday lay perception and thought” (p. 265, Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2007; see Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) for an overview of East Asian holistic thinking. In practical terms, this means that Asian traditions do not privilege scientific methods of observation above the intuitive illumination of the original mind, but see these as complementary forms of knowing.

Confucian traditions in particular tend to see the metaphysical ultimate as a creative principle functioning incessantly to guide the becoming of worldly phenomena. *Jen* or *Ren* (defined as humanity) is identified with *Shengsheng* (creative creativity) by Song-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers (see S.H. Liu, 1998 for an extended treatment). It is thus a “moral principle” in the broadest sense of the term, from which continually changing aspects of being in time and space emerge. In the most powerful and complete statement of contemporary Neo-Confucian philosophy by Mou Tsung-san, the Kantian dualism between phenomenon (perception of reality) and noumenon (the thing-in-itself) is not accepted. While Mou (1975) is sympathetic to Heidegger’s (1977) notion of human beings as Desein (being-there), a being in the world, and psychological states as
anxiety and care as modes of existence, he argued that a phenomenological ontology is capable only of giving a description of human existence and unable to give it a value basis. Hence, according to Mou (1975), the best that Heidegger (1977) can achieve is an inner metaphysics and not the transcendent metaphysics that Asian intellectual traditions demand (see S.H. Liu, 1989a for a more extended version of these arguments, and Bhawuk’s (2008b) contemporary social psychological work following on this theme from Indian philosophical traditions).

Chinese social scientists, like Western social scientists might not explicitly reference philosophy as they conduct their research, but like Westerners they have followed their own implicit cultural program and many have proceeded to conduct research that frequently combines qualitative and quantitative methods and blurs the boundaries between empiricism and hermeneutics. For instance, many indigenous Chinese psychology papers combine quantitative and qualitative methods, and the warp and weft of their papers is the interweaving of Chinese tradition with contemporary mainstream psychology references. A “hot topic” at indigenous Chinese psychology conferences (most of it published in Chinese) has been the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, which is fraught with the weight of contending cultural expectations between younger and older generations. Qualitative or quantitative approaches to analyzing surveys, interviews, and ethnographies have been used as acceptable forms of inquiry. Culture is most often not the explicit topic of inquiry, but rather is embedded within the processes and objects of inquiry. There are obvious exceptions to these rules. For example, Lee (2006) is a strong advocate of a hermeneutical phenomenological
approach to indigenous research on ethnicity in Taiwan following Heidegger, and feminist scholars as elsewhere tend to prefer qualitative to quantitative forms of inquiry. However, the most popular text advising social science graduate students on how to do thesis research (Bih, 2005) is completely ecumenical with respect to methodology, advising only that the research method should suit the research question. Having said this, the flagship *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, representing “the establishment” in Taiwan, still favors quantitative research, and as a whole, the university system privileges the contributions of the natural sciences above those of the humanities and social sciences.

For many Asian social scientists, the 6 statements that Kashima (2005) uses to describe a generic epistemic position on culture and its implications for psychology would be uncontroversial: “1. Culture is socially and historically constructed, 2. People construe themselves using concepts and other symbolic structures that are available, 3. People develop a theory of mind (i.e. a theory of how the mind works) to understand others. 4. People have beliefs about the world, and they act on those beliefs. 5. People engage in meaningful action. 6. Culture is constitutive of the mind.” (p. 20). For indigenous psychologists in particular, it is the division between human and natural phenomenon, and the polemics between advocates of different forms of knowledge construction that would appear to be problematic. Kashima’s (2005) summary that “To put it simply, the argument is that human agency and self-reflexivity make human society and culture dynamic (i.e., changing over time) and knowledge and human activities historically and culturally contingent” (p. 22) seems more like a good starting point than a bone of
contention. Gergen (1973), for example, treats the historical contingency of psychological phenomena as a call to revolution, whereas Liu and Hilton (2005) see it as grist for their mill. The former sees historical contingency as evidence requiring the overthrow of a methodological hegemony, whereas the latter see it as a description of the operation of human agency and cultural construction through time requiring empirical investigation (Liu & Hilton, 2005) and philosophical reflection (Liu & Liu, 1997).

As Leung (2007) noted, Asian social psychologists have not yet fully capitalized on the relative freedom from “methodolatry” that their philosophical traditions provide in terms of creating notable breakthroughs. He criticized Asians for their lack of ambition, citing a relative paucity of sustained programmatic research. As the current Editor-in-Chief of the Asian Journal of Social Psychology, I would have to concur: most of the 200 or so papers submitted to the journal annually lack imagination, consisting to a significant extent of replications and minor variations on a theme established by quantitative research from the United States.

While indigenous research in Asian social, personality, clinical, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology is still in its formative years, several characteristics would appear to be foundational. The first is the aforementioned lack of preoccupation for translating epistemological concerns into methodological boundaries. The second is an overwhelming concern with social relationships and social interconnectedness. The third is a naturalistic approach to culture as a relatively uncontested element of basic

It remains to be seen whether Asian social psychologists will be able to fulfill the epistemological promise of their philosophical traditions (Ward, 2007). Asian universities, like universities all over the world, privilege the natural sciences and aspire to and internalize standards set by Western universities. They push their faculty to publish in prestigious journals, which are most often controlled by American universities and American or European academics. The Shanghai Jiaotong University’s rankings of the best 500 universities in the world, which was constructed for the purpose of providing “objective standards” to aim for in developing a “World Class” Chinese university ranked in the top 100 (Beijing University and Tsinghua are aspirants) completely favors the natural sciences and virtually disregards contributions from the humanities and social sciences. Given these circumstances (see Adair, Coelho, & Luna, 2002; Leung 2007; Ward, 2007), it is highly unlikely that Asian academics will be able to produce philosophically and epistemologically autonomous bodies of work. Rather in the near future, global psychology will emerge as a patchwork quilt of pluralistic practices connected to a still dominant American center (see Liu et al., 2008; Moghaddam, 1989).

Japanese social psychology is a good example of both the variety and constraint in the patchwork quilt. Mainstream Japanese social psychology is thoroughly enmeshed in an empiricist dialogue with American social psychology on epistemic grounds set by North America. While there certainly is a small indigenous psychology movement in Japan
(see Behrens, 2004 for example), it does not have the scope or ambition of the movements in Taiwan or the Philippines. Perhaps in reaction to this, recently a dissident faction emerged in Japan challenging the mission of the mainstream on epistemic grounds, constructing arguments that pit quantitative versus qualitative methods, and contrast human science versus natural science in ways that would be very familiar to qualitative researchers in North America (see Atsumi, 2007; Sugiman, 2006).

Overall, the volume of increase in submissions to *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, from 168 in 2007 to 182 in 2008 to 210 in 2009 (a 10% increase per annum), and the massive increase in Asian authors in social psychology over the last 10 years even after controlling for the impact of *AJSP* (Haslam & Kashima, in press) point to the potential inherent in the region and its peoples. As the methodological and theoretical skills together with the cultural confidence of Asians increases following the trend-setting success of their economies, one cannot help but be excited about possible breakthroughs coming out of Asia that pierce the dichotomy between natural science and human science in innovative ways. Hence, it is fitting to close this chapter by providing a brief introduction to a few of the more prominent epistemologically informed projects that have emerged in Asian psychology in recent years.

*Three Epistemologically Informed Asian Research Projects*

The work of Hong Kong clinical psychologist David Y.F. Ho is unusual in that it is both informed by Chinese philosophy and written in English, making it accessible to
international audiences. Two of his more imaginative pieces on Chinese indigenous psychology contain an interpretative analysis of classic Chinese culture stories (Ho, 1998b) and a humorous dialogue between Confucianist and a clinical psychologist (Ho, 1989) around such culturally loaded terms as “propriety” and “impulse control”. These excursions are underpinned by a serious commitment to what he and his colleagues call methodological relationalism (Ho, Peng, Lai, & Chan, 2001). This is a general conceptual framework for the analysis of thought and action that takes a person’s embeddedness in a network of social relations as the fundamental unit of analysis: “Actions of individuals must be considered in the context of interpersonal, individual-group, individual-society, and intergroup relations. In particular, each interpersonal relationship is subject to the interactive forces of other interpersonal relationships. This consideration introduces the dialectical construct of metarelation or relation of relations.” (p. 397). Two basic analytic units are used in Ho et al.’s (2001) approach to personality and social psychology, person-in-relations (focused on the target person in different relational contexts) and persons-in-relation (focused on different persons interacting within a relational context). Their quantitative work attempts to deconstruct the hegemony of person versus situation formulations of behavior as “consistent” versus “inconsistent” by introducing an intermediate layer person-in-relations. They have argued cogently that relationships can transcend the person versus situation dichotomy, because they are neither intrinsically part of the person, nor intrinsically part of the situation, but rather situate the person in a web of relations that help them to navigate through a situation in particular ways (see Ho & Chau, 2009, for an empirical demonstration).
They have also developed a qualitative approach called investigative research (Ho, Ho, & Ng, 2006), arguing that “neither a psychology predicated on methodological individualism nor a sociology based on methodological holism is fully equipped to account for the total complexities involved” (p. 19) in understanding the relationships between individuals in society. “A social fact, though not reducible to facts about the individual, is nonetheless a fact about the social behaviour of, manifested by, individuals; and a psychological fact is a social fact wherever it refers to behaviour occurring in the presence of others, actual, imagined, or implied. Each contains and is contained by the other. A knowledge of one enhances, and a lack of knowledge of one diminishes, the understanding of the other.” (p. 19-20).

Ho, Ho, and Ng (2006) propose two metatheoretical propositions to base their research methodology on: “1. The conceptualization of psychological phenomena is, in itself, a psychological phenomenon. As a metalevel phenomenon, it requires further study. 2. The generation of psychological knowledge is culture dependent: Cultural values and presuppositions inform both the conceptualization of psychological phenomena and the methodology employed to study them. Accordingly, the role of the knowledge generator, given his or her cultural values and presuppositions, cannot be separated or eliminated from the process of knowledge generation. These propositions do not necessarily negate positivism. Rather, they challenge positivism to have greater sensitivity to culture dependence and to broaden its scope of investigation.” (p. 22). At this point, rather than elaborating their epistemological position, they argue for reflexivity in applying three
“intellectual attitudes germane to investigative research” based on the two presuppositions. These appear to be pragmatic and dialectical, but grounded in realist epistemology: “The first stresses the importance of critically examining the evidence in the truth-seeking process. The second confronts the inherently complex, even deceptive, nature of social phenomena; vigilance against deception is integral to seeking truth. The third sees the recognition of ignorance and knowledge generation as twin aspects of the same process.” (p. 22). Rather than offer any standard techniques or procedures, they describe investigative research as “disciplined, naturalistic, and in-depth”, guaranteeing data quality and acting in the service of social conscience.

Ho et al. (2006) advocate BOTH the use of reflexivity AND moving from exploration to confirmation (e.g., from qualitative exposition to quantitative hypothesis testing) as research methods. They state their admiration for good investigative reporting produced by journalists (e.g., in their verification of source information and their dedication to truth seeking), but do not state in a clear, programmatic way how such journalistic training could be applied to social science research. From the perspective of the Western trained methodologist, Ho et al. (2006)’s program might not appear sufficiently compelling—it is lacking in details, and the thorny questions of confrontation between truth value and desire to do good in the process of investigative research are not articulated. But the Asian ontological and epistemological systems described previously can help Western scholars to make sense of this desire and their pragmatic means of achieving it. For Ho, Ng, and Ho (2007), reifying a dividing line between qualitative forms of “human
science” and quantitative forms of “natural science” just doesn’t make sense, and they react against this with an almost moral sense of indignation.

Thirty years of work by Taiwanese social psychologist Kwang-guo Hwang describes a research program in indigenous Chinese psychology built on foundations of traditional Chinese theories of knowledge. Whereas Ho could be described as something of a lone wolf, working out an epistemologically sophisticated program of indigenous research in a Hong Kong social science thoroughly entrained by Western paradigms, Hwang has had the good fortune to have spent his career working within and contributing to a highly developed and collaborative indigenous psychology in Taiwan (Hwang, 2005b; Yang, 1999). Whereas Ho’s primary dialogue partners are Westerners and Westernized or bicultural Asians, the capstone of Hwang’s (2009) work, *Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research* was written in Chinese and directed towards Chinese social scientists. Because Hwang’s prodigious output consists mainly of books written in Chinese whose thrust is theoretical rather than empiricist, the work is almost impossible to do justice in a few paragraphs. It is possible here only to give a flavor of the work. It should be noted that while Hwang is situated in social psychology, he has read widely in the philosophy of science and the sociology of science, and his writing is clearly directed towards social scientists and not just psychologists.

Hwang’s (2009, 2006, 2005b, 2005c) mission is to realize a comprehensive epistemology of social sciences for Chinese (and by extension other non-Westerners) that provides the
philosophical foundations for engaging in fruitful dialogue with one another and Westerners. Hwang’s (2009, 2006, 2005b, 2005c) project is consistent with Mou’s basic premise that different philosophical and cultural traditions provide alternative (and overlapping) ontological bases for constructing the phenomenology of subjective experience and the epistemology of its examination. The foundational statement of his work on Confucian relationalism was a model of face and favor (Hwang, 1987) that analyzed the inner structure of Confucianism for managing social relations and social exchange. In his book on Knowledge and Action, Hwang (1995) argued that Western culture emphasizes the importance of philosophy for pursuing knowledge, while Chinese cultural traditions of Taoism, Confucianism, Legalism and Martial School are concerned about wisdom for action. Consistent with an approach based on constructive realism (Wallner & Jandl, 2006), Hwang (1995) argues that since psychology’s foundations and current practices are grounded in Western philosophy, genuine progress in indigenous psychology comes through constructing a scientific micro-world consistent with Western philosophy, while maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the influence of Chinese cultural traditions on the daily life of Chinese people. To familiarize Chinese social scientists with the major schools of Western philosophical thought influencing social science thinking, he wrote The Logic of Social Science in Chinese. Hwang (2006) recognizes that to construct a coherent scientific micro-world, social scientists must not only be able to recognize themselves as fish swimming in a phenomenological sea of cultural constructions, but they must be able to translate these insights into the systematic forms that scientific micro-worlds require. Moreover, these micro-worlds often share
much in common with one another, so that communication and translation of concepts between them is a critical feature of scientific and phenomenological insight.

Based on a philosophy of post-positivism, his summary work *Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research* emphasizes that the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is the construction of a scientific micro-world constituted by a series of theories that reflect both universal human minds in general, as well as the particular mentalities of a given culture. In view of the fact that most theories of Western social psychology have been constructed on the presumption of individualism, Hwang (2009) explained how he constructed the Face and Favor model (Hwang, 1987) with four elementary forms of social behavior and used it as a framework to analyze the deep structure of Confucianism (Hwang, 2001a). Then he illustrated the nature of Confucian ethics in sharp contrast to Western ethics and constructed a series of theories based on relationalism to illuminate social exchange, the concept of face, achievement motivation, organizational behaviors, and conflict resolution in Confucian societies.

Hwang’s (2009) project lays out the foundations and the call for programmatic development for what could be decades of research in indigenous social science, particularly if in the future mainland Chinese decide to pursue this avenue of research. In Taiwan, students and professors from all around attend his seminars at National Taiwan University. But Hwang is primarily a theorist rather than an empiricist, and so this is a slow developing project that is focused on the big picture. We should not expect to see
immediate results. Rather, as the Chinese Culture Connection (1987) noted, one of the most salient characteristics of Chinese people is long-term orientation, and in the 21st century Chinese will need time in the order of decades to work out their response in the social sciences to the foundations and practices laid out by the West.

Recent work from Indian scholars to draw from their great philosophical traditions to create a metaphysically-oriented psychology is another topic of international interest. According to a recent definitional statement by Dalal & Misra (in press), “More than materialistic-deterministic aspects of human existence, IP (Indian Psychology) takes a more inclusive spiritual-growth perspective on human existence. In this sense no clear distinction is made between psychology, philosophy and spirituality, as conjointly they constitute a comprehensive and practical knowledge or wisdom about human life.”

Hence, what appears consistent among Asian scholars drawing from their massive and distinct traditions is a questioning of Western ontology, and reconsideration of whether discretely methodological forms of knowing should hold such a privileged position in generating and reifying social science knowledge (Bhawuk, 2008a; Paranjpe, 1984). But there are differences as well. If Chinese philosophical traditions have drawn Chinese social psychologists into thinking about social relatedness and holistic interconnectedness as fundamental ontological postulates, Indian philosophical traditions have a similar pull into the spiritual depths (Bhawuk, 2003) of the phenomenology, epistemology, and practice of Self (atman).
Sinha (1933), as cited by Bhawuk (2008b) described Indian psychology as based on metaphysics. Rather than beginning with Erickson or Freud, Indian scholars like Paranjpe (1998) begin with Vedic traditions like the Upanishads, among whose basic tenets is that “truth should be realized, rather than simply known intellectually” (Bhawuk, in press). According to Bharati, 1985, as cited in Bhawuk, 2008b, “The self has been studied as "an ontological entity" in Indian philosophy for time immemorial, and "far more intensively and extensively than any of the other societies" in the east (Confucian, Chinese, or Japanese) or the west (either secular thought or Judeo-Christian-Muslim traditions)”. The basic methodology is the practice of meditation, and the goal of meditative practices is to uncover the nature of the true self (atman), unencumbered by even such a fundamental phenomenological unity as time (Bhawuk, 2008b; Rao & Paranjpe, 2008). Even the basic dividing line between the knower and the known cannot be maintained if the meditative practices of Indian philosophy are accepted as an important and valid form of knowledge. In marked contrast to Chinese philosophers’ tendency to maintain distinctions (li-i-fen-shu, one principle, many manifestations) while seeking for unity (tien-ren-ho-i, heaven and humanity in union, see S.H. Liu, 1989b, or Liu & Liu, 1999), Indian philosophers have plumbed the very depths of knowing to collapse even basic polarities such as good and evil, or being and non-being under the glare of intuitive illumination (see Paranjpe, 2008, for a comparison of Indian and Western perspectives).

The contemporary Indian Psychology movement appears to be in the process of constructing a psychology of self that is simultaneously a practice of self-realization.
Bhawuk has gone so far as to propose a general methodology for translating classic Indian scriptures into psychological models of theory and practice: “For example, in the second canto of the Bhagavad-Gita a process of how desire and anger cause one’s downfall is presented. The sixty-second verse delineates this process by stating that when a person thinks about sense objects, he or she develops an attachment to it. Attachment leads to desire, and from desire anger is manifested. The sixty-third verse further develops this causal link by stating that anger leads to confusion (sammaoha) or clouding of discretion about what is right or wrong, confusion to bewilderment, to loss of memory or what one has learned in the past, to destruction of buddhi (i.e., intellect or wisdom) to the downfall of the person or his or her destruction” (Bhawuk, in press).

Even a cursory reader of Bhawuk’s work will recognize that the phenomenological layer of concepts described in Indian psychology are not only distinct from comparable Western concepts, but also systematic and compelling once their internal logic is discerned. Bhawuk does not appear to privilege any Western forms of empiricism or phenomenology in terms of validating or providing an understanding of this system. Similarly, advocates of the transcendental meditation were quite happy for Western scientists to measure them during meditation and find that their oxygen consumption and heart rate decreased, skin resistance increased, and electroencephalographs showed changes in frequencies suggesting low stress (Bhawuk, 2008a; see Rao & Paranjpe, 2008 for a more detailed review). This scientific knowledge did not change the subjective practice and goals of transcendental meditation one bit.
Bhawuk’s (in press, 2008b) models are entirely theoretical at this point: in Hwang’s (2009, 2006) terms they represent a translation of the philosophical micro-world of Indian philosophy into a psychological micro-world of relationships between variables: how this translation will then impact on the cultural macro-world of the practice of Indian religions by lay people or inspire qualitative or quantitative investigation is anyone’s guess. It is mind-boggling to realize that one of the most profound statements on the consequences of anger and desire on the human condition, known and practiced for millennia as part of the root philosophy of one of the world’s great cultures, has only recently made its entry into the psychological literature (see Bhawuk, 1999, 2008b). Bhawuk (in press) carefully situates his construction of psychological models within the context of his daily meditative practices and as part of his family life. The dualism of qualitative versus quantitative methodologies never comes up as an issue in his writing. His quest is to expand the boundaries of science, not divide it into analytical portions circumscribed by methodological differences that seem almost quaint besides the monumental questions of being and non-being, time and permanence, probed by Indian philosophy (Bhawuk, 1999).

By comparing Indian culture with the culture of science, Bhawuk (2008a) argued that science itself has a culture, which is characterized by tenets like objectivity, impersonalness, reductionism, and rejection of the indeterminate. He cautioned that as cultural or cross-cultural researchers we needed to be sensitive to the fact that science also has a culture, and adopting worldviews, models, questions, and methods that are characteristic of indigenous cultures, especially those of non-Western origin, might benefit our research. He stressed the need for crossing disciplinary boundaries, and
recommended that we go beyond multiple-method and use multi-paradigmatic research strategies to understand various worldviews in their own contexts. A team of researchers from various academic discipline can help us find linkages across disciplines and paradigms.

**Conclusion**

While each of the three programs reviewed above are exceptional, it is necessary to situate them within the greater flows of history and institutional practices that characterize social science research in Asia. Ho, Hwang, and Bhawuk mobilize the intellectual capital inherent in their cultures to innovate original solutions to perennial problems in social science. The first two are senior scholars towards the final phase of their careers, whereas the third is a senior scholar in his prime; none of them is under survival pressures in terms of career development. The far more typical submission to *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* or other major culture-oriented journals in psychology is a replication of a Western model with minor variations, the primary justification for which is “no data from XXX (fill in the country) has to their knowledge been collected to test this model”. Social psychological research in Asia can be characterized by tension between scholars living within a phenomenological layer of cultural constructions as a visible part of their everyday life, and producing English language publications that are devoid of such meaningful content and dedicated towards the pragmatics of career advancement according to top-down standards imported from the “best” (read Western) universities³.

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³ Asian education systems emphasize rote learning, and Asian educated scholars often do not realize that pure rote learning (i.e., replication without innovation) is not valued in most international journals.
The pockets of innovation cited here have not changed the overall institutional climate favoring natural science research and practices in Asia, nor have they touched the publications prestige gradient, where English language (JCI/SSCI) journals are valued above local language outputs4. Asian social psychologists appear highly pragmatic in carving out their careers amidst a disjuncture between their subjective experiences and dominant institutional practices (see Adair et al., 2002, for bibliometric evidence of the massive extent of Western dominance of the published literature in psychology, and Haslam & Kashima, in press for challenges to this trend).

Some researchers working with qualitative paradigms in Western institutions have made highly conscious, sometimes ethical choices in working with particular methodologies. At best their work reflects the polish and cohesiveness of intellectual rigor. At worst it dissolves into hair-splitting methodolatry, and promotion of group interests using methodology as a means of academic combat. Researchers in Asian institutions seem typically to be more pragmatic, at worst sublimating their phenomenological experiences into whatever methodological paradigm is dominant and can be used to promote self advancement, and at best developing late in their careers an ecumenical and innovative orientation towards methodology. To change the shape of this gradient, it would be necessary for there to be more collaboration and communication between open-minded

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4 It is more, not less difficult for Asians who have learned English as a second language to publish in international qualitative compared to quantitative journals. A bibliometric study on international social psychology publications by Haslam & Kashima (in press) reported that the Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Asian Journal of Social Psychology, and Journal of Social Psychology were the most popular outlets for Asian authors: all of these are predominantly quantitative in orientation, though AJSP also publishes qualitative papers and the other two culture-oriented journals have had recent special issues on qualitative forms of inquiry.
Westerners with influence on international journals and Asian scholars with a passion for probing the depths of their cultural resources and expanding the breadth of their disciplinary practices (see Liu et al., 2008). In this process, bicultural members of the Asian academic diaspora have and will continue to play a major role (Liu & Ng, 2007).

In the interim, Asian scholars working pragmatically in disciplines not of their cultural making can operate at the margins to adopt an alternative system of meaning for reconciling the disjuncture between their phenomenological experience of the world as a cultural construction and their professional judgment of how to best further their careers. To illustrate with personal experience, early in my career I would sometimes write quantitative descriptive papers without hypotheses and be forced into a hypothetico-deductive model by international journal editors. At this point in mid-career, I have internalized mainstream psychological discourses to such an extent that writing in such a mode requires little effort and has significant benefits. But in terms of meaning, I regard the hypothetico-deductive model in psychology as a post-hoc explanatory model rather than as a universal model of prediction and control. This is not to deny there might be a deep structure that underlies human psychology, but even where it exists, this deep structure can only find expression through interactions with the phenomenological layer of subjective experiences that is mediated by culture’s concepts and an institutional layer of societal governance. Therefore, I treat all statements of causality in psychology as contingent upon the phenomenological and institutional layer operating in the situation at the time of survey or experiment administration. In my own papers I articulate this symbolic layer of meaning with great detail, and I tend to be cautious about other more
careless statements of universality. In some sense, I do treat social psychology, in Kenneth Gergen’s (1973) famous phrase, as history (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu & Liu, 1997), but I do not see how privileging qualitative methodology over quantitative methodology or vice versa solves the problem of the historical and cultural contingency of human behavior. When I write for quantitative journals, I follow their dominant discourses and practices for communicating how the phenomenological layer of culture conditions individual behavior, emotion and cognition; when I write for qualitative journals, I do the same thing (Liu & Mills, 2006). I view methodologies as no more and no less than different prisms through which the objects of inquiry are refracted and communicated. In terms of their relative strengths, qualitative research is useful for telling us the what of a phenomenon, and quantitative research the how much, how prevalent, and under what conditions is it causal?

Putting these together, Liu and Sibley (in press) advocate four steps in the interweaving of qualitative and quantitative methods to describe and prescribe national political cultures. (1) Ascertaining the symbolic landscape through open-ended survey methods that give an overview of the major historically warranted symbols prevalent in a society; this may include quantitative analysis techniques and representative samples, but must involve open-ended inquiry. (2) Describing the discursive repertoires that make use of political symbols in everyday talk through various institutionally mediated channels; this may involve archival analysis, interview, or focus group methods, the key is to examine naturalistic discourse for thematic content. (3) Operationalizing symbolic representations as legitimizing myths or ideologies by converting naturally occurring talk to quantitative
scale measures or experimental conditions; making maximum use of empiricist techniques to make causal inferences. (4) Moving from representation to action using both empirical findings and personal reflexivity as resources; applying findings from social science with a full awareness of their conditional and contingent nature when giving policy advice.

As the editor of a journal, I am open to either or both modes of communication (Liu, 2008), but I believe that a researcher must understand the internal logic of each prism in order to be able to blend and transcend their influences. I see the ultimate arbitrator of methodology as value, and I see value as having an ontological status that precedes rather than being derived from epistemology. The two research values I subscribe to besides truth value (see Liu & Liu, 1999) are (1) indigenous compatibility (Yang, 2000)—to what extent does the research reflect the phenomenology of cultural and institutional systems from which observations were derived, and (2) practical value—to what extent does the research provide subjective utility to academic and lay communities the researcher is resides within. I believe the future for Asian social psychology, to paraphrase Atsumi (2007), is to fly with the two wings of scientific inquiry and practical utility. It is in the latter area where I hope that an Asian social psychology unencumbered by dualism will be able to make substantial breakthroughs in the future (Liu et al., 2008; Liu & Liu, 2003).

In conclusion, S.H. Liu (1989a) summarizes the methodological advice of Hsiung Shih-Li, another eminent neo-Confucian philosopher (and a teacher of Mou Tsung-san) as
follows: “The scientific way of thinking has to posit an external physical world as having an independent existence of its own. From a pragmatic point of view this procedure is perfectly justifiable. But it has the danger of hypostatizing functions into ontological substances and hence committing a metaphysical fallacy. In order to guard against the natural tendency of man to fall into such a naïve attitude, philosophy has to adopt two important methodological procedures. In the first place, we have to appeal to a specific analytical method which purports to destroy all attempts to identify phenomenal functions with ontological principle itself by finding out all the contradiction or absurdities involved in such untenable metaphysical conjectures” (p. 25). On the first point, qualitative researchers have done well, constructing a phalanx of ‘posts’ to deconstruct naïve attempts to reify natural science models into human science. But Hsiung’s second point is more radical, and cuts right to the heart of what it means to be a social scientist and a human being: “this is exactly what the Buddhist philosophy has done in attempting to sweep away phenomena in order to realize the ontological depth of all beings. However, in adopting these negative procedures of the Buddhist philosophy one is tempted to emphasize only the silent aspect of the ontological principle and neglect its creative aspect. In the second place, therefore, we have to appeal to a specific method of inner illumination. It is only through such illumination that we are able to realize the infinite creative power of the ontological principle.” (p. 25).

The great Asian philosophical traditions of both China and India recognize the possibility of both sensible intuition and intuitive illumination. They converge in both providing theories of not only knowledge, but practice. Indian philosophers have delved most
deeply into the nature of self, and contemporary Indian psychologists have developed this into a body of knowledge with both theoretical and practical implications. Chinese philosophers have synthesized Indian philosophical insights (particularly those of the Buddhists) to develop a moral metaphysics that leads directly to a psychology of ethical social relations. While these are early days in the development of indigenous psychologies, there is hope for the future as the 21st century unfolds. The twin scourges of the end of cheap oil and the continuation of global warming will likely require a more practically-oriented social science (see Liu et al. 2008), particularly in developing societies where these challenges will be felt most keenly. In the critical transition period between a fossil fuel driven global economy and a mixed energy economy, there is the possibility that the epistemological breakthroughs in Asian philosophy may be translated into concrete practices of social science where quantitative and qualitative methods are used like hand and glove to assist societal development and creating global consciousness. In their summary of open-ended survey data from 24 societies on representations of world history, Liu et al. (2009) commented that “If there is a lay narrative of history, it might be that out of suffering comes great things” (p. 678). Conversely, even if the sky does not fall down, it may still be useful to work on the margins to connect the centers of an increasingly interconnected world of parallel and distributed cultural values (Liu, 2008/9).
References


